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SUMMARY 
 
 
This dissertation is devoted to empirically contrasting the Suppositional Theory of 
conditionals, which holds that indicative conditionals serve the purpose of engaging in 
hypothetical thought, and Inferentialism, which holds that indicative conditionals 
express reason relations. Throughout a series of experiments, probabilistic and truth-
conditional variants of Inferentialism are investigated using new stimulus materials, 
which manipulate previously overlooked relevance conditions. These studies are some 
of the first published studies to directly investigate the central claims of Inferentialism 
empirically.  
In contrast, the Suppositional Theory of conditionals has an impressive track 
record through more than a decade of intensive testing. The evidence for the 
Suppositional Theory encompasses three sources. Firstly, direct investigations of the 
probability of indicative conditionals, which substantiate “the Equation” (P(if A, then C) 
= P(C|A)). Secondly, the pattern of results known as “the defective truth table” effect, 
which corroborates the de Finetti truth table. And thirdly, indirect evidence from the 
uncertain and-to-if inference task.   
 Through four studies each of these sources of evidence are scrutinized anew 
under the application of novel stimulus materials that factorially combine all 
permutations of prior and relevance levels of two conjoined sentences. The results 
indicate that the Equation only holds under positive relevance (P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) > 0) 
for indicative conditionals. In the case of irrelevance (P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) = 0), or 
negative relevance (P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) < 0), the strong relationship between P(if A, then 
C) and P(C|A) is disrupted. This finding suggests that participants tend to view natural 
language conditionals as defective under irrelevance and negative relevance (Chapter 
2). Furthermore, most of the participants turn out only to be probabilistically coherent 
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above chance levels for the uncertain and-to-if inference in the positive relevance 
condition, when applying the Equation (Chapter 3). Finally, the results on the truth 
table task indicate that the de Finetti truth table is at most descriptive for about a 
third of the participants (Chapter 4).   
 Conversely, strong evidence for a probabilistic implementation of Inferentialism 
could be obtained from assessments of P(if A, then C) across relevance levels (Chapter 
2) and the participants’ performance on the uncertain-and-to-if inference task 
(Chapter 3). Yet the results from the truth table task suggest that these findings could 
not be extended to truth-conditional Inferentialism (Chapter 4). On the contrary, 
strong dissociations could be found between the presence of an effect of the reason 
relation reading on the probability and acceptability evaluations of indicative 
conditionals (and connate sentences), and the lack of an effect of the reason relation 
reading on the truth evaluation of the same sentences. A bird’s eye view on these 
surprising results is taken in the final chapter and it is discussed which perspectives 
these results open up for future research.     
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
Diese Abhandlung widmet sich der empirischen Gegenüberstellung der suppositio-
nellen Theorie der Konditionalsätze und dem Inferentialismus. Laut der suppositio-
nellen Theorie liegt die Hauptfunktion indikativer Konditionalsätzen darin, hypothe-
tischem Denken zu veranlassen, während der Inferentialismus behauptet, dass sie 
Begründungsrelationen ausdrücken. Anhand einer Reihe von Experimenten werden 
probabilistische und wahrheitsbasierte Varianten des Inferentialismus mit neuen 
Stimulusmaterialien untersucht, die zuvor übersehene Relevanzbedingungen 
manipulieren. Die in dieser Abhandlung vorgestellten Studien gehören zu den ersten 
Veröffentlichungen, die die zentralen Aussagen des Inferentialismus auf direkte Weise 
empirisch überprüfen.  
Im Gegensatz dazu weist die suppositionelle Theorie durch mehr als ein 
Jahrzehnt intensiver Tests eine beeindruckende Erfolgsbilanz auf. Die Befunde für die 
suppositionelle Theorie setzten sich aus drei Quellen zusammen. Erstens, direkte 
Untersuchungen der Wahrscheinlichkeit indikativer Konditionalsätze, welche die 
Gültigkeit von „the Equation“ (P(wenn A, dann C) = P(C|A)) bestätigen. Zweitens, ein 
Ergebnismuster, das als „defekte Wahrheitstabelle“ bezeichnet wird und die               
de Finetti Wahrheitstabelle belegt. Drittens, indirektes Beweismaterial durch 
ungewisse „and-to-if“ Schlussfolgerungen.  
Durch vier Studien wird jede dieser Beweisquellen erneut überprüft. Dazu 
werden neue Stimulusmaterialien angewandt, die alle Permutationen von A-priori-
Wahrscheinlichkeiten und Relevanzbedingungen zweier miteinander verbundener 
Sätze faktoriell kombinieren. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass „the Equation“ für 
indikative Konditionalsätze lediglich unter positiver Relevanz (P(C|A) - P(C|¬A) > 0) gilt. 
Im Fall von Irrelevanz (P(C|A) - P(C|¬A) = 0)  oder negativer Relevanz (P(C|A) - P(C|¬A) 
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< 0) wird die starke Beziehung zwischen P(wenn A, dann C) und P(C|A) unterbrochen. 
Der Grund dafür dürfte sein, dass TeilnehmerInnen dazu tendieren, Konditionalsätze in 
natürlicher Sprache unter diesen Bedingungen als defekt zu betrachten (2. Kapitel). 
Weiterhin erweisen sich nur bei der positiven Relevanz-bedingung die meisten 
TeilnehmerInnen als probabilistisch kohärenter als das Zufallsniveau für ungewisse 
„and-to-if“ Schlussfolgerungen, wenn die „Equation“ als gültig vorausgesetzt wird (3. 
Kapitel). Letztendlich deuten die Ergebnisse der Wahrheitstabellen-Aufgaben darauf 
hin, dass die de Finetti Wahrheitstabelle die Antworten von höchstens ein Drittel der 
Teilnehmer beschreibt (4. Kapitel).  
Anderseits lassen sich überzeugende Belege für die probabilistische Variante 
des Inferentialismus sowohl der Bewertung von P(wenn A, dann C) unter 
Relevanzbedingungen (2. Kapitel) als auch der Performanz der Teilnehmer in der 
ungewissen „and-to-if“ Schlussfolgerungen unter Relevanzbedingungen (3. Kapitel) 
erbringen. Im Gegensatz dazu sprechen die Ergebnisse der Wahrheitstabellen-Aufgabe 
eher gegen die wahrheitsbasierte Variante des Inferentialismus (4. Kapitel). Vielmehr 
deutet das Ergebnismuster darauf hin, dass starke Dissoziationen zwischen dem 
Einfluss von Relevanzbedingungen auf Einschätzungen von Wahrscheinlichkeiten und 
dem fehlenden Einfluss derselben auf Wahrheitsbeurteilungen gefunden werden 
können. Während der wahrgenommene Begründungszusammenhang von Anteze-
denz und Konsequent die Zuschreibung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten indikativer 
Konditionalsätze (sowie verwandter Sätze) stark beeinflusst, wurde kaum Einfluss auf 
Wahrheitsbeurteilungen derselben Sätze gefunden. Im abschließenden Kapitel werden 
diese überraschenden Ergebnisse von einem höheren Blickwinkel aus betrachtet und 
mögliche Erweiterungen für zukünftige Forschung erörtert.    
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Conditionals continue to receive much attention in psychology, philosophy, linguistics, 
and computer science (Bennett, 2003; Douven, 2015; Nickerson 2015). Indeed the 
literature on conditionals is so vast that it is difficult for researchers to keep track of its 
many branches within a single discipline and nearly impossible to keep track of it 
across disciplines. Part of the reason is that as much as researchers agree on the 
centrality of conditionals for understanding human reasoning and argumentation, as 
much do they disagree over how exactly to understand their semantic content 
(Edgington, 2014), pragmatics, computational models (Oaksford and Chater, 2010), 
and logical principles (Arlo-Costa, 2007).     
In adding to this literature, the present dissertation selects a somewhat narrow 
scope by focusing on the empirical content of two theories of indicative conditionals in 
contemporary philosophy and psychology of reasoning. On the one hand, the 
Suppositional Theory of conditionals which was originally imported to the psychology 
of reasoning from formal epistemology. On the other, Inferentialism which is based on 
an old idea in philosophy that conditionals can be viewed as condensed arguments. 
While the Suppositional Theory of conditionals has established an impressive track 
record through more than a decade of intensive empirical testing (Over and Evans, 
2003; Evans and Over, 2004; Over and Cruz, forthcoming), the empirical testing of the 
more recent introduction of Inferentialism into the psychology of reasoning (Spohn, 
2013; Olsen, 2014; Douven 2015; Krzyżanowska, 2015; Skovgaard-Olsen 2015, 2016) 
still represents uncharted territory. Indeed, one of the main goals of the present 
dissertation is exactly to embark on the empirical investigation of Inferentialism 
through a series of experiments outlined in Chapters 2-4. Like Douven, Elqayam, 
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Singmann, Over, and Wijnbergen-Huitink (forthcoming), these studies represent some 
of the first attempts to investigate the psychological merits of Inferentialism directly. 
Before presenting the studies themselves, this introduction will briefly cover 
some of the theoretical background for the Suppositional Theory of conditionals, 
outline some of the existing empirical results corroborating the theory, and identify 
three experimental paradigms that will set the frame for the rest of the dissertation. 
 
The Suppositional Theory of Conditionals 
 
In a famous footnote, Ramsey (1929/1990) suggested that two interlocutors could 
settle their argument over a conditional ‘if A, then C’ by hypothetically adding A to 
their stock of beliefs and arguing over C on that basis. As outlined in Arlo-Costa (2007), 
this little footnote outlining, what was later to become “the Ramsey test”, has inspired 
at least three opposing research programs in logics:  
 
• The AGM belief-revision theory that only works with qualitative all-or-
nothing beliefs and characterizes updating behavior under revision and 
contraction of belief states through eight axioms. The AGM theory was 
originally formulated with the goal of formulating a conditional logic 
based on principles of belief revision until Gärdenfoss proved a triviality 
theorem showing that the theory was not suitable for this intended 
purpose. Within AGM theory, the Ramsey test can be stated as follows:  
   B supports A > B iff B * A supports B 
for 'B' representing a belief set, 'A > B' representing a conditional, and    
'B * A' representing the revision of 'B' by A (Rott, 2017). 
• The Stalnaker-Lewis possible worlds semantics of conditionals that 
supplies an influential account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, 
according to which a counterfactual (i.e. ‘if A had been the case, then C 
would have occurred’) is true iff the consequent is true in all the closest 
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possible world(-s) in which the antecedent is true. In Stalnaker's notation, 
this idea is made precise by introducing the idea of a selection function, 
f(A, w), which selects the closest world (or the set of closest worlds) to w 
in which A is true. The conditional, 'A > C', is then true iff the selected A-
world(s) is a subset of the set of worlds in which C is true, [C] (Égré and 
Cozic, 2016).    
• The probabilistic semantics of indicative conditionals of Adams (1975), 
which in its original form denies that indicative conditionals have truth 
conditions, and subscribes to either P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) or acc(if A, 
then C) = acc(C|A), for ‘if A, then C’ referring to simple conditionals (which 
exclude nestings of conditionals). Here acc(if A, then C) stands for the 
acceptability of the conditional. Often this version of Adams’ thesis is 
preferred, because it is unclear whether P(if A, then C) can still be 
interpreted as a probability in light of the so-called triviality results, as we 
will see in Chapter 2 (Bradley, 2007; Douven, 2015). 
 
Through the influence of the writings of Edgington (1995) and Bennett (2003), the 
psychological hypothesis that the probability of indicative conditionals is evaluated as 
a conditional probability found its way into the psychological literature (Evans and 
Over, 2004), where it goes by the name “the Equation”. In the psychological literature, 
it is assumed that the Ramsey test is implemented by treating the false antecedent 
cases as irrelevant and assessing the ratio of A&C and A&non-C cases (Oberauer, 
Geiger, Fischer, and Weidenfeld, 2007). However, the exact mental processes involved 
in carrying out the Ramsey test still remain unknown (Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, 
Handley, and Sloman, 2007).  
Since Adams (1975) denied that indicative conditionals possess truth conditions, 
he was faced with the challenge of providing an alternative account of the validity of 
argument schemes involving conditionals. The solution he came up with was to 
introduce the notion of p-validity. An inference is p-valid, iff the uncertainty of the 
conclusion is not greater than the sum of the uncertainties of the inference’s premises 
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for all probability distributions (with the uncertainty of a proposition, p, defined as 1 – 
P(p)): [1-P(A1)] + [1-P(A2)]+…+[1-P(Ai)] ≥ 1 – P(B). The notion of p-validity generalizes 
the classical notion of deductive validity—according to which an argument schema is 
valid iff there does not exist a model in which all the premises are true and the 
conclusion is false (Garmut, 1991)—to the notion that a valid inference cannot take us 
from premises that have a high probability to a conclusion that has a low probability. 
Adams observed that this latter property of probability preservation from the 
premises to the conclusion was one that classically valid inferences had and 
introduced his more general notion of p-validity to deal with both the cases where the 
premises are uncertain and the cases in which conditionals feature as conclusions 
(Edgington, 2014).  
In the psychology of reasoning, the Suppositional Theory of conditionals 
endorsing these views is often advanced in explicit opposition to analyses of indicative 
conditionals in terms of the material implication (⊃),1 which has been widely accepted 
earlier in the psychology of reasoning. Since the material implication is logically 
equivalent to the disjunction ‘not-A or C’ it has introduction rules, which are 
appropriate for a disjunction. In classical logic a disjunction can always be inferred 
from either of its disjuncts (an inference rule known as “disjunction-introduction”). 
Consequently, if the natural language indicative conditional has the truth conditions of 
the disjunction ‘not-A or C’, then it should be possible to both infer ‘If A, then C’ from 
‘not-A’ and to infer ‘if A, then C’ from ‘C’. In Chapter 2, we will explain why these 
argument schemes, which are also known as the paradoxes of the material 
implication, are usually rejected.  
In contrast, the paradoxes of the material implication are not valid based on p-
validity, which is usually seen as a decisive advantage of the account. In addition, the 
following argument schemes would have been valid based on the material implication 
but are no longer valid based on p-validity. This too is seen as an advantage of p-
                                                             
1  The material implication is logically equivalent to ‘not-A or C’ and ‘not(A and non-C)’ 
and is thus true in all other cells of the truth table than the A and not-C cell.  
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validity, since all of these argument schemes have well-known counterexamples 
discussed in the philosophical literature (Bennett, 2003: ch. 9): 
 
Strengthening of the antecedent: 
if A, C
∴if A and B, C
 
Contraposition: 
if A, C
∴if ∼C,∼A
 
Transitivity: 
if A, B; if B, C
∴if A, C  
 
However, instead of following Adams (1975) in holding that indicative 
conditionals lack truth conditions, the proponents of the Suppositional Theory of 
conditionals in the psychology of reasoning usually take the de Finetti truth table as 
supplementing the Ramsey test (Evans and Over, 2004): 
 
Table 1. De Finetti Truth Table 
   
 
 
 
 
 
The Psychological Evidence 
On the Suppositional Theory of conditionals, the word ‘if’ owes its distinctive character 
to its role in hypothetical thought by engaging the imagination to simulate possibilities 
(Evans and Over, 2004; Evans, 2007). For more than a decade of research, the 
Suppositional Theory of conditionals has become a widely accepted theory in the 
A C If A, then C 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
void 
void 
Note. ‘⊤’ = True, ‘⊥’ = False 
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psychology of reasoning and has been gaining grounds over against the mental model 
theory, which remains a popular theory of other types of reasoning like spatial 
reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 2008). The mental model theory used to adopt the material 
implication reading of indicative conditionals (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002), but has 
recently been modified in response to persistent criticism to eschew a commitment to 
the material implication, however (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin, 2015). 
To prepare the grounds for the empirical studies reported in Chapters 2-4, the 
following two sections introduce some of the empirical evidence that has been 
accumulating for the Suppositional Theory of conditionals through this decade of 
empirical research. We will here focus on the classical truth table task and the more 
recent “probabilistic truth table task” (in Chapter 3 the uncertain and-to-if inference 
task is also discussed). For although the Wason selection task (where the participants 
are asked to select the cards needed to find out whether a conditional rule is true or 
false) and the conditional inference task (investigating the argument schemes MP, MT, 
AC, and DA) belong to some of the most studied tasks, these tasks do not produce 
separate predictions for the material implication and the Suppositional Theory of 
conditionals.2 
 
The Probabilistic Truth Table Task 
In Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003) the participants were presented with a distribution of 
2000 playing cards with colored letters on them, which crossed frequency of pq and 
the ratio of pq to p¬q across four conditions, as shown in Table 2.  
 
 
 
                                                              
2  Or I should say, at least this was the stance taken in Evans, Handley, Neilens, and Over 
(2007). In Baratgin, Over, and Politzer (2013) new predictions are made for the Suppositional 
Theory of conditionals in the Wason selection task that mimick the predictions made in 
Oaksford and Chater (2007).  
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Table 2.Frequency Distribution from Oberauer 
& Wilhelm (2003) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this experimental design, the Equation predicts that the participants’ 
assessment of, say, P(if there is an A on a card, then it is red) are sensitive only to the 
ratio of pq to p¬q. The material implication predicts that the assessment only depends 
on the relative frequency of p¬q. Yet, a conjunctive interpretation predicts that the 
probability assignment is only sensitive to the relative frequency of pq. Using this 
paradigm, Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003) found that the majority of the participants 
conformed to the Equation and that a minority of the participants followed the 
conjunctive interpretation. Moreover, in other similar experiments with frequency 
distributions and abstract stimulus materials (e.g. Evans, Handley, and Over, 2003), the 
participants generally judge P(if p, then q) as P(q|p). A minority judge P(if p, then q) as 
P(p,q) and judgments as P(¬p or q) rarely occur. 
In Evans, Handley, Neilens, and Over (2007) and Oberauer et al. (2007) individual 
variation in the conjunctive and the conditional probability responses was 
investigated. In Evans et al. (2007) it was found that 58% of the participants provided a 
conditional probability response and that 38% provided a conjunctive probability 
response (with the rest remaining unclassified), and that the participants providing the 
conditional probability response generally exhibited a higher level of cognitive ability. 
In Oberauer et al. (2007) it was found that 70% of the participants could be classified 
as providing conditional probability responses with 18% of the participants providing 
conjunctive probability responses.  
Cases HH HL LH LL 
pq 
p¬q 
¬pq 
¬p¬q 
900 
100 
500 
500 
900 
900 
100 
100 
90 
10 
950 
950 
100 
100 
900 
900 
Note. ‘HH’, high frequency of pq, high P(q|p). 
‘HL’ high freuquency of pq, low P(q|p). ‘LH’ low 
frequency of pq, high P(q|p). ‘LL’ low frequency 
of pq, low P(q|p). 
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The minority conjunctive-probability-response is puzzling since it seems to 
indicate a failure to engage with hypothetical thought, as Evans and Over (2004) point 
out. But it is compatible with mental model theory, which assumes that there are 
various levels of depth in the processing of indicative conditionals, where only creating 
a mental model of the A&C cell counts as the shallowest level of processing (Byrne and 
Johnson-Laird, 2002). Because Over et al. (2007) did not find a tendency to produce a 
conjunctive probability response pattern with realistic stimulus materials, Evans et al. 
(2007) speculate that the conjunctive response pattern may arise due to a 
combination of abstract stimulus materials and lower cognitive ability. 
 
“Defective Truth Tables” 
It has long been known that there is a tendency to treat the false antecedent cells in a 
truth table task as irrelevant for the truth value of indicative conditionals, when the 
participants are given a ternary response option. At a time when the material 
implication was the accepted model, this response pattern was dubbed ‘the defective 
truth table’. Later it has been reinterpreted as indicative of the de Finetti truth table 
(Evans and Over, 2004).  
In the following, Baratgin, Over, and Politzer (2013) will be discussed as an 
illustration of the empirical evidence corroborating the de Finetti truth table. In their 
study, Baratgin et al. (2013) not only investigate the truth evaluations of indicative 
conditionals (‘If A then C’) but also of conditional bets (‘I bet that if A then C’). In the 
Bayesian tradition, subjective degrees of beliefs as measured by probability 
assignments are operationalized by betting quotients, where the participants have to 
make decisions about their relative preferences of betting on events described by pair 
of propositions. In the Bayesian literature on indicative conditionals going back to 
Ramsey and de Finetti, the indicative conditional is often compared to conditional 
bets. This comparision is meant to convey the idea that just as a conditional bet is 
rendered void, if the antecedent turns out to be false, so indicative conditionals 
possess an indeterminate truth value in the false antecedent cells of their truth tables. 
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Or as Baratgin et al. (2013: 309) put it: “When A turns out to be false, no indicative 
assertion or bet is made”.  
 Using deductive instructions where A and C were treated as certain, Politzer, 
Over, and Baratgin (2010) tested the 2x2 de Finetti table (see Table 1) both for 
indicative conditionals and conditional bets by asking the participants to make ternary 
truth evaluations, or win/lose evaluations, for every cell of the truth table. The results 
of their study were found to support Table 1. However, often in the so-called new 
Paradigm of psychology of reasoning, probabilistic instructions (where the premises 
are treated as uncertain and the response format is one of degrees of belief) are 
preferred over deductive instructions (where the premises are treated as certain and 
the participants are asked to make categorical judgments, Singmann and Klauer, 
2011). For this reason, Baratgin et al. (2013) decided to replicate Politzer et al.’s (2010) 
results for the relation between indicative conditionals and conditional bets using the 
following 3x3 de Finetti table (see Table 3), where A and C are allowed to be uncertain:  
 
    Table 3. De Finetti Truth Table 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To introduce the uncertainty manipulation, the participants were presented 
with photos of two opaque boxes containing black/white and round/square chips. 
Occasionally, a chip from the top box would drop into the bottom box and the 
participants were presented with a photograph of how the chips looked as they 
A C If A, then C 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
U 
U 
U 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
U 
⊥ 
⊤ 
U 
⊥ 
⊤ 
U 
⊥ 
⊤ 
U 
⊥ 
U 
U 
U 
U 
U 
U 
Note. ‘U’ = Uncertain ‘⊤’ = True, ‘⊥’ = 
False 
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passed the empty space between the two boxes. These photographs could in turn be 
taken by cameras with different filters. As a result, under one condition the 
black/white chips might look grey (in which case the color of the chip would be 
indeterminate) or the shape might be indiscernible. Consequently, the participants 
could either be presented with information that conclusively confirm which color or 
shape the chips had while they passed from the top box to the bottom box 
(corresponding to the ⊤ and ⊥ cells of Table 3). Alternatively, the participants might be 
left in a state of uncertainty with respect to these attributes due to the blurring of the 
filters (corresponding to the U cells of Table 3). 
The participants were instructed that two children would be playing with a 
game containing these two boxes, where one of the children would pick a chip at 
random from the top box and let it drop down into the lower box and the second child 
had to guess which chip it was. As part of this game, the second child would then 
make conditional assertions (e.g. “If the chip is round, then it is white”) or conditional 
bets (e.g. “I bet that if the chip is round, then it is white”). The task of the participants 
was to give a ternary response about whether the conditional assertion was certainly 
true/false or neither nor, or the conditional bet had been certainly won/lost or neither 
nor, for each of the nine truth table cells in Table 3.  
The results showed that there were no significant differences between the 
participants’ responses to indicative conditionals and conditional bets and that when 
the 2x2 cells were considered for indicative conditionals, 38.6% agreed with the de 
Finetti truth table, 35.6% responded according to the conjunction, and 13.9% 
responded according to the material implication. Considering the remaining five cells 
of the 3x3 tables, more than half of the participants were classified as following the de 
Finetti truth table. The rest were classified according to other three-valued truth 
tables known in the literature. Again these results provide support for the de Finetti 
2x2 and 3x3 truth tables and for the parallel between indicative conditionals and 
conditional bets, which in turn corroborates the Suppositional Theory of conditionals. 
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Inferentialism  
In the chapters to come we will go more into details with Inferentialism, or the 
relevance approach to conditionals, as it was called in Skovgaard-Olsen (2016).  
Inferentialism holds that indicative conditionals express inferential relations, or 
reason relations (defined in Chaper 2). On the strong reading, Inferentialism makes 
reason relations part of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals ("truth 
conditional Inferentialism") and rejects the validity of 'A∧C ⊨ if A, then C’ (Douven, 
2015; Krzyżanowska, 2015). Truth-conditional Inferentialism rejects the validity of this 
argument scheme, because the indicative conditional is viewed as expressing a reason 
relation and the mere truth of A and C does not ensure that they are inferentially 
connected. Rejecting the validity of the and-to-inference is a distinguishing feature of 
this approach, since and-to-if inferences are trivially valid on the material implication 
account and on accounts of conditionals that are inspired by the Ramsey test (Douven, 
2015). 
In Chapter 4, truth-conditional Inferentialism is tested directly by introducing a 
relevance manipulation into the truth table task. In Chapters 2-3, a weaker 
probabilistic implementation of Inferentialism is investigated by measuring the 
participants’ probability assignments to indicative conditionals and their reasoning on 
the uncertain-and-to-if inference task to investigate whether the participants view 
indicative conditionals as defective when they fail to express a reason relation.  
Putting the Two Theories to the Test 
To contrast Inferentialism and the Suppositional Theory experimentally, the following 
paradigms were selected: (1) assessments of P(if A, then C) and the classical truth 
table task, because they are among the most frequently cited sources of evidence for 
the Suppositional Theory in the literature, and (2) the uncertain-and-to-if inference, 
because and-to-if inferences have been identified as diagnostic for deciding between 
Inferentialism and the Suppositional Theory.  
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The general idea behind these experiments is to test how robust the 
Suppositional Theory is under extreme conditions. To make an analogy: for a 
researcher interested in examining rationality, it makes sense to study cases of 
irrationality to investigate the boundary conditions and limitations of human 
rationality. For a researcher interested in studying text comprehension, and how the 
participants make sense of a string of connected passages, it is a valuable research 
strategy to study cases where participants are challenged and experience difficulties in 
deciphering the meaning of concatenated strings of words. Similarly, for researchers 
interested in studying relevance, and our use of conditionals to express reason 
relations, it is a sound research strategy to systematically investigate cases where 
relevance and reason relations break down. In Chapters 2-4, a series of experiments 
are conducted that did exactly this. Because most published studies prior to their 
publication tended to use stimulus materials where the antecedent is probability 
raising for the consequent for realistic stimulus materials (positive relevance), a 
central motive behind conducting these experiments was to create conditions that 
allow for violations of positive relevance. In each case, the goal was to investigate 
whether the patterns we find for positive relevance generalize to the pathological 
cases, where the antecedent lowers the probability of the consequent (negative 
relevance), or leaves it unchanged (irrelevance). 
In Chapter 2, an experiment is reported that employed this research strategy for 
investigations of P(if A, then C) and Acc(if A, then C). In Chapter 3 an experiment is 
reported that employed it for the uncertain and-to-if inference task. And, finally, in 
Chapter 4 experiments are reported that employed it for the truth evaluation, 
probability and acceptability evaluations for conditionals and related connectives.   
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Abstract 
More than a decade of research has found strong evidence for P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) 
(“the Equation”). We argue, however, that this hypothesis provides an overly 
simplified picture due to its inability to account for relevance. We manipulated 
relevance in the evaluation of the probability and acceptability of indicative 
conditionals and found that relevance moderates the effect of P(C|A). This 
corroborates the Default and Penalty Hypothesis put forward in this paper. Finally, the 
probability and acceptability of concessive conditionals (“Even if A, then still C”) were 
investigated and it was found that the Equation provides a better account of 
concessive conditionals than of indicatives across relevance manipulations.  
 Keywords: Indicative conditionals, the New Paradigm, relevance, reasons, 
concessive conditionals, the Equation. 
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Introduction 
In philosophy, there is a widely shared consensus that Stalnaker’s Hypothesis is wrong 
and that Adams’ Thesis is correct, due to formal problems affecting the former but not 
the latter – known as the triviality results.   
 
STALNAKER’S HYPOTHESIS: P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) for all probability distributions 
where P(A) > 0 and ‘If A, then C’ expresses a proposition.  
 
ADAMS’ THESIS: Acc(if A, then C) = P(C|A) for all simple conditionals (i.e. conditionals 
whose antecedent and consequent clauses are not themselves conditionals), 
where ‘Acc(if A, then C)’ denotes the degree of acceptability of ‘If A, then C’.4 
 
TRIVIALITY RESULTS: Lewis’ triviality results show that there is no proposition whose 
probability is equal to P(C|A) for all probability distributions without the latter 
being subject to trivializing features such as that P(C|A) collapses to P(C) or that 
positive probabilities can only be assigned to two pairwise incompatible 
propositions (Bennett, 2003: Ch. 5; Woods, 1997: Ch. 4, p. 114–8).  
  
In psychology, there has been a tendency to endorse a thesis very similar to 
Stalnaker’s hypothesis, known as the Equation, which avoids the problems affecting 
the former by either denying that conditionals express propositions altogether or by 
endorsing three-valued de Finetti truth tables (Table 1): 
 
  Table 1. De Finetti Truth Table 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EQUATION: P(if A, then C) = P(C|A), but ‘If A, then C’ does not express a classical 
proposition. (Bennett, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford &Chater, 2007)                                                              
4  One of the reviewers pointed out that Adams later abandoned this position in Adams 
(1998). To sidestep such exegetical issues we use the phrase ‘Adams’ Thesis’ to denote the 
position attributed to him in the literature based on his earlier work.  
A C If A, then C 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
void 
void 
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At present, the theories united under the heading ‘the New Paradigm of 
Reasoning’, which endorse the Equation, have branched out in different directions. To 
name just a few, in Baratgin, Politzer, and Over (2013) and Politzer, Over, and Baratgin 
(2010), the Equation is studied in relation to three-valued de Finetti truth tables in 
general and its relation to conditional bets is emphasized. In Pfeifer and Kleiter (2011) 
and Pfeifer (2013), the Equation is endorsed on the basis of a coherence-based 
probability logic that works with intervals of imprecise probabilities. However, what 
matters for our purposes is not so much the exact theory in which the Equation is 
embedded but rather the general commitment to the Equation. As it stands, over a 
decade of empirical research has found strong evidence in favor of the Equation and a 
recent study has begun to challenge Adams’ Thesis, as nicely outlined in Douven 
(2015b: Ch. 3, 4).   
In contrast, a basic intuition that has emerged repeatedly throughout the 
history of philosophy is that in conditionals like ‘If it rains, then the match will be 
cancelled’ the antecedent and the consequent should somehow be connected or 
relevant for one another as one aspect of the conditionals’ meaning (for references 
see Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016; Krzyżanowska, 2015; Douven, 2015b). This intuition is 
especially salient when we observe examples in which the relevance expectation is 
violated, as in conditionals such as ‘If blood is red, then Oxford is in England’, for which 
the truth-value of the antecedent leaves the truth-value of the consequent 
unaffected. However, surprisingly this intuitive idea is not preserved in any of the 
theories of conditionals currently endorsed in the psychology of reasoning, as we shall 
see. 
 
The Paradoxes of the Material Implication 
Before the Equation became popular in the psychology of reasoning (Evans & Over, 
2004; Oaksford &Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 2013), the dominant theory was mental model 
theory, which is based on the material implication analysis of natural language 
 
21 
 
conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).5 Since the material implication is always 
true except in cases when its antecedent is true and its consequent is false, the theory 
validates the following argument-schemes that are known to give rise to nonsensical 
results once natural language content is substituted:   
 
¬A
∴ if A, C
                                                    
C
∴ if A, C
                                    [1] 
 
With no restrictions on the relationship between the antecedent and the 
consequent, any conditional could be inferred from a false antecedent or a true 
consequent, no matter how odd. Hence, from the true premise ‘It is not the case that 
Europe has been ruled by France since Napoleon’ the conditional ‘If Europe has been 
ruled by France since Napoleon, then the sun emits light’ could be inferred. And from 
the true premise ‘The sun emits light’, the conditional ‘If Europe has been ruled by 
France since Napoleon, then the sun emits light’, or indeed ‘If Europe was liberated 
from occupation by Napoleon’s France, then the sun emits light’ could be inferred. 
Unsurprisingly, participants in psychological experiments tend to find such inferences 
odd as well (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011). Of course, this fact has not escaped the 
proponents of mental model theory. In accounting for the oddness of such inferences, 
they exploit the logical equivalence of the material implication with ‘¬A v C’ and argue 
that the reason why we are reluctant to endorse the valid argument schemes in [1] is 
due to the problem with endorsing the following equally valid argument schemes:   
 
¬A
∴ ¬A v C                                               C∴ ¬A v C                                        [2] 
Since more possibilities are excluded by the premises than by the conclusions in 
[2], information is lost in the conclusion, and according to Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
                                                             
5  As one of the reviewers pointed out, mental model theory has recently been revised 
so as to avoid being committed to the material implication analysis of the natural language 
conditional in Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin (2015). However, we here restrict our 
focus to the previous version of the theory. 
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(2002; Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009)) this is really the source of our intuitive 
problems with [1]. However, in the absence of a prior theoretical commitment to the 
logical equivalence of natural language conditionals to disjunctions, a much more 
straightforward diagnosis of the oddness of [1] runs as follows. The problem is not so 
much that fewer possibilities are excluded by the conclusion than by the premises, but 
rather that different conditions are imposed by the premises and the respective 
conclusions. The premises are silent on the relationship between A and C and impose 
conditions on a set of possible worlds by being factual propositions; the conclusions 
impose constraints on epistemic states (i.e., that A is epistemically relevant for C). 
In contrast, the probabilistic approaches that are currently replacing the mental 
model theory under the heading ‘the New Paradigm of Reasoning’ endorse the 
Equation and reject [1]. Purportedly this is because the premises do not 
probabilistically constrain the conclusion when the latter is interpreted as a 
conditional probability as long as 0 < P(premise) < 1 (Bennett, 2003, p. 139; Evans & 
Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011). However, as argued in 
Skovgaard-Olsen (2016), it can be claimed that these theories reject [1] for the wrong 
reasons. The most obvious diagnosis of the oddness of [1] remains that no restrictions 
on the relevance of A for C are introduced by the premises, whereas indicative 
conditionals fit for the speech act of assertions seem to require A to be relevant for C. 
Yet these probabilistic approaches within the New Paradigm of Reasoning are unable 
to account for this. According to the latter, indicative conditionals should be seen as a 
linguistic device by which the participants activate a mental algorithm known as the 
Ramsey test, which consists in temporarily adding the antecedent to their knowledge-
base and evaluating the consequent under its supposition (Evans & Over, 2004; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 2013). As such, indicative conditionals can have a 
high probability of being true as long as P(C) is high, even if the antecedent is 
irrelevant for the consequent. Accordingly, none of the main contenders in 
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contemporary psychological accounts of conditional reasoning are willing to make 
relevance part of the core meaning of natural language conditionals.6 
 
P(If A, then C) and Relevance 
The next surprise is that until quite recently,7 when the role of relevance in the 
interpretation of conditionals was empirically investigated it was either found that no 
support could be provided (Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Singmann, Klauer, 
& Over, 2014), or that it was only weakly supported by the data (Over, Hadjichristidis, 
Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007). So perhaps relevance should be set aside for our 
theories of conditionals after all. In these studies, relevance was operationalized in 
terms of the ∆p rule, which is well-known from the psychological literature on 
causation, where ∆p > 0 has been taken to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for inferring causality (Cheng, 1997). 
 
THE ∆P RULE: ∆p = P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) 
 
 As P(C|A) is already occupied as a predictor of P(if A, then C) by the Equation, 
Over et al. (2007) and Singmann et al. (2014) try to obtain an orthogonal predictor for 
the relevance approach by using P(C|¬A). The evidence clearly favored P(C|A) as a 
predictor. However, as Spohn (2013: 1092) observes, the ∆p of the stimulus material 
used in Over et al. (2007) ranged from .23 to .32 and it would thus seem that a fairer 
test of the relevance approach would cover the whole spectrum of positive relevance, 
irrelevance, and negative relevance:8 
                                                             
6  However, it should be noted that Over & Evans (2003) did entertain the possibility that 
relevance could characterize a subgroup of conditionals (i.e. causal conditionals). Yet this idea 
was later rejected in Over et al. (2007). 
7  An exception is Douven, Elqayam, Singmann, Over, and Wijnbergen-Huitink 
(forthcoming). In this study it was found in a novel experimental task that the participants 
used clues about the inferential relations between A and C in evaluating the conditionals used 
in that task.  
8  In these definitions we follow Spohn (2012: Ch. 6, 2013). Importantly, this notion of 
relevance is different from the notion of relevance as introduced by Sperber and Wilson 
(1986) in that it does not attribute a role to processing costs as negatively correlated with 
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POSITIVE RELEVANCE: ∆p > 0 
IRRELEVANCE: ∆p = 0 
NEGATIVE RELEVANCE: ∆p < 0 
 
To be sure, Oberauer et al. (2007) did include ∆p = 0 conditions. But in contrast 
to Over et al. (2007), they did not use realistic stimulus material that would enable the 
participants to form their own relevance expectations based on their background 
knowledge. Instead they supplied the participants with frequency information about a 
deck of cards relating properties in artificial relations. Accordingly, it is unclear 
whether a failure to take relevance into account in their study is due to: (a) the 
independence of the participants’ assessment of P(if A, then C) with respect to 
relevance assessments, or (b) the participants’ failure to incorporate novel frequency 
information about artificial stimuli into their degrees of belief in conditionals. Hence, 
one goal of the present study was to use realistic stimuli that activate the participants’ 
background knowledge while measuring P(if A, then C) across systematic 
manipulations along the relevance dimension. 
 A further issue is that it is not entirely obvious what the relationship between 
P(if A, then C) and relevance should be on the relevance approach to conditionals. 
There are more options available than simply considering ∆p as a predictor of P(if A, 
then C). Indeed, in Douven (2015a) and Olsen (2014: Ch. 3; see also Skovgaard-Olsen, 
2015) it is suggested that an alternative could also provide a solution to the unsolved 
problem of where the participant’s conditional probabilities come from, if we do not 
want to assume that they are calculated from unconditional probabilities using the 
Kolmogorov ratio definition (i.e. P(C|A) = P(C&A)/P(A)). Reference to the Ramsey test 
can only be part of the solution, because it does not in itself tell us which psychological 
mechanisms are involved in determining P(C) once A has been added as a supposition 
to the participants’ knowledge base, as recognized by Over et al. (2007): 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
perceived relevance. In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (draft), there is further 
discussion of how they relate to other popular ideas in the psychological literature, such as 
the dual processing framework and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory.  
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Explaining how the Ramsey test is actually implemented—by means of deduction, 
induction, heuristics, causal models, and other processes—is a major challenge, in our 
view, in the psychology of reasoning (p. 63). 
Douven’s (2015a) suggestion is that once A has been added to the knowledge base, 
assessments of the strength of arguments from A to C (given background knowledge) 
are used in determining P(C) in performing the Ramsey test. Olsen’s (2014: Ch. 3) 
suggestion is that heuristic assessments of the extent to which A is a predictor of C are 
used. 
A third possibility, which we propose in this paper, is the Default and Penalty 
Hypothesis. The Default and Penalty Hypothesis holds that in evaluating either P(if A, 
then C) or Acc(if A, then C) the participants evaluate whether A is a sufficient reason 
for C. Applying the explication of the reason relation given in Spohn (2012: Ch. 6), this 
requires two things: (i) evaluating whether positive relevance is fulfilled, and (ii) 
evaluating P(C|A). The default assumption is that positive relevance is given, so the 
participants jump directly to evaluating P(C|A), which explains the existing evidence 
for the Equation. However, once the default assumption of positive relevance is 
violated, the violation of the participants’ expectations will disrupt the equality 
between P(C|A) and both P(if A, then C) and Acc(if A, then C).  
How exactly this disruption takes place is a matter for further research. 
Conceptually, the idea is that the negative surprise of the lack of positive relevance 
makes the participants apply a simple penalty to P(if A, C) or Acc(if A, C) (amounting to 
a main effect of the relevance condition). However, the discovery that A is not a 
reason for C may also lead the participants to rely less on P(C|A) (amounting to an 
interaction between the effect of P(C|A) and the relevance condition), since P(C|A) is 
used to assess the sufficiency and strength of the reason relation.     
The Default and Penalty Hypothesis can be motivated by the observation that 
we use conditionals to display and discuss the inferential relations we are prepared to 
use in arguments (Fogelin, 1967, Brandom, 2010: 44–8, 104). Processing conditionals 
accordingly makes us expect an inferential relation to be displayed and so we expect 
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there to be a relationship of epistemic relevance between A and C. However, this 
default assumption can, of course, be overridden. Perhaps one way of accounting for 
so-called non-interference conditionals, where there is no apparent connection 
between A and C, is to say that they are exactly like cases in which the context 
indicates that this default assumption is to be set aside (Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016). That 
is to say, in these special cases relationships between sentences can be displayed that 
are so absurd in the first place that a rhetorical point is made either of the absurdity of 
the antecedent (e.g. ‘If you can lift that, then I am a monkey’s uncle’) or of the fact 
that the consequent is endorsed come what may (e.g. ‘If it snows in July, the 
government will fall’). However, such non-interference conditionals are the exception 
and the default assumption is one of the positive relevance of the antecedent for the 
consequent. 
One virtue of the last two possibilities for relating P(If A, then C) to the 
relevance approach is that each offers an explanation for the substantial body of 
evidence found in favor of the Equation. According to Douven (2015a) and Olsen’s 
(2014: Ch. 3) suggestions, inferential relations and predictor relationships, 
respectively, play a role in determining P(C|A), which in turn is used in determining P(if 
A, then C). According to the Default and Penalty Hypothesis, upon processing the 
antecedent with realistic materials9 and the conditional form, the participants will by 
default assume the positive relevance of the antecedent for the consequent. Hence, as                                                              
9  As this indicates, we formulate the Default and Penalty Hypothesis in the first instance 
as a psychological hypothesis concerning the processing of realistic material implementing a 
more general relevance approach to conditionals. How the theory extends to the processing 
of abstract material is an open issue. But one issue is clearly that as the stimulus material 
blocks the participants’ ability to make relevance expectations on the basis of their 
background knowledge, they can only rely on the information provided by the experimenters. 
Accordingly, since false antecedent cases fail to supply the participants with useful 
information for assessing whether A is a sufficient reason for C, evaluation of the conditional 
under these circumstances may provoke a presupposition failure. In the literature on 
presupposition failures in general, it is thought that they either make the afflicted sentence 
false or truth-valueless (Heim and Kratzer, 1998: Ch. 4, 6). Perhaps this accounts for the effect 
known as ‘the defective truth table’ in the literature, which has been taken as evidence for de 
Finetti truth table (Evans and Over, 2004). (We owe parts of this argument to discussions with 
Seth Yalcin.) 
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long as we are primarily investigating positive relevance stimulus material then 
participants should jump directly to the second step and evaluate P(if A, then C) solely 
on the basis of P(C|A). But as soon as this tacit assumption of positive relevance is 
violated, then we can experimentally distinguish the Default and Penalty Hypothesis 
from the Equation. One of the goals of the present study is to test this hypothesis. 
 
Relevance and the Core Meaning of Conditionals 
As current probabilistic theories of reasoning do not make relevance, or inferential 
relations, part of the core meaning of conditionals, they have to treat it as a pragmatic 
component that is introduced by contextual factors. One option is to attribute the 
expectancy of the antecedent’s relevance to the consequent to an implicature that 
arises due to Gricean norms of non-misleading discourse.10 However, as Douven 
(2015a) points out, it is not entirely obvious how exactly the pragmatic mechanism is 
supposed to work. 
Moreover, if this pragmatic explanation were true, we would only expect to find 
an effect of relevance manipulations on the acceptability of utterances in 
conversational contexts, as Gricean maxims in the first instance apply to 
conversational contexts.11 In contrast, studies investigating P(If A, then C) have been 
used by proponents of the Ramsey test and the Equation to arbitrate between 
conflicting accounts of the core meaning of conditionals (Over & Evans, 2003). Hence, 
we should not expect to find a relevance effect on P(If A, then C), if the latter quantity 
is an indicator of semantic content and expectations of relevance are to be excluded 
from the semantic analysis. On the contrary, if relevance expectations are part of the 
                                                             
10  To be sure, Grice also has a maxim to the effect that one should make one’s 
contributions to the conversation relevant (with an unspecified notion of relevance). 
However, it should be noted that the latter maxim applies to the level of whole speech acts, 
whereas when we talk about relevance in relation to conditionals, we are dealing with an 
internal relation between the antecedent and the consequent in one sentence. 
11  The reason for this qualification is that Douven (2010) has made a case for the claim 
that Gricean maxims of conversation not only apply to conversational contexts but also to 
individual reasoning. 
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core meaning of conditionals, then we should expect to find a relevance effect in both 
the P(if A, then C) and Acc(if A, then C) conditions.  
It is more difficult to say how evidence of a relevance effect on P(If A, then C) 
would affect the mental model theory. This is because the theory has been formulated 
in such a way that the core meaning of conditionals is only investigated directly using 
abstract stimulus materials. When realistic stimulus materials are applied, the theory 
allows for both pragmatic and semantic modulation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). In 
mental model theory, it is assumed that there are different levels of processing 
conditionals. In the most superficial mode, indicative conditionals are thought to be 
processed as conjunctions by constructing a mental model of the first cell of the truth 
table for the material implication, where both the antecedent and the consequent are 
true (while adding a mental footnote in the form of an ellipsis representing that there 
are further implicit models that would be consistent with the truth of the conditional, 
which distinguishes its mental-model representation from that of a conjunction): 
 
A      C 
…    
 
Pragmatic modulation is thought to occur when contextual factors modify the mental 
models constructed of the truth table cells in which the conditional is true. Semantic 
modulation occurs when the content of the antecedent and the consequent modifies 
the mental models constructed of the truth table cells in which the conditional is true. 
In both cases, this can take the form of adding information to the models, preventing 
the construction of models, or by aiding the participant in replacing the mental 
footnote with an explicit representation of all the cases in which the conditional is 
true.  
However, as it stands the mental model theory has not been formulated in such 
a manner as to generate the general expectation that the antecedent should be 
epistemically relevant for the consequent once natural language content is used. As 
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such, it too would be faced with the explanatory challenge of how to account for a 
relevance effect on P(If A, then C) without relying on ad hoc principles.  
 
Concessive Conditionals 
As outlined above, previous studies that do not include a systematic comparison 
between positive relevance, negative relevance, and irrelevance based on realistic 
materials have not found a relevance effect on P(if A, then C). Yet Douven and 
Verbrugge (2012) did find that the categorical acceptance of indicative conditionals 
requires the antecedent to provide evidential support for the consequent as a 
necessary condition, in addition to high conditional probabilities. Moreover, they also 
found that the evidential support relation could be used to differentiate between the 
acceptability of indicative conditionals and concessive conditionals such as ‘Even if it 
rains, then Michael will still go outside for a smoke’. Accordingly, a further goal of the 
present study is to investigate whether these findings can be extended from the case 
of categorical acceptability to quantitative degrees of acceptability.  
In Skovgaard-Olsen (2016), it is suggested that concessive conditionals could be 
used to deny that A is a sufficient reason against C in contexts where there is a 
presupposition of A being a reason against C. This can occur either because the 
speaker denies that A is a sufficient reason against C or because the speaker denies 
that A is a reason against C—perhaps because A is taken to be irrelevant for or indeed 
to constitute a reason for C by the speaker. So whereas the Default and Penalty 
Hypothesis makes us predict that the participants will find indicative conditionals 
defective in the negative relevance and irrelevance conditions, in general there should 
be nothing defective about the use of concessive conditionals here. The exception, of 
course, is when P(C|A) = low and A is indeed a sufficient reason against C.  
We can distinguish two versions of this hypothesis about concessive 
conditionals. In one version the concessive conditional simply expresses a denial of A 
as a good objection against C, if A were true (i.e. P(C|A) ≠ low). In another version, the 
concessive conditional expresses an unconditional commitment to C and the 
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assumption that the degree of justification for C would be stable with respect to the 
truth of A (i.e. P(C) = high and P(C|A) ≠ low). On this latter proposal, the unconditional 
commitment to C distinguishes concessive conditionals from indicative conditionals. In 
the case of the indicative conditional, ‘If A, then C’, we adopt a conditional 
commitment to C under the supposition that A is true, because A is viewed as a 
sufficient reason for C. In the case of the concessive ‘Even if A, then (still) C’, we retain 
an unconditional commitment to C even if A is true, because it is denied that A is a 
good objection against C. For both of these proposals, it might seem a bit redundant 
to deny that A is a good objection against C when it is obvious that A is either 
irrelevant or positively relevant for C. But strictly speaking one would not be 
committing an epistemic error in doing so, because it is true after all that C would not 
be undermined by the truth of A, if A raises the probability of C (∆p > 0) or leaves it 
unchanged (∆p = 0).  
Igor Douven (personal communication, September, 2015) notes in relation to 
the second version of the hypothesis about concessive conditionals that it may 
actually fit the non-interference conditionals we encountered above (e.g. ‘If it snows in 
July, the government will fall’) better than concessive conditionals. In the case of non-
interference, substitution of ‘whether or not’, ‘regardless of whether’, and sometimes 
‘even if’ for ‘if’ makes little difference to their assertability (Douven, 2015b: 11). 
Accordingly, it should be possible to test whether the participants are interpreting a 
given concessive as a non-interference conditional by testing their sensitivity to such 
substitutions. In our experiment below, we will, however, only test the first version of 
the hypothesis about concessive conditionals, which is more clearly distinguished from 
non-interference conditionals. 
 
The Current Experiment 
A general lesson to take from the discussion above is that if we want to make progress 
on the issue of whether expectations of epistemic relevance should be included in the 
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core meaning of indicative conditionals, then we should use realistic stimulus material 
that allows the participants to form expectations about relevance. We should then 
systematically violate those expectations through manipulations of relevance that also 
implement conditions of negative relevance and irrelevance. We did this in our 
experiment. As discussed above, we predict that in the case of indicative conditionals 
we find an effect of the relevance condition: for positive relevance (PO) the Equation 
holds, whereas for irrelevance (IR) and negative relevance (NE) it does not hold. In 
contrast, for concessive conditionals we predict no such effect. Here the Equation is 
expected to hold throughout, for all three relevance conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted over the Internet to obtain a large and demographi-
cally diverse sample. A total of 577 people took part in the experiment. The 
participants were sampled through the Internet platform www.Crowdflower.com from 
the USA, the UK, and Australia and were paid a small amount of money for their 
participation.   
The following exclusion criteria were used: not having English as native 
language, failing to answer two simple SAT comprehension questions correctly in a 
warm-up phase, completing the task in less than 160 seconds or in more than 3600 
seconds, and answering ‘not seriously at all’ to the question of how seriously they 
would take their participation at the beginning of the study. The final sample consisted 
of 348 participants: 94 were assigned to the P(if A, then C) condition, 89 to the Acc(if 
A, then C) condition, 78 to the P(Even if A, then still C) condition, and 87 to the 
Acc(Even if A, then still C) group (see below). The mean age was 37.2 years, ranging 
from 17 to 72 years; 39.4 % of the participants were male; 57.8 % indicated that the 
highest level of education that they had completed was an undergraduate degree or 
higher. 
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Design 
The experiment implemented a mixed design. There were two factors that were varied 
within participants: relevance (with three levels: PO, NE, IR), and priors (with four 
levels: HH, HL, LH, LL, meaning, for example, that P(A) = high and P(C) = low for HL). 
The prior manipulation had the goal of increasing the spread of the conditional 
probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This ensured a robust estimation 
of the relationship with the dependent variables. Two further factors were varied 
between participants, leading to the four experimental groups: conditionals, with two 
levels: indicative (‘if A, then C’) and concessive (‘Even if A, then still C’); and mode of 
evaluation, with two levels: probability and acceptability.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the four experimental groups. The 12 within-
participants conditions were randomly assigned to 12 different scenarios for each 
participant. More specifically, we performed a large pre-study (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 
draft) in which we measured prior probabilities and perceived relevance for a set of 18 
scenarios from which we obtained the 12 different scenarios employed here. From 
each of the 12 selected scenarios we could construe all 12 within-participants 
conditions. Consequently, the mapping of conditions to scenarios was 
counterbalanced across participants, thereby preventing confounds of condition and 
content.  
To reduce the dropout rate once the proper experiment had begun, 
participants first saw three pages stating our academic affiliations, asking for their 
email addresses (which were not paired with their responses, however), presenting 
two SAT comprehension questions in a warm-up phase, and posing a seriousness 
check about how careful the participants would be in their responses (Reips, 2002). 
Following this, the experiment began with the presentation of the 12 within-
participants conditions. Their order was randomized anew for each participant. 
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For each of the 12 within-participants conditions, the participants were 
presented with three pages. The (randomly chosen) scenario text was placed at the 
top of each page. One participant might thus have seen the following scenario text:  
 
Sophia's scenario: Sophia wishes to find a nice present for her 13-year-old son, Tim, 
for Christmas. She is running on a tight budget, but she knows that Tim loves 
participating in live roleplaying in the forest and she is really skilled at sewing the orc 
costumes he needs. Unfortunately, she will not be able to afford the leather parts 
that such costumes usually have, but she will still be able to make them look nice. 
 
The underlying idea was to use brief scenario texts concerning basic causal, functional, 
or behavioral information that uniformly activates stereotypical assumptions about 
the relevance and prior probabilities of the antecedent and the consequent of 12 
conditionals that implement our experimental conditions for each scenario. To 
introduce the 12 experimental conditions for the scenario text above we, inter alia, 
exploited the fact that the participants would assume that receiving things belonging 
to orc costumes would raise the probability of Tim being excited about his present 
(PO), receiving a Barbie doll would lower the probability of Tim being excited about his 
present (NE), and that whether Sophia regularly wears shoes would leave the 
probability of Tim being excited about his present unchanged (IR). A pretest with 725 
participants reported in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (draft) showed that the average ∆p was 
.32 for the positive relevance conditions, -.27 for the negative relevance conditions, 
and -.01 for our irrelevance conditions.12 
On the first page of each within-participants condition, the scenario text was 
followed by two questions presented in random order. One of those questions 
measured the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent, which is 
here illustrated for the NE-LH condition (= negative relevance, P(A) = low, P(C) = high) 
for the scenario text above:                                                              
12  [The published version is here being corrected. The full sample of 725 participants was 
used to validate the stimulus materials and not just the sample of 495 participants after the 
exclusion.]  
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Suppose Sophia buys a Barbie doll for Tim. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the following sentence is true on a 
scale from 0 to 100%: 
Tim will be excited about his present. 
 
The other question measured the probability of the conjunction of the antecedent and 
the consequent. We included this question to measure the probability of the premise 
of an inference task presented on the third page of the study. On the second page, the 
scenario text was either followed by a question asking the participants to evaluate P(if 
A, then C), Acc(If A, then C), P(Even if A, then still C), or Acc(Even if A, then still C), 
depending on which experimental group they were in:  
 
Could you please rate the probability that the following sentence is true on a scale 
from 0 to 100 %: 
IF Sophia buys a Barbie doll for Tim, THEN Tim will be excited about his present. 
 
If the participants were in one of the acceptability groups (i.e. Acc(If A, then C) or 
Acc(Even if A, then still C)), and it was their first scenario then they would first receive 
the following instruction:  
 
When we ask – here and throughout the study – how 'acceptable' a statement is, we 
are not interested in whether the statement is grammatically correct, unsurprising, 
or whether it would offend anybody. Rather we ask you to make a judgment about 
the adequacy of the information conveyed by the statement. More specifically, we 
ask you to judge whether the statement would be a reasonable thing to say in the 
context provided by the scenarios.  
 
On the third page, the participants were presented with a short argument with the 
conditional as the conclusion. The results of that task are not reported here.  
Thus, for each of the 12 within-participants conditions, each mapped to a 
different scenario, participants went through 3 pages. For each question, the 
participants were instructed to give their responses using sliders ranging from 0% to 
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100%. The full list of scenarios, the raw data, the data preparation script, and the 
analysis script can all be found in the supplemental materials at: https://osf.io/j4swp/. 
 
Results 
Figures 1 and 3 provide an overview of the data per mode of evaluation and relevance 
condition with the estimated conditional probability P(C|A) on the x-axis and the 
dependent variables (either P(if A, then C), Acc(if A, then C),  P(Even if A, then still C), 
or Acc(Even if A, then still C)) on the y-axis (similar plots further divided as a function 
of prior manipulation are provided in the supplemental materials; they essentially 
show the same pattern, albeit with more noise). Regarding the statistical analysis it is 
important to note that the data has replicates on both the level of the participant 
(each participant provided one response for each of the twelve within-participants 
conditions; i.e., four responses per relevance condition) as well as on the level of the 
scenario (each scenario could appear in each relevance condition; we obtained 
between 19 and 41 responses for each scenario-by-relevance-condition combination 
across all four groups). This dependency structure, with conditions repeated within 
participants and scenarios, can be accommodated by a linear mixed model (LMM) 
analysis with crossed random effects for participants and scenarios (Baayen, Davidson, 
& Bates, 2008). Details of the model specification can be found in the Appendix. 
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Indicative Conditionals 
 
Figure 1. Raw data values (plotted with 80% transparency) and LMM estimated 
linear effect of P(C|A) as a predictor on Acc(if A, then C) (upper row) and P(if A, 
then C) (lower row) across relevance manipulations (PO = left column, NE = 
center column, IR = right column). The confidence bands show the 95% 
confidence region of the effect of P(C|A). 
 
Figure 1 seems to support our first hypothesis; for indicative conditionals the 
relevance condition seemed to affect the results but the mode of evaluation (P(if A, 
then C) vs. Acc(if A, then C)) seemed to have little influence. In the PO condition the 
agreement between the conditional probability and the dependent variable seemed to 
be very strong. If it were not for some data point in the upper left corners the 
agreement would have been perfect and the regression line would have lain exactly on 
the main diagonal. However, in the other two conditions this relationship seemed 
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much weaker, mainly because of a larger cluster of data points in the lower right 
corners. In addition, there seemed to be a difference in intercept, such that the overall 
level of responses to the dependent variable seemed to be considerably lower in the 
NE and IR condition compared to the PO condition.  
This pattern was confirmed in an LMM analysis with fully crossed fixed effects 
for the conditional probability P(C|A), relevance condition (PO, NE, and IR), and modes 
of evaluation (P(if A, then C) and Acc(if A, then C)). Interestingly, this LMM showed no 
effects of the mode of evaluation, all F < 1.5, p > .28, indicating that the probability of 
the conditional was judged in exactly the same way as the acceptability of the 
conditional. We found a main effect of conditional probability, F(1, 33.45) = 505.16,    
p < .0001, which was further qualified by an interaction between conditional 
probability and the relevance condition, F(2, 18.10) = 20.21, p < .0001. Follow-up 
analysis on the interaction showed that the slope in the PO condition (b = 0.78, 95%-CI 
= [0.71, 0.86]) was significantly larger than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.60, 
95%-CI = [0.49, 0.72]), t(20.05) = 3.27, pH = .008
13, as well as significantly larger than 
the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.42, 95%-CI = [0.32, 0.52]), t(22.08)= 6.00, pH < 
.0001. Additionally, the slopes from the NE and IR conditions also differed significantly, 
t(12.26) = 2.36 , pH = .04.  
In other words, in the PO condition an increase in perceived conditional 
probability by 1% led to an increase of around 0.8% in the perceived probability or 
acceptability of the conditional – an almost perfect relationship. In the other 
conditions the same increase in perceived conditional probability led to a markedly 
lower increase in the perceived probability or acceptability of the conditional of 0.6% 
and 0.4%, respectively. 
We also found a main effect of the relevance condition, F(2, 16.97) = 89.25,      
p < .0001, indicating that the level of perceived probability or acceptability of the 
conditional differed across the three conditions. However, given the significant                                                              
13  We controlled for the family-wise error rate of follow-up tests, for each set of follow-
up tests separately, using the Bonferroni-Holm correction (indicated by the index "H"). 
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interaction with conditional probability, the pattern was slightly less simple. Across the 
conditional probability scale, PO conditionals received higher ratings than both NE and 
IR conditionals, t > 4.49, pH < .002. However, while there was clearly no difference 
between NE and IR at the far left of the scale (i.e., at 0%), t(10.36) = - 0.71, pH = .49, 
this result was less clear at the midpoint of the scale (i.e., at 50%), t(12.28) = 2.27, pH = 
.10 as well as at the far right end of the scale (i.e., at 100%), t(12.30) = 2.37, pH = .10. 
The estimated marginal means [EMM] were PO = 18.8%, NE = 3.1%, and IR = 4.3% at 
0%, PO = 58.1%, NE = 33.3%, and IR = 25.3% at 50%, and PO = 97.3%, NE = 63.4%, and 
IR = 46.3% at 100%. 
Careful inspection of Figure 1 suggests that there was a further difference 
between the three relevance conditions. The effect of conditional probability on the 
dependent variable seemed to be quite uniform across participants in the positive 
relevance condition. In contrast, in the other two conditions there seemed to be more 
inter-individual variability in the slope, some participants seemed to maintain a slope 
of one (i.e., their responses lay on the main diagonal) whereas other decreased the 
slope. This decrease seemed to be specifically strong in the irrelevance condition, 
where some slopes seemed to be at zero. To assess this hypothesis Figure 2 (upper 
row) plots the distribution of individual slope estimates derived from the LMM. As can 
be seen, the distribution of conditional probability slopes in the PO condition clearly 
peaks, whereas the one in the IR condition is a lot flatter with (at least) one rather 
weak peak at 0. This is supported by the empirical standard deviations of the individual 
slopes estimates, 0.20 in the PO condition, 0.24 in the NE condition, and 0.29 in the IR 
condition, as well as by the empirical kurtosis,14 0.98 in the PO condition, -0.95 in the 
NE condition, and -1.11 in the IR condition. Ensuring the distribution of random effects 
is not an artifact of the hierarchical modeling approach; since it shrinks extreme 
estimates towards the mean estimate, we also estimated separate regressions for 
                                                             
14  “For symmetric unimodal distributions, positive kurtosis indicates heavy tails and 
peakedness relative to the normal distribution, whereas negative kurtosis indicates light tails 
and flatness” (DeCarlo, 1997, p. 292). 
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each individual and relevance condition. This analysis essentially showed the same 
pattern of results (see supplementary materials).   
 
Figure 2. Individual slope estimates for the effect of conditional probability 
P(C|A) on the dependent variable across conditions. These estimates are derived 
from the random effects terms of the LMM. In each plot each participant 
provided one slope estimate. The x denotes the fixed effects estimate. 
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Concessive Conditionals 
 
Figure 3. Raw data values (plotted with 80% transparency) and LMM estimated 
linear effect of P(C|A) as a predictor on Acc(Even if A, then still C) (upper row) 
and P(Even if A, then still C)  (lower row) across relevance manipulations (PO = 
left column, NE = center column, IR = right column). The confidence bands show 
the 95% confidence region of the effect of P(C|A).  
 
Inspection of Figure 3 suggests a more homogenous pattern for the concessive 
conditionals. With small exceptions in the PO conditions, the agreement between the 
conditional probability and the dependent variable was almost perfect. There seemed 
to be few other effects. This was supported by an LMM with the same structure as the 
indicative conditionals, which revealed a main effect of conditional probability, F(1, 
16.63) = 827.43, p < .0001, but no interaction between conditional probability and the 
relevance condition, F(2, 13.21) = 2.00, p = .17. The overall effect of conditional 
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probability was b = 0.78, 95%-CI [0.73, 0.83], again suggesting that an increase in 
conditional probability of 1% results in an increase in probability or acceptability of the 
concessive conditional of around 0.8%, but this time for all three relevance conditions. 
As before, there was no effect of mode of evaluation, all F < 1.8, p > .22. We also 
found a small main effect of relevance condition, F(2, 11.79) = 4.06, p = .046. Follow-
up analysis revealed that (at the midpoint of the conditional probability scale) PO 
conditionals (EMM = 53.4%) received higher ratings than NE conditionals (EMM = 
45.3%), t(14.81) = 2.99, pH = .03. IR conditionals (EMM = 49.0%), however, differed 
from neither of the other conditions, |t| < 1.8, pH > .21.
15 The distribution of individual 
conditional probability effects (Figure 2, lower row) shows clearly peaked distribution 
with the largest variability for PO (SD = 0.18), followed by NE (SD = 0.11), and IR (SD = 
0.06) and positive kurtosis in each case (PO = 0.82; NE = 1.22; IR = 1.80).  
 
Discussion 
As we saw in the introduction, earlier studies that did not systematically contrast PO, 
NE, and IR stimulus material failed to find a relevance effect on indicative conditionals. 
In contrast, we introduced this manipulation and our results indicate that relevance 
affects the rating of the probability and the acceptability of indicative conditionals. 
These findings corroborate the predictions of the Default and Penalty Hypothesis that 
participants make a default assumption of positive relevance when processing the 
antecedent and the ‘If…, then…’ form with realistic material. As long as this 
assumption is fulfilled, reasoners proceed to the second step of the evaluation of 
whether A is a sufficient reason for C by evaluating whether P(C|A) = high. Yet, when 
                                                             
15  When analyzing the effect of relevance condition at each end of the scale separately, 
we found that at the left end (i.e., 0%), PO conditionals received higher ratings than NE (pH= 
.04) and IR differed from neither (pH > .38), whereas there was no difference between the 
three conditions at the right end of the scale (i.e., 100%), all pH > .99. Note also that the 
interaction between conditional probability and relevance was not significant. Hence, not a 
lot of weight should be attached to the differences of effects at different scale positions. 
 
42 
 
the participants’ expectations of positive relevance are violated in the irrelevance or 
negative relevance conditions, they react to the perceived defect of the indicatives by 
providing lower ratings and by showing less sensitivity to P(C|A). The analysis of the 
random effects estimates of the LMM reveals, however, that there is quite some 
individual variability present in the interaction between relevance and P(C|A). As 
shown in Figure 2 (upper row), there appears to be a minority for whom P(C|A) 
continues to have a steep slope even in the irrelevance condition for indicative 
conditionals while P(C|A) has either a weak relationship, or no relationship at all, for 
the remaining participants in the same condition. 
Both Adams’ Thesis and the Equation are challenged by these findings. To 
account for the effects, proponents of the Equation would have to attribute the 
relevance effect to pragmatic modulation.16 For the Acc(If A, then C) group this might 
be accomplished by invoking Gricean maxims of conversation, since the instructions 
explicitly introduced a conversational context. Yet the same strategy cannot be applied 
to account for a relevance effect in the P(If A, then C) group—unless it is assumed that 
pragmatic factors are implicitly infused in the experimental task.  
However, adopting this latter interpretation would put proponents of the 
Equation in a somewhat odd dialectical position. On the one hand, studies 
investigating P(If A, then C) have been used as direct evidence against the mental 
model theory to show that it got the core meaning of natural language conditionals 
wrong, since the dominant response is P(If A, then C) = P(C|A) (Over & Evans, 2003; 
Evans & Over, 2004). On the other hand, this fictive opponent would now insist that 
the same type of task, which was once used to arbitrate in disputes over the core 
meaning of conditionals, can no longer be interpreted as an investigation of semantic 
content in the absence of pragmatic factors now that a relevance effect has been 
found. Of course, the immediate problem would then be to explain what can prevent                                                              
16  It could be argued that this strategy is not available to proponents of Adams’ Thesis. 
After all, if Gricean maxims are required to account for a relevance effect on our judgments of 
the acceptability of indicatives, then presumably they should also explicitly enter into the 
theory for it to be descriptive of acceptability conditions.    
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proponents of the mental model theory from using the same dialectical strategy to 
account for the evidence for P(If A, then C) = P(C|A) by claiming that it arose merely 
due to an infusion of pragmatic factors into the core meaning of the natural language 
conditional, which continues to be given by the material implication. Furthermore, we 
may note that if this strategy is to avoid having the appearance of an ad hoc attempt 
to dodge an unpleasant objection, then the burden of justification is on those 
engaging in this line of defense to produce positive experimental evidence that this is 
indeed what is happening in the concrete task under the relevance manipulations. 
To be sure, finding a theory-neutral way of operationalizing the distinction 
between semantic and pragmatic content continues to be a vexing problem. Part of 
the reason is that the distinction continues to be deeply controversial in both the 
philosophical and linguistic literature on purely theoretical grounds (Bach, 1997, 
Birner, 2013: Ch. 3). However, until this theoretical dispute is resolved, we propose to 
adopt the following strategy: to interpret our results as minimally raising an 
explanatory challenge to proponents of the Equation. If investigations of P(If A, then C) 
can be used to challenge and replace one theory of the core meaning of conditionals, 
then it seems legitimate to use the same task for documenting a relevance effect on 
the core meaning of conditionals. 
As we have noted, the dialectical situation is somewhat different when it comes 
to the mental model theory, insofar as it holds that the core meaning of conditionals is 
to be investigated through the use of abstract stimulus materials. (In contrast, the 
Equation has been defended on the basis of tasks that use abstract and realistic 
materials interchangeably, Over & Evans, 2003.) However, the mental model theory is 
likewise faced with the explanatory challenge of showing how semantic modulation 
gives rise to the general expectation of positive, epistemic relevance of the antecedent 
for the consequent based on systematic principles, since its preferred account of the 
core meaning of conditionals ignores relevance considerations altogether.  
Turning to our results concerning the concessive conditional, it is somewhat 
ironic that the present results indicate that P(C|A) is actually a better predictor of 
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P(Even if A, then still C) than of P(If A, then C) across relevance manipulations. This is 
ironic since the Equation and the Ramsey Test were offered as explanatory hypotheses 
specifically concerning indicative conditionals that were silent on concessive 
conditionals. In contrast, it was predicted by our account that there would be a defect 
affecting indicative conditionals but not concessive conditionals in the irrelevance and 
negative relevance conditions. The reason we gave was that concessive conditionals 
deny that A is a good objection against C. For the negative relevance condition this 
requires that P(C|A) does not have a low probability. So here this qualitative analysis 
coincides with an account that uses P(C|A) as a predictor of the probability or 
acceptability of ‘Even if A, then still C’. A little surprising, however, is that the 
acceptability ratings of the concessive were still high in the positive relevance 
condition, since denying that A is a good objection against C seems to be a bit 
redundant when A is actually a reason for C. Indeed, Douven and Verbrugge (2012: 
485) think that a categorical acceptance of the concessive is positively odd for the 
positive relevance condition. But strictly speaking, the denial continues to be accurate 
under this condition, since A is not a good objection against C, if A in fact raises the 
probability of C.     
In their investigation into the categorical acceptance of indicative and 
concessive conditionals, Douven and Verbrugge (2012) found that there was a 
tendency to accept the indicative conditional in positive relevance conversational 
contexts, whereas there was a tendency to accept the concessive conditional in 
negative relevance or irrelevance conversational contexts. In contrast, we found little 
difference between the degree of Acc(Even if A, then still C) across PO, NE, and IR. 
However, in comparing these results it must be kept in mind that Douven and 
Verbrugge (2012) were investigating comparative judgments of the categorical 
acceptance of indicative conditionals versus concessive conditionals across relevance 
manipulations, whereas we are making between-subject comparisons of the absolute 
degrees of acceptance of indicative conditionals and concessive conditionals across 
relevance manipulations. So while in their study only a small group of participants 
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accepting the concessive in the PO condition, this may simply have been because their 
participants had the choice to select the indicative instead. In contrast, our study 
involved a between-groups comparison. So we did not ask for comparative judgments 
between concessives and indicatives. This might explain why there is a difference in 
how acceptable the concessive was found to be in the PO condition across the two 
studies.   
Douven and Verbrugge (2010) report differences between the acceptability and 
probability of indicative conditionals when contrasting conditionals with inductive, 
abductive, and deductive inferential relations between the antecedents and 
consequents. In light of these findings, it is somewhat surprising that no differences 
between the probability and acceptability of both the indicative and concessive 
conditionals were found in our experiment. However, as Douven (personal 
communication, November, 2015) points out, one explanation might be that the 
differences were most marked for conditionals expressing inductive relations (where 
the connection is based on purely frequentist information), whereas the positive 
relevance conditionals we investigated seemed to have a more abductive character. 
Their findings suggest that the type of inferential relation may exercise an influence on 
the assessment of the reason relationship. But as Douven and Verbrugge (2012) 
readily admit, it is difficult to formulate a deeper understanding of their findings in the 
absence of a more detailed account of the processing of deductive, inductive, and 
abductive inferential relations. 
One final thing that may seem surprising about our results is that the Equation 
only seemed to hold in the positive relevance case. Yet, as Igor Douven (personal 
communication, September, 2015) points out, the triviality results seem to show that 
P(If A, then C) = P(C|A) entails the probabilistic independence of the antecedent and 
the consequent. So it may seem surprising that in our experiment we found that the 
Equation only holds when the antecedent is probabilistically dependent on the 
consequent. However, as Douven and Verbrugge (2013) point out, the triviality results 
actually rely on the following assumption, which is stronger than the Equation:  
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GENERALIZED EQUATION: P(if φ, then ψ|χ) = P(ψ|φ, χ), for any ψ, φ, χ such that P(φ, 
χ) > 0 
 
And in their experiments, Douven and Verbrugge (2013) found evidence that this 
stronger assumption fails to hold for normal conditionals. Whether this is the right 
explanation is a subject for further research. 
 
Conclusion 
More than a decade of research has offered the Equation (P(If A, then C) = P(C|A)) 
strong empirical support. Moreover, not only do the prevalent theories in the 
psychology of reasoning not make the expectation of relevance of the antecedent for 
the consequent part of the core meaning of conditionals, but previous studies also 
appear to suggest that the presence of such an expectation is not supported by the 
data. In the present study, results were presented that challenge this consensus by 
showing a relevance effect on P(If A, then C). This raises an explanatory challenge for 
psychological theories of conditionals like the recent probabilistic theories and the 
mental model theory, which deny that relevance plays a role in the core meaning of 
indicative conditionals. Moreover, it was found that P(C|A) actually provides a better 
predictor of the probability and acceptability of concessive conditionals than for 
indicative conditionals across relevance manipulations. This new finding is also 
surprising given that the probabilistic theories use P(C|A) as their main predictor for 
indicative conditionals, but have so far been silent on concessive conditionals. 
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Appendix: 
Details of the LMM Analysis 
All analyses were performed using lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, in press) 
for the statistical programming language R (R Core Team, 2015). To ease 
interpretation of the numerical covariate P(C|A), we centered it and the dependent 
variable on the midpoint of the scale (at 50%). For numerical stability in the estimation 
we also divided both by 100 so that all variables were on the scale from -1 to 1 (as 
factors were coded with 1 and -1). We followed the suggestions of Barr et al. (2013) 
and employed the maximal random effects structure as detailed below. Tests of fixed 
effects were Wald-tests using the Kenward-Roger approximation for degrees of 
freedom (Halekoh&Højsgaard, 2014). Follow-up analyses were based on the methods 
implemented in lsmeans (Lenth, 2015) and also employed the Kenward-Roger 
approximation for deriving standard errors and degrees of freedom.  
Each of the LMMs (one for the indicative and one for the concessive 
conditionals) had crossed random effects for participants and scenarios. For 
participants, we estimated random intercepts as well as by-participant random slopes 
for P(C|A), the relevance condition, and their interaction. For scenarios we also 
estimated random intercepts as well as by-scenario random slopes for P(C|A), the 
relevance condition, the mode of evaluation, as well as all corresponding interactions. 
We also estimated all correlations among random effects for both the by-participant 
random effects as well as the by-scenarios random effects. Note that we did not 
estimate random slopes for the prior manipulation for either random effects term. 
This followed the consideration that the prior was only manipulated to achieve a 
certain spread of conditional probabilities in each relevance manipulation. 
Furthermore, including random slopes for the priors would have prevented us from 
estimating random slopes for the conditional probabilities in each relevance condition 
(as such a model would have been oversaturated), which were of substantive interest 
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in the present study (see Figure 2). For an analysis of the effect of the priors see the 
supplementary materials. 
 
Supplementary Materials 
The Influence of the Prior Manipulation 
Besides the two between-participants factors (conditionals and mode of evaluation) 
we had two within-participants factors: relevance (with three levels: PO, NE, IR), and 
priors (with four levels: HH, HL, LH, LL, meaning, for example, that P(A) = high and P(C) 
= low for HL). Combining these two within-participants factors lead to the 12 items on 
which each participant worked.  
 
Indicative Conditionals by Prior Manipulation 
The following plots show the data for the indicative conditionals separated by prior 
manipulation. The order is HH (P(A) = high and P(C) = high), HL (P(A) = high and P(C) = 
low), LH (P(A) = low and P(C) = high), and LL (P(A) = low and P(C) = low). As can be seen 
when comparing HH and LH with HL and LL, manipulating the prior of the consequent 
achieved the intended goal of producing a spread in the conditional probability. For 
HH and LH most of the mass is on the right side of the scale (i.e., near 100), whereas 
for LH and LL most of the mass is near the left end of the scale (i.e. near 0). 
Interestingly, this pattern does not seem to hold completely consistently. For the LH 
and the NE relevance condition most of the data points remained on the left side and 
for the LL conditionals and the PO relevance condition the data still showed a 
relatively uniform spread. This shows that while in general the prior manipulation 
worked, participants’ estimates of the conditional probabilities were not unaffected by 
the relevance condition.  
Given the reduced spread in each of the sub-plots the precision with which the 
individual slopes were estimated was obviously reduced compared to the main 
analysis. If all data points were on the same value of the independent variable (i.e., the 
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conditional probability), the estimated slope would be 0. Consequently, the few data 
points that did not have the same value of independent variable as most others have 
an unusually and unjustifiably high influence on the estimate of the slope (so-called 
influential observations). Nevertheless, the pattern was surprisingly robust. With the 
exception of the LL prior the estimated slopes always followed the order PO > NE > IR. 
For the LL prior, the estimates of PO and NE were almost identical. This shows that the 
main pattern holds across the prior manipulation and they did not systematically 
affect the results. The following tables gives the estimated slopes by condition 
aggregated across conditional type: 
 
Condition HH HL LH LL 
PO 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.58 
NE 0.56 0.67 0.45 0.60 
IR 0.43 0.41 0.23 0.52 
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Concessive Conditionals by Prior Manipulation 
For the concessive conditionals the following plots show the data by prior 
manipulation; the order is again HH, HL, LH, and LL. As before, the prior of the 
consequent (i.e., the second letter) seems to have a strong effect on where on the y-
axis most of the data mass was located. For HH and LH, most data points were on the 
right side of the scale and for LH and LL most of the data points were on the left side 
of the scale. Also replicating the findings from the indicative conditionals, the only real 
outliers of this pattern seemed to be LH for NE and LL for PO.  
As for the indicative conditionals, the pattern obtained for the full data set was 
also mostly replicated for each prior manipulation. For HH and HL the pattern was 
perfectly replicated despite the lowered spread (although there was some imprecision 
in the estimates at those parts of the scale for which there was little data). For LH and 
LL there was more variance in the estimated slopes but this was again due to some 
influential outliers: in the PO and NE conditions most data was so lumped at the ends 
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of the scale that just a few outliers were enough to drag the slope away from 1. There 
did not seem to be any systematic deviation from the overall pattern. 
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Analysis of Individual Regressions 
Our hierarchical modeling approach (LMM) ensured that the individual estimates were 
distributed nicely around the mean slope estimate for each condition via shrinkage of 
the individual parameters. This allowed us to perform a joint analysis of all participants 
while simultaneously controlling for random participant and item (i.e., scenario) 
variability. However, this parameter shrinkage might not be completely desired at this 
point as it might mask a bimodal distribution of the slopes in the IR condition. 
Consequently, we also estimated individual regressions for each participant and 
condition, which are displayed in the following figure. In total we estimated 1044 
individual regressions (348 x 3) of which 25 slopes were above 1.5 (max = 6.4), 2 were 
below -1.5 (min = -2.12), and 13 could not be estimated (as the conditional 
probabilities were constant).  
For the indicative conditionals the figure shows a pattern very similar to the 
LMM estimates, but also hinted at a bimodal distribution in (at least) the IR condition 
with one peak around 0 and one peak around 1. The median slope estimate was 0.96 
in the PO condition, 0.60 in the NE condition, and 0.29 in the IR condition confirming 
the pattern of the LMM analysis (the mean estimates were close to the LMM means, 
as shown when comparing the next figure to Figure 2 in the main text).  
For the concessive conditionals, the median estimates from the individual 
regressions were 0.91 (PO), 0.94 (NE) and 0.93 (IR). 
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Figure Slopes. Individual slope estimates for the effect of 
conditional probability P(C|A) on the dependent variable 
across conditions. These estimates are derived from individual 
regressions per relevance condition based on four data points 
each. In each plot each participant provided one slope 
estimate. We excluded estimates above 1.5 and below -1.5. 
The x denotes the mean of the displayed estimates. 
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Abstract 
The present paper examines precursors and consequents of perceived relevance of a 
proposition A for a proposition C. In Experiment 1, we test Spohn’s (2012, ch. 6) 
assumption that ∆P = P(C|A) – P(C|∼A) is a good predictor of ratings of perceived 
relevance and reason relations, and we examine whether it is a better predictor than 
the difference measure (P(C|A) – P(C)). In Experiment 2, we examine the effects of 
relevance on probabilistic coherence in Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over’s (2015) 
uncertain “and-to-if” inferences. The results suggest that ∆P predicts perceived 
relevance and reason relations better than the difference measure and that 
participants are either less probabilistically coherent in “and-to-if” inferences than 
initially assumed or that they do not follow P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) (“the Equation”). 
Results are discussed in light of recent results suggesting that the Equation may not 
hold under conditions of irrelevance or negative relevance. 
Keywords: Relevance, reason relations, and-to-if-inferences, conditionals, 
probabilistic coherence, the Equation 
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Introduction 
Although the reason relation plays a central role in a number of philosophical 
discussions, a precise explication of this concept is usually absent (e.g., Brandom, 
1994; McDowell, 1994; Brewer, 2002; Reisner & Steglich-Petersen, 2011). In Spohn 
(2012, ch. 6), a precise account has, however, been given in terms of the difference 
that one proposition, A, makes in the degree of belief of another proposition, C, which 
draws on the literature on confirmation measures:18 
 
A is a reason for C iff       P(C|A) > P(C|∼A)  [1] 
A is a reason against C iff  P(C|A) < P(C|∼A) [2] 
 
At the same time, the notion of epistemic relevance is explicated by stating that 
A is positively relevant to C iff [1] holds, negatively relevant iff [2] holds, and irrelevant 
iff P(C|A) = P(C|∼A). One of the general advantages of having such a formal account is 
that it enables one to investigate the formal properties of reason relations and 
relevance and to formulate a taxonomy of reason relations (see Spohn, 2012, section 
6.2), which has repercussions for their application to philosophy and psychology 
(Spohn, 2013; Skovgaard-Olsen, 2015).  
 The first goal of the present study is to test the following prediction attributed 
to Spohn (2012): there is both a high correlation between ∆P (i.e. P(C|A) – P(C|∼A)) 
and perceived relevance and between ∆P and ratings of reason relations. As ∆P is only 
one among a whole family of confirmation measures we contrast it with the difference 
measure (P(C|A) – P(C)), which is another popular alternative (Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, 
and Osherson, 2007; Douven and Verbrugge, 2012). Formally, P(C|A) > P(C|∼A) entails 
P(C|A) > P(C).19 However, the degree of relevance as measured by P(C|A) – P(C|∼A)                                                              
18   Yet it should be noted that there is large problem of the unification of theoretical 
reasons and practical reasons raised by the contributions in Reisner and Steglich-Petersen 
(2011), which Spohn’s account does not yet tackle, and that there are predecessors for 
analyzing epistemic relevance in the way Spohn does in the literature (see Falk and Bar-Hillel, 
1983; Walton, 2004, ch. 4). 
19  In the special case where P(A) = 1, P(C|A) = P(C) but P(C|∼A) is undefined. 
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need not match the degree of relevance as measured by P(C|A) – P(C). This raises the 
empirical issue of which of the two best describes the degree of perceived relevance 
and the perceived strength of the reason relation of the participants.20 
In Experiment 2 we turn to the effects of relevance on the probabilistic 
coherence of the participants in the uncertain and-to-if inference (i.e. inferring ‘if A 
then C’ from ‘A and C’). 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 725 people from the USA, UK, and Australia completed the experiment, 
which was launched over the Internet (via www.Crowdflower.com) to obtain a large 
and demographically diverse sample. Participants were paid a small amount of money 
for their participation.   
The following exclusion criteria were used: not having English as native 
language (33 participants), completing the experiment in less than 240 seconds or in 
more than 5400 seconds (43 participants), failing to answer two simple SAT 
comprehension questions correctly in a warm-up phase (214 participants), providing 
answers outside the range of 0% to 100% (three participants), and answering ‘not 
serious at all’ to the question how serious they would take their participation at the 
beginning of the study (zero participants). Since some of these exclusion criteria were 
overlapping, the final sample consisted of 475 participants. Mean age was 38.91 years, 
ranging from 18 to 73, 55.8 % indicated that the highest level of education that they 
had completed was an undergraduate degree or higher. 
                                                              
20  Actually, Spohn (2012: ch. 6)’s preference for the delta-p measure over the difference 
measure is grounded in the different behavior of their ranking theoretic analogues. Although 
it would indeed be attractive to investigate psychological applications of ranking theory, the 
present study takes the more conservative, probabilistic route. 
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Design 
The experiment implemented a mixed design with three factors that determined the 
content and relationship of the antecedent, A, and consequent, C, of a conditional ‘If A 
then C’. There were two factors that varied within participants: relevance (with three 
levels: positive relevance (PO), negative relevance (NE), irrelevance (IR)), and priors 
(with four levels: HH, HL, LH, LL, meaning, for example, that P(A) = low and P(C) = high 
for LH). One further factor varied between participants: type of irrelevance (with two 
levels labelled ‘same content’ and ‘different content’). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two irrelevance conditions for each scenario implementing a 
conceptual distinction between whether A is topically relevant or irrelevant for C. As 
this factor did not affect any of the results reported here we do not discuss it any 
further (see supplementary materials, section 3) and only use the different content 
irrelevance condition in Experiment 2. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
We created 18 different scenarios (see supplemental materials for full list) for each of 
which we constructed 16 conditions according to our design (i.e., 4 conditions for PO 
[i.e., HH, HL, LH, LL], 4 conditions for NE, 4 conditions for IR-same content, and 4 
conditions for IR-different content; note again that the two IR conditions were 
collapsed for the analysis as they did not differ). Each participant worked on one 
randomly selected (without replacement) scenario for each of the 12 within-subjects 
conditions such that each participant saw a different scenario for each condition.21 
Following the recommendations of Reips (2002) to reduce dropout rates, we 
presented two SAT comprehension questions as an initial high hurdle in a warm-up 
phase (in addition to using them for excluding participants). 
The experiment was split into twelve blocks, one for each within-subjects 
condition. The order of the blocks was randomized anew for each participant and                                                              
21  The supplementary materials contain details on how 12 scenarios were selected for 
future experimentation on the basis of the 18 scenarios we created. 
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there were no breaks between the blocks. Within each block, participants were 
presented with two pages. The scenario text was placed at the top of each page. One 
participant might thus see the following scenario text:  
 
Julia has gained some weight during her holiday in Egypt, and now wishes to lose 5 
kilos. She is very determined to make lifestyle changes. She is not obese by any 
means. Yet it is unlikely that she will end up looking like a model — nor is it her goal. 
Most would characterise her as being within the normal range.   
 
The idea was to use brief scenario texts concerning basic causal, functional, or 
behavioral information that uniformly activates stereotypical assumptions about the 
relevance and prior probabilities of the antecedent and the consequent of 12 
conditionals that implement our experimental conditions for each scenario. So to 
introduce the 12 within-subjects conditions for the scenario text above we, inter alia, 
exploited the fact that participants would assume that Julia’s beginning to exercise 
would raise the probability of her losing weight (PO), lower the probability of her 
gaining weight (NE), and that a sentence describing the present weather conditions of 
the location where Julia spent her holiday would be irrelevant for whether or not ‘Julia 
will lose weight’ by exercising after returning from the holiday (IR). 
On the first page of each block, the scenario text was followed by two questions 
presented in random order that measured the prior probability of the two sentences:  
 
Please rate the probability of the following statement on a scale from 0 to 100%:  
[Julia begins to exercise/ Julia will gain weight] 
 
On the second page, the same scenario text was followed by four questions presented 
in random order. The first two questions measured the conditional probability of the 
consequent given the antecedent, P(C|A), and its negation, P(C|∼A). To illustrate using 
the NE-LL condition (= negative relevance, P(A) = low, P(C) = low) for the scenario 
above:  
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Suppose Julia has weight loss surgery. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the following sentence is true on a 
scale from 0 to 100%: 
Julia will gain weight. 
 
The third question, the relevance rating, asked the participants to rate the extent to 
which the antecedent was relevant for the consequent on a five point scale ranging 
from ‘irrelevant’ to ‘highly relevant’. The fourth question, the reason relation scale, 
asked the participants to rate the extent to which the antecedent was a reason 
for/against the consequent on a five point scale ranging from ‘a strong reason against’, 
‘a reason against’, ‘neutral’, and ‘a reason for’ to ‘a strong reason for’. For each 
question, participants gave their response by entering a number into a specified field. 
The full list of scenarios, the raw data, the data preparation script, and the analysis 
script for both Experiment 1 and 2 can all be found at: https://osf.io/fdbq2/. 
 
Results and Discussion 
We performed a manipulation check (see supplementary materials) and prepared the 
data for the analysis. Perceived relevance was initially measured in an undirected way, 
because it was assumed that participants would not be sensitive to the theoretical 
distinction between positive and negative relevance. To obtain a directed perceived 
relevance rating, we combined the directional information of the reason relation scale 
with the relevance rating to generate a directional relevance scale ranging from -4 
(strongly negatively relevant) to +4 (strongly positively relevant). If participants 
indicated that A was a reason against C on the reason relation scale, their assessment 
of how relevant A was for C was interpreted as negative relevance. If the participants 
indicated that A was a reason for C, their assessment of how relevant A was for C was 
interpreted as positive relevance. If the participants indicated that A was neutral in 
relation to C, their assessment was interpreted as that A was irrelevant for C. The 
reason relation scale was coded on a scale from -2 (strong reason against) to +2 
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(strong reason for). ∆P and the difference measure were calculated from the 
conditional probability questions and the prior of the consequent. 
As the data had replicates both on the level of the participant (each participant 
provided one response for each of the 12 within-participant conditions) and on the 
level of the scenarios (each scenario could appear in each relevance condition across 
participants) we employed a linear mixed model (LMM) analysis with crossed random 
effects for participants and scenarios for the analysis (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 
2008). We estimated one LMM with directional relevance scale as dependent variable 
and one LMM with reason relation as dependent variable. Each LMM had fixed effects 
for ∆P as well as the difference measure. The random effects structures were 
“maximal” (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, &Tily, 2013): random intercepts for participants and 
contents with by-participant and by-content random slopes for both fixed effects, and 
correlations among all by-participant and among all by-content random terms. Fixed 
effects were evaluated via the Kenward-Roger approximation (via afex; Singmann, 
Bolker, Westfall, & Aust, 2016). The LMMs did not include effects for the prior 
manipulations, which were primarily introduced to ensure that our results generalize 
to the whole spectrum of sentences describing likely and unlikely events. 
 
Fig. 1. LMM estimates of fixed effects for Experiment 1. In the left panel the 
directional relevant scale is the dependent variable and in the right panel reason 
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relation is the dependent variable. Error bands show 95% confidence intervals 
from the LMM. 
 
Fig. 1 displays the estimated effects from both models which clearly show that 
the effects of ∆P are considerably stronger than the effects of the difference measure 
(dashed lines). Furthermore, for the model with relevance scale as dependent 
variable, ∆P was a significant predictor, F(1, 20.94) = 269.07, p < .0001, but the 
difference measure failed to be, F(1, 18.21) = 1.30, p = .27. This indicates that in 
contrast to the difference measure, only ∆P could explain unique variance. For the 
model with reason relation as dependent variable both ∆P, F(1, 18.99) = 232.35, p < 
.0001, as well as the difference measure, F(1, 17.26) = 7.72, p = .01, were significant 
predictors.22 Although initially purely philosophically motivated, it turns out that the 
explication of relevance and reason relations of Spohn (2012) in terms of ∆P is 
descriptive of the assessments of our participants. See supplementary materials 
(section 2) for a comparison with a further confirmation measure.23 
 
Experiment 2 
The last 10-15 years of research on conditionals within the psychology of reasoning 
have been marked by the emergence of a New Paradigm characterized by a shift from 
models based on classical logic to probabilistic competence models (Elqayam & Over, 
2013). Within the New Paradigm there is a widespread endorsement of the Equation, 
P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Baratgin, Over,                                                              
22  Note that the zero-order correlations of the difference measure with both dependent 
variables were highly significant (r > .39). But its effect was reduced in the joint LMM due to 
the high covariance with ∆P (r = .73), which was itself more strongly correlated with both 
dependent variables (r > .53). 
23  We tested a further confirmation measure, Keynes and Horwich’s logged-ratio 
measure (Tentori et al., 2007). Unfortunately, this measure introduces the problem of 
extreme (- ∞) or undefined values for 24% of our observations (e.g., when the denominator is 
0). When analyzing the reduced sample, no unique variance was accounted for by the logged-
ratio measure and again only ∆P was a significant predictor (see section 2, supplementary 
materials). Other proposed confirmation measures contain variables not collected in this 
study (such as the likelihood) and could therefore not be applied to our data. 
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and Politzer, 2013; Pfeifer, 2013). In addition to direct evidence stemming from 
investigations of the probability of the conditionals, and evidence from the truth table 
task (Over & Evans, 2003), it has been suggested that evidence from uncertain and-to-
if inferences supports this view (Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over, 2015). Cruz et al. 
(2015, p. 3) use their results from uncertain and-to-if inferences to make an argument 
in favor of the Equation based on the following line of thought: “If people’s judgments 
are highly incoherent for one interpretation [of the conditional], and yet highly 
coherent for another, there is an argument in favor of the interpretation that renders 
their judgments coherent”. Since it was found that the Equation was better able to 
make the participants’ responses coherent than the material conditional, 24 they 
interpret their results as providing strong evidence in favor of the Equation. 
In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016), we found that the evidence 
for the Equation was qualified once P(if A, then C) was evaluated across three 
relevance levels, where relevance was defined as described above.25 While there was 
an almost perfect relationship between P(if A, then C) and P(C|A) in the positive 
relevance (PO) condition, this relationship was markedly weaker in the negative 
relevance (NE) and even weaker in the irrelevance (IR) condition. Moreover, the 
results showed that P(C|A) is a much better predictor of P(Even if A, then still C) across 
relevance levels. The second goal of the present study is therefore to test whether 
introducing the same relevance manipulation to and-to-if inferences leads participants 
to perceive a defect in the conditionals in the NE and IR conditions, which should make 
them more reluctant to infer the conclusion under these conditions. 
Following our earlier findings (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016), we hypothesize 
that the results of Cruz et al. (2015) are similarly affected by a relevance manipulation. 
More specifically, in line with Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016) we hypothesize that for 
                                                             
24  The material conditional (‘⊃’) has a truth table that is logically equivalent to ‘¬A ∨ C’ 
and for this reason, Cruz et al. (2015) attribute the prediction that P(if A, then C) = P(¬A ∨ C) 
to this theory.  
25  For results on introducing the relevance manipulation into the truth table task see 
Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Krahl, and Klauer (in review).  
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indicative  conditionals we replicate their findings in the PO condition, but not in the 
NE or IR conditions. In contrast, for the concessive (i.e., even-if) conditionals, the level 
of probabilistic coherence of the participants was not expected to drop in the NE/IR 
conditions as compared to the PO condition.  Hence, we test whether the participant’s 
degree of probabilistic consistency drops under manipulations of negative relevance 
and irrelevance for indicative conditionals, when P(if A, then C) and P(C|A) are 
equated.   
 
Method 
Participants 
The present experiment was part of Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016); consequently we 
analyzed the same 348 participants reported there.26 However, the data for this 
specific task are reported here for the first time. Data were collected over the 
Internet.  
 
Design 
Experiment 2 implemented a mixed design with the same 12 within-participant 
conditions as Experiment 1. In addition, the type of conditional was varied between 
participants (with two levels: indicative (‘if A, then C’), concessive (‘Even if A, then still 
C’)). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Prior to Experiment 2, we selected 12 scenarios from the set of 18 scenarios for which 
all within-subjects condition were most precisely realized (see supplementary 
                                                             
26   In contrast to the other task in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016), the present task did not 
involve differentiating between assessing the probability and acceptability of the respective 
sentences as two modes of evaluation. For this reason, the two groups evaluating 
probabilities and acceptabilities separated in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016) are analyzed 
together below.  
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materials). The 12 within-participants conditions were randomly assigned to 12 
different scenarios for each participant anew.27 Moreover, in contrast to Experiment 
1, the participants reported probabilities using sliders ranging from 0% to 100%. Aside 
from this, Experiment 2 was designed following the schema of Experiment 1.  
Within each of the 12 within-participants conditions, the participants were 
presented with three pages, which had a randomly chosen scenario text at the top. On 
the first page of the experiment, the scenario text was followed by two questions 
presented in random order. The first measured the conditional probability of the 
consequent given the antecedent using the same question format as in Experiment 1. 
The second question measured the probability of the conjunction of the antecedent 
and the consequent, which was used to measure the probability of the premise of an 
inference task on the third page.  
On the second page, the participants evaluated either the acceptability or the 
probability of conditionals in a task reported in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016). On the 
third page, the participants were presented with a short argument, whose premise 
was the conjunction, and a conditional as the conclusion. The participants were here 
reminded of the probability that they had assigned to the conjunction on the first page 
and asked to assess the probability of the conditional on its basis. Thus, one 
participant might see the following question on page three: 
 
In the following you will be presented with a short argument.  
Premise: Julia starts to exercise AND Julia will gain weight. 
(You have estimated the probability of the premise as: 13%)  
Based on the premise and it's probability, please indicate how much confidence you 
have in the following conclusion:  
Conclusion: Therefore, IF Julia starts to exercise, THEN Julia will gain weight. 
 
 
                                                             
27   See also: https://osf.io/j4swp/. 
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Results and Discussion 
We estimated probabilistic coherence across relevance manipulations in the and-to-if 
inference following Cruz et al. (2015). 28  This entailed comparing the observed 
coherence rates against a chance coherence rate. 29 As shown in Table 1, the 
descriptive data seemed to confirm our predictions. For indicative conditionals 
participants’ probabilistic coherence was above chance levels only for PO while for the 
concessive conditionals participants’ probabilistic coherence was above chance levels 
for all relevance conditions. Table 1 also shows whether participants’ probability 
evaluations conformed to P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) independent of the uncertain and-to-if 
inference task (i.e., both responses from the first page of each within-subject 
condition). Participants reliably conform to this inequality in ≈ 78% of the cases (≈ 19% 
above chance) across relevance levels with 77% in PO, 81% in NE, and 76% in IR. In 
contrast, the participants’ conformity to P(Conclusion) ≥ P(A,C) varied markedly across 
relevance levels with 87% in PO, 66% in NE, and 54% in IR. Given this apparent 
discrepancy between the effects of our relevance factor on the conformity to these 
two inequalities, we decided to analyze the effect of relevance on the conformity to 
both inequalities together while correcting for chance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
28  Cruz et al. (2015) argued that – given the truth of the Equation, where P(if A, then C) is 
interpreted as P(C|A) – participants have to respond with P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A&C) to be 
probabilistically coherent. From P(A&C) = P(C|A)*P(A) and 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1 it follows that P(C|A) ≥ 
P(A&C). 
29  Assuming that a response produced by any other process or a random response has 
an equal chance of falling on any point of the response scale, the probability of selecting a 
response greater than P(A,C) amounts to 1 – P(A,C).  
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Table 1. Frequency of probabilistically coherent and-to-if inference (and corresponding 
percentages). 
P(conclusion) ≥ P(A,C) P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) 
 True Chance ∆ True ∆ 
P(conclusion) = P(If A, C) 1511  (69%) 59% 9% 1713  (78%) 19% 
PO 634    (87%) 45% 41% 565    (77%) 32% 
NE 481    (66%) 71% -5% 591    (81%) 10% 
IR 396    (54%) 62% -8% 557    (76 %) 14% 
P(conclusion) = P(Even if) 1516  (77%) 59% 18% 1557  (79%) 20% 
PO 515    (78%)  47% 31% 508    (77%) 30% 
NE 482    (73%)  70% 3% 518    (79%) 9% 
IR 519    (79%)  60% 19% 531    (81%) 20% 
Note. “True” gives raw probabilistic coherence, “Chance” gives probabilistic coherence 
based on uniform responses, and “∆” their difference. Value for conformity to P(C|A) ≥ 
P(A,C) are given in the two rightmost columns. 
 
The statistical analysis of these data followed Singmann, Klauer, and Over’s 
(2014; see also Evans, Thompson, & Over, 2015). We first coded coherent/conforming 
responses in which either P(Conclusion) or P(C|A) was at least as large as that of the 
premise with ‘1’ and incoherent responses/non-conforming with ‘0’. To implement the 
chance baseline, we subtracted 1 minus the probability of the premise from this value. 
We then estimated a LMM with this chance corrected violation score (in which values 
above 0 indicate coherent/conforming responding above chance) as dependent 
variable and relevance condition as well as type of probabilistic measure (coherence 
versus conformity) and their interaction as independent variables separately for the 
indicative and concessive conditional groups. We thus had two LMMs in total; one for 
each type of conditional group (i.e., indicative and concessive). We again estimated 
crossed random effects for participants and scenarios with maximum random slopes 
(i.e., by-participant and by-scenario random slopes for all fixed effects plus 
correlations among the slopes). 
For the indicative conditionals the statistical analysis confirmed our prediction 
that relevance affects probabilistic coherence. It also affected probabilistic conformity, 
but to a lesser degree. All effects of the LMM were significant (including the intercept), 
most importantly the interaction of relevance condition and type of probabilistic 
measure, F(2, 15.15) = 25.15, p < .0001. It indicated that coherence was only above 
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chance for PO (β = 0.42, 95% CI [0.33, 0.50]), but not for NE (β = -0.05, 95% CI [-0.11, 
0.00]) and IR (β = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.00]). In contrast, conformity was above 
chance for all three conditions (smallest β for NE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.05, 0.14]). Note also 
that for both types, PO was larger than NE and IR (all ps < .0001), while the latter two 
did not differ from each other (ps > .43). 
For the concessive conditionals we found both a significant intercept indicating 
general above chance responses, β = 0.19, 95% CI [0.15, 0.23], F(1, 21.37) = 78.39, p < 
.0001, and an effect of relevance condition, F(2, 13.05) = 18.75, p = .0001, but no 
further effects (all remaining p > .22) indicating that type of probabilistic measure had 
no effect for the concessive conditionals. For the main effect of relevance, all three 
relevance conditions differed significantly from each other, all p < .004, but coherence 
and conformity were significantly above chance in each case (βNE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.01, 
0.12], βIR = 0.19, 95% CI [0.14, 0.25], and βPO = 0.30, 95% CI [0.23, 0.37]).  
As Table 1 indicates, the proportions of coherent or conforming responses were 
around 78% across relevance conditions in all cases except for probabilistic coherence 
for indicative conditionals. Table 1 indicates that all further differences in the 
statistical analysis are solely driven by different sizes of the chance intervals. This 
finding thus corroborates the result from Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016) that P(if A, 
then C) ≠ P(C|A) for negative relevance or irrelevance but that P(Even if A, then still C) 
= P(C|A) across all relevance levels. 
Our results extend Cruz et al. (2015), who found that participants were 
probabilistically coherent above chance levels overall. However, they employed 
stimulus material inspired by the Linda problem from Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) 
work on the conjunction fallacy, which implements only the PO condition for the 
indicative conditional at one specific priors level (‘If Linda votes in the municipal 
elections, then she votes for the Socialist Party’).30 In contrast, our results are based 
on all permutations of the relevance and priors levels for both indicative and 
concessive conditionals.                                                               
30   Nicole Cruz (personal communication, 20.05.2016). 
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Interestingly, Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013) showed that the prevalence of 
the conjunction fallacy also depends on whether or not the information the 
participants are given in the scenario is positively relevant for the second conjunct. 
Tentori et al. (2013) interpret their results as showing that the participants committing 
the conjunction fallacy tend to substitute a sound estimation of confirmation relations 
for the intended probability assignment. This introduces the possibility that a similar 
cognitive mechanism may be implemented in the participants’ lack of conformity to 
P(conclusion) ≥ P(premise) above chance levels in the NE and IR conditions. 
 
General Discussion 
In this study we manipulated relevance and prior probabilities using a new cluster of 
scenarios (see supplementary materials). Experiment 1 presented evidence for high 
agreement between ∆P and ratings of perceived relevance and reason relations and 
suggests that ∆P is a better predictor than the difference measure. Follow up studies 
might contrast ∆P with further confirmation measures (see Tentori et al., 2007; 
Douven and Verbrugge, 2012). Interestingly, when removing extreme (- ∞) and 
undefined values, ∆P correlates to a very high degree, r = .96, with the following log 
odds ratio for our data set: 
τ(C|A)- τ(C|A�) ≈  𝑙𝑛 � 𝑃(𝑌=1|𝑋=1)𝑃(𝑌=0|𝑋=1)𝑃(𝑌=1|𝑋=0)
𝑃(𝑌=0|𝑋=0) � 
 
The logged odds ratio measure thus accounts for pretty much the same 
variance as ∆P. The log odds ratio measure is a more direct approximation of Spohn’s 
(2012: ch. 6) ranking-theoretic explication of the reason relation (i.e. τ(C|A)- τ(C|A�)> 
0) in probability theory, and it was therefore used as a relevance parameter in the 
logistic regression model of the conditional inference task put forward in Skovgaard-
Olsen (2015). 
In their relevance theory, Wilson and Sperber (2004; see also Sperber, Cara, 
Girotto, 1995) propose that maximization of relevance is a general principle 
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structuring both cognition and communication. Their account introduces an economic 
aspect to assessments of relevance; the cost of processing information decreases the 
perceived relevance, whereas the gain in cognitive effects increases the perceived 
relevance. In principle, it is possible to combine this idea with Spohn’s (2012) theory as 
the latter gives us a precise notion of cognitive effect in terms of difference-making in 
degrees of belief, and the precise formal principles guiding belief revision, whereas 
Sperber and Wilson’s theory introduces a focus on processing costs.  
In Experiment 2, we examined the role of relevance for the uncertain and-to-if 
inference task presented in Cruz et al. (2015). It was found that the participants 
perform above chance levels for PO, but below chance levels for NE and IR, thus 
qualifying Cruz et al.’s (2015) results. This result is hard to reconcile with probabilistic 
approaches to the semantics of conditionals that equate P(if A, then C) with P(C|A) 
(Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 2013). In fact, it presents these 
theories with a dilemma: either P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) does not hold across relevance 
manipulations, or the participants are less probabilistically coherent than initially 
seemed to be the case.  
The Equation (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)) here acts as an auxiliary assumption that 
implies P(conclusion) ≥ P(premise), if the participants are to be probabilistically 
coherent. Throughout the last 10-15 years, the Equation has been supported time 
after time (see Douven, 2015: ch. 3-4). However, relevance levels dramatically 
moderate this relationship (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). Accordingly, we suggested 
that conditionals that violate the default assumption of positive relevance (e.g. ‘If the 
sun is shining in Egypt, then Julia will lose weight’) are viewed as defective and 
penalized in their probability ratings. Based on these results, we suspect that the 
culprit that makes it appear that the participants are probabilistically incoherent in the 
NE and IR condition is the Equation. On the alternative outlined in Skovgaard-Olsen et 
al. (2016), the participants rely on a heuristic for assessing reason relations when 
evaluating P(if A, then C), which introduces no normative requirement that 
P(conclusion) ≥ P(premise) for the NE and IR conditions, where there is no strong 
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relationship between P(if A, then C) and P(C|A). The participants’ lack of conformity to 
P(conclusion) ≥ P(premise) above chance levels in the NE and IR conditions is in other 
words explained by the perceived defect of these conditionals owing to their violation 
of the expectation that A is a reason for C.  
This interpretation is supported by the observation that participants conformed 
to P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) in their probability evaluations independently of the uncertain and-
to-if inference task in ≈ 78% of the cases both in the group with indicative and with 
concessive conditionals across relevance conditions. Hence, the below chance level 
performance in the uncertain and-to-if inference task for the NE and IR conditions 
does not appear to reflect a general failure to conform to P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) across 
relevance levels. 
Aside from the Equation, which introduces the normative requirement that 
P(conclusion) ≥ P(premise), because P(Conclusion) is treated as P(C|A) and it is a 
requirement of probability theory that P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C), other semantics of conditionals 
are also committed to P(conclusion) ≥ P(premise) in the and-to-if inference. The 
reason is that several conditional logics treat ‘A ∧C ⊨ if A, then C’ as a valid argument 
schema (Arlo-Costa, 2007), and given P(B) ≥ P(A), whenever A ⊨ B, it holds that P(if A, 
then C) ≥ P(A ∧ C).  
One example is Lewis’ semantics of counterfactuals, and there is already 
discussion about whether a weakening of the system should be allowed, which avoids 
treating ‘A ∧C ⊨ if A were, then C would have been’ as a theorem (Kutschera, 1974). It 
remains to be seen, whether there are differences in the participants’ conformity to 
P(Conclusion) ≥ P(A ∧ C) for indicative and counterfactual conditionals across 
relevance conditions.  
However, it is clear that other theories aside from those endorsing the Equation 
are faced by explanatory challenges by our results. As Douven (2015: section 2.1-2.2) 
points out, ‘A ∧C ⊨ if A, then C’ is valid for semantics of indicative conditionals such as 
the material conditional, Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics, and three-valued truth 
tables like the de Finetti table. Yet it is rejected by Inferentialism, which holds that it is 
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part of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals that there is an inferential 
relation connecting A and C. 
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Supplementary Materials: 
Manipulation Check and Selection of Scenarios 
We first performed a manipulation check to ensure that the numbers the participants 
provided could be interpreted as probabilities satisfying the axioms of the probability 
calculus. To this end, the law of total probability, 𝑃(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐶|𝐴𝑖)𝑃(𝐴𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1 , was 
applied to the measurements of P(A), P(C|A), and P(C|¬A) to calculate an ideal value 
that P(C) should take if the participants were probabilistically consistent. This 
calculated value for P(C) was then subtracted from the actual value of P(C) supplied by 
the participants to form a probabilistic consistency scale using the following formula: 1 − |𝑃(𝐶) −  [𝑃(𝐶|𝐴) ∙ 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐶|?̅?) ∙ (1 − 𝑃(𝐴))]|. This measure takes on values 
smaller or equal to one, where a value of one indicates perfect probabilistic 
consistency. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of mean consistency values for the 
participants in a boxplot and reveals that participants are surprisingly probabilistically 
consistent with 75% of the distribution having probabilistic consistency rates of almost 
.9. Given these results we were confident that participants’ responses could be 
interpreted as probabilities. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Probabilistic consistency ratings of 
the participants based on applying the law 
of total probability to the probabilities they 
provided. 
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Experiment 1: Correlation Matrices 
Table 1 displays the inter-correlation of the four variables of Experiment 1 and shows 
that, as expected, all correlations were highly significant. One can also see that, as 
hypothesized, ∆P seemed to be a better predictor for both relevance and the reason 
relation than the difference measure.  
 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Measures Obtained 
in Experiment 1 
 Reason 
relation 
∆P Difference 
Measure 
Mean (SD) 
Relevance 
Reason Relation 
∆P 
Difference Measure 
.81 
 
 
 
.54 
.58 
 
 
.40 
.46 
.73 
 
 0.73  (2.29) 
 0.06  (1.19) 
 0.01  (0.41) 
-0.01  (0.34) 
Note. All correlations are highly significant, p < .0001. Given the non-
independence of data points within participants and within contents, these p-
values should, however, be read with caution. The ranges for the variables 
are: directional relevance from -4 to 4, reason relation from -2 to 2, ∆P from -
1 to 1.   
 
To appropriately test this hypothesis it is important to consider that the data 
has replicates both on the level of the participant (since each participant provided one 
response for each of the 12 within-participant conditions) and on the level of the 
scenarios (as each scenario could appear in each relevance condition across 
participants). Due to this dependency structure with conditions repeated within 
participants and scenarios, standard statistical procedure such as correlation cannot 
be used. For this reason, a linear mixed model was used in the paper for the analysis.  
Out of the six confirmation measures mentioned in Tentori et al. (2007), our 
design only allowed us to test the Keynes and Horwich’s ratio measure, 
log(P(C|A)/P(C)) in addition to the difference measure (which is also listed there). 
Unfortunately, this measure introduces the problem of extreme (- ∞) or undefined 
values for 24% of our observations. Furthermore, it correlates highly with the 
difference measure for the reduced sample, r = .89: 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Measures Obtained in 
Experiment 1 
 Reason 
relation 
∆P Difference 
Measure 
Ratio Mean (SD) 
Relevance 
Reason Relation 
∆P 
Difference Measure 
Ratio 
.83 
 
 
 
.54 
.57 
 
 
.40 
.43 
.69 
 
.37 
.40 
.61 
.89 
 0.73  (2.29) 
 0.06  (1.19) 
 0.01  (0.41) 
-0.01  (0.34) 
-0.01  (0.80) 
Note. All correlations are highly significant, p < .0001. Given the non-independence 
of data points within participants and within contents, these p-values should, 
however, be read with caution. The ranges for the variables are: directional 
relevance from -4 to 4, reason relation from -2 to 2, ∆P from -1 to 1.   
 
When adding the ratio measure to our LMM model for Experiment 1, the 
results indicate that it accounts for no unique variance on its own for either perceived 
relevance, F(1, 24.00)  = 2.63, p = .12, or perceived reason relation as DV, F(1, 24.57)  = 
2.21, p = .15. Indeed, it remains the case that of these three predictors, only ∆P 
accounts for unique variance for perceived relevance, F(1, 25.14)  = 235.84, p < .0001, 
and perceived reason relation, F(1, 22.16)  = 216.87,  p < .0001.    
 
Selection of the Scenarios 
For the selection of the scenarios, the full sample of 725 participants was used without 
applying our exclusion criteria, and as there were no significant differences between 
the IR_S and IR_D conditions, the difference between them was collapsed for the 
analysis. 
The distinction between these two ways of implementing the irrelevance 
category was initially introduced in an attempt to implement the notion of ‘topical 
relevance’ from relatedness logic (Iseminger, 1986; Walton, 2004: ch. 4), which treats 
two propositions as relevant if they share a subject matter and as irrelevant if they 
don’t. The way we operationalized this requirement was that two propositions are 
judged to be relevant, if they concern the same context/content and irrelevant if they 
didn’t. Accordingly, if Stephen is going on a date, then we assumed that if two 
propositions (A, C) both concern preparations for the dating situation then they will 
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share a subject matter, whereas a proposition concerning what Stephen’s neighbor 
likes to eat (B) concerns a different subject matter. Under this assumption, A and C are 
topically relevant to each other, whereas A and B are topically irrelevant to each other. 
However, as there were no significant differences between the IR_S and IR_D 
conditions, the difference between them was collapsed for the analysis, and the IR_D 
conditions of our stimulus materials were selected for Experiment 2. 
To prevent scenario content from becoming a nuisance variable only complete 
scenarios were selected so that we could ensure that all experimental conditions were 
represented within each scenario. For each experimental condition, the outputs of the 
following three equations were z-transformed and the average was taken. This 
average was used to calculate the 30th percentile with the largest distance from 
optimal: (1) (∆𝑃���� − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙)2, (2) �𝑃(𝐴)������� − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙�2, and (3) �𝑃(𝐶)������� − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙�2. 
To illustrate, for the experimental condition IRHH, the optimal value of ∆P would be 0 
and the optimal values of P(A) and P(C) would be 100. So to ensure that our selected 
scenarios were able to implement this experimental condition, the distance of the 
average ∆P, P(A), and P(C) from these optimal values was used as a selection criterion.  
For each scenario, the frequency of its experimental conditions lying within the 
30th percentile of the worse experimental conditions was counted. The 30th percentile 
with the largest number of bad experimental conditions was then used to exclude six 
complete scenarios. That is to say, scenarios with five or more counts of worse 
experimental conditions were excluded. The mean frequency of the worse 
experimental manipulations for excluded scenarios was 5.83, and the mean frequency 
of worse manipulations for included scenarios was 2.6. In one case, a choice had to be 
made between two scenarios that both had 5 worse manipulations using boxplots. 
   In Table 3, summary statistics is shown for the excluded {3, 4, 6, 9, 15, 18} and 
included scenarios {1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17}. With ∆P values of almost 0 
on average for the IR conditions and the NE and PO conditions differing with ∆P values 
above |.25| from the IR conditions in the expected directions, the relevance 
manipulations were successfully implemented. Moreover, with high and low prior 
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manipulations differing on average with |.20| or more from the midpoint of the scale, 
the priors manipulations was also successfully implemented. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of selected scenarios.  
 Included  Excluded 
PO ∆P mean .32 .22 
NE ∆P mean -.27 -.21 
IR ∆P mean -.01 .020 
Mean high P(A) .70 .63 
Mean low  P(A) .15 .15 
Mean high P(C) .77 .70 
Mean low  P(C) .27 .30 
 
However, because complete scenarios were selected some outliers had to be 
accepted in particular scenarios, which are still in need of further improvement.  
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Abstract 
In this study we investigate the influence of reason relation readings of indicative 
conditionals and ‘and’, ‘but’, and ‘therefore’ sentences on various cognitive 
assessments. According to the Frege-Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. 
Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect 
participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two 
experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into 
the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability 
and probability evaluations. Across the two experiments a strong dissociation was 
found. The reason relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their 
probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth 
evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are 
discussed.  
 Keywords: Relevance, truth conditions, indicative conditionals, probability, 
acceptability, conjunctions 
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Introduction 
The goal of the present paper is to investigate experimentally which cognitive 
assessments are affected by salient reason-relation readings of conjoined sentences. 
Following the tradition in linguistics, philosophy and psychology, we will focus on 
truth, probability, and acceptability evaluations (Garmut, 1991; McCawley, 1993; 
Nickerson, 2015). For our target sentences, we have chosen indicative conditionals 
(e.g. ‘if it rains, then Sally’s birthday party will be ruined’) and ‘But’, ‘And’, and 
‘Therefore’ sentences (henceforth referred to as ABT sentences). As we will explain in 
detail below, a focused comparison between these sentences allows us to investigate 
which aspects of their meaning are influenced by their reason relation reading. 
 The standard work of reference in this context is Grice’s (1989) seminal work. In 
that book, Grice was concerned with enforcing Modified Occam’s Razor as a 
methodological principle, according to which “Senses are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity” (p. 47). Grice’s central point was that when modeling the meaning of 
natural language content, we can keep the logic simple by distinguishing between the 
truth-conditional content of sentences and the different implicatures that enrich the 
truth-conditional content of such sentences. In particular, Grice (1989) was concerned 
about things such as preventing that: 
 
1) we reject the truth table of the material implication (‘⊃’) as a model of the 
truth conditional content of indicative conditionals (see Table 1 below) 
based on the fact that natural language conditionals have a prominent 
reason relation reading, according to which the antecedent is a reason for 
the consequent, 
2) we reject the truth table of the logical conjunction (‘∧’) based on the fact 
that natural language conjunctions have readings that indicate temporal 
succession and causal relations, and 
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3) we reject the logical conjunction as a model of the truth conditional 
content of sentences involving ‘but’ and ‘therefore’ based on the salient 
reason relation reading of natural language sentences in which they occur. 
 
A key distinction proposed by Grice (1989) was conversational and conventional 
implicatures. These twin notions provided the means to explain how these various 
sentences could have a meaning that goes beyond their truth conditional content. The 
notion of a conversational implicature was called upon to explain the pragmatic 
phenomenon that we often use words to convey a meaning that differs from what we 
literally say. For instance, when Julia responds that “I don’t like parties” to the 
question “Are you going to the party tonight?”, her interlocutor can infer that the 
message that Julia intends to convey is that she won’t go to the party tonight (Blome-
Tillmann, 2013). Grice’s (1989) project was to reconstruct such pragmatic inferences 
to the intended meaning rationally, based on maxims of informative, truthful, 
relevant, and clear communication that implement the goal of cooperative discourse.    
In addition, Grice (1989) also introduced the category of conventional 
implicatures to account for the cases where it is not a feature of the utterance of a 
sentence in a particular context that invites an interpretation of the intended meaning 
that differs from the truth conditional content of the sentence. In particular, Grice 
thought that it was part of the conventional meaning of ‘therefore’ to introduce a 
consequence relation (e.g. ‘He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave’), which goes 
beyond its truth conditions as modeled by the logical conjunction.  
Another example is that sentences such as ‘she was poor but honest’ have been 
thought to express a contrast between being poor and honest since Frege (1892), 
which is not to be found in its truth-conditional equivalent ‘she was poor and honest’. 
Often the treatment of ‘but’ is left with this observation in the philosophical literature. 
In fact, the analysis of ‘but’ is a rich topic in linguistics, where at least four different 
readings are dissected. However, attempts have been undertaken to subsume these 
various readings under the prominent denial of expectation reading, where an implicit 
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or explicit assumption is denied by the second clause (Iten, 2000, Chap. 5; Blackmore, 
2004, Chap. 4), which is closely related to a reason relation reading. 
 Common to both conversational and conventional implicatures is the 
expectation that their content will not affect the truth-conditional content of the 
sentences in which they occur (Potts, 2015). Conversational implicatures and 
conventional implicatures differ in that only conversational implicatures can be 
cancelled (e.g. adding the qualification “I don’t like parties, but I would be happy to 
come tonight” cancels the conversational implicature that Julia won’t attend the party 
tonight). Furthermore, only conventional implicatures can be detached, or removed, 
by uttering a different sentence with the same truth-conditional content in the 
context of utterance (e.g. uttering “she was poor and honest” instead of “she was 
poor but honest”). Finally, only conversational implicatures can be reconstructed on 
the basis of Grice’s maxims of conversation (Blome-Tillmann, 2013).  
 It is not uncommon to find references to semantic and pragmatic modulation in 
the psychological literature (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002), or to invoke Grice’s 
theory to explain pragmatic effects (Nickerson, 2015). Given the prominent role that 
Grice’s thought continues to have on theorizing about natural language, it is important 
that its central claims are subjected to empirical tests and do not just figure as ad hoc 
explanations that are invoked to explain divergent results when convenient.  
One natural assumption is that meaning components classified as 
conversational or conventional implicatures influence the acceptability/assertability 
assessments of the participants, but they should not affect their truth evaluations. This 
predicts a dissociation between the influence of factors relating to conversational and 
conventional implicatures on acceptability/assertability32 and truth-value assessments. 
Although probability assignments were not originally discussed in this context, we 
would expect them to be vary in tandem with the acceptability judgments. 
As noted above, the ABT sentences have been thought to be truth conditionally 
equivalent in the Frege/Grice tradition. In addition, therefore-sentences have a salient                                                              
32  In this paper we will not distinguish the two.  
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reason relation reading, whereby φ is a reason for ψ in “Nick forgot about her birthday 
(φ), therefore he didn’t buy Sally a present (ψ)”. In contrast, φ appears to be a reason 
against ψ in “Nick dislikes Sally (φ), but he attended her birthday party (ψ)”. Finally, 
and-sentences seem to fall somewhere in between and can be used as a baseline for 
comparing these two extremes.  
In light of these differences in their reason relation readings despite their 
assumed truth conditional equivalence, comparing the ABT sentences on their truth, 
probability, and acceptability evaluations will give us important clues about whether 
the abovementioned dissociation can be found. If the differences in their reason 
relation reading are attributable to implicatures, then these differences should only 
show up in their acceptability evaluations and probability evaluations. Yet their truth 
evaluations should be unaffected. If, on the contrary, the assumption is wrong that the 
ABT sentences only differ in their implicatures, then we should see evidence of their 
different reason relations readings affecting their truth evaluations.   
There is a long tradition in the psychology of reasoning of investigating truth 
conditions by presenting participants with the cells of truth tables in the truth-table 
task (for reviews, see Manktelow, 2012; Nickerson, 2015). However, in order to 
address the question of what range of cognitive evaluations the reason-relation 
reading affects, a measurement tool is needed to capture the presence and absence of 
specific reason relations and to be able vary it orthogonally to the presence or absence 
of other psychological factors of interest.   
 
Reason Relations 
For the purpose of this paper, we will rely on Spohn’s (2012, Chap. 6) explication of 
reason relations. According to Spohn (2012: ch. 6), the reason relation and the notion 
of epistemic relevance can be explicated as follows:  
THE ∆P RULE: ∆p = P(ψ | φ) – P(ψ | ¬φ)  
POSITIVE RELEVANCE/φ IS A REASON FOR ψ: ∆p > 0 
IRRELEVANCE: ∆p = 0 
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NEGATIVE RELEVANCE/φ IS A REASON AGAINST ψ: ∆p < 0 
The underlying intuition here is that relevant information changes the 
probability of the propositions that it concerns. The probabilistic change is here 
explicated through a comparison between conditioning on the information and 
conditioning on its negation. When such a comparison shows that φ increases the 
probability of ψ, then φ is said to be a reason for ψ. When it shows that φ decreases 
the probability of ψ, then φ is said to be a reason against ψ. Using these explications, 
we specify Grice’s conventional implicature hypothesis as follows: sentences 
containing ‘φ therefore ψ’ differ from sentences containing the connective ‘φ and ψ’ 
in suggesting that φ is a reason for ψ (∆p > 0), and sentences containing ‘φ but ψ’ 
differ from the latter in suggesting that φ is a reason against ψ (∆p < 0). 
In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016b), participants’ perceived 
reason relations and perceived relevance were investigated for a large range of 
everyday contexts, and empirical support for the explication of the reason relation 
above could be obtained. The stimulus materials used in the present study contains 12 
scenarios with 12 different conditions, implementing all permutations of positive 
relevance (PO), negative relevance (NE), irrelevance (IR) and high (H) and low (L) prior 
probability within each scenario. For ∆p values ranging from -1 to 1, a pretest with 725 
participants showed that the average ∆p was .32 for the positive relevance conditions, 
-.27 for the negative relevance conditions, -.01 for the irrelevance conditions. 
Moreover, the pretest found that the average prior probability was ca. 70% for the 
high probability items and less than 30% for the low probability items. 
The scenarios used were designed to trigger the participants’ stereotypical 
assumptions about basic causal, functional, or behavioral information to implement 
the above relevance categories. For instance, one scenario text runs as follows: 
 
Scott was just out playing with his friends in the snow. He has now gone inside but is 
still freezing and takes a bath. As both he and his clothes are very dirty, he is likely to 
make a mess in the process, which he knows his mother dislikes. 
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As verified in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b), the two sentences ‘Scott turns on the 
warm water’ and ‘Scott will be warm soon’ both have a high prior probability, with the 
first sentence raising the probability of the second (PO HH). Moreover, the sentence 
‘Scott turns on the cold water’ has a low prior probability and it lowers the probability 
of ‘Scott will be warm soon’ (NE LH). Finally, in the absence of further information it 
seems reasonable to assume that ‘Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as him’ has 
a high prior probability. Yet this sentence leaves the probability of the previous 
sentences unchanged and is therefore irrelevant for them. Now if ‘φ therefore ψ’ 
expresses positive relevance, then the sentence ‘Scott turns on the warm water 
therefore Scott will be warm soon’ should sound fine, and if ‘φ but ψ’ expresses 
negative relevance then the sentence ‘Scott turns on the warm water but Scott will be 
warm soon’ should sound rather strange. Conversely, the negative relevance version 
should sound better with ‘but’ (‘Scott turns on the cold water but Scott will be warm 
soon’) yet strange with ‘therefore’ (‘Scott turns on the cold water therefore Scott will 
be warm soon’).  
One area in which these explications have already been applied is in the 
empirical research on conditionals to which we now turn. As we shall see, indicative 
conditionals are another type of sentences which have a salient reason-relation 
reading, and there is currently a large theoretical interest in this field in diagnosing for 
which types of cognitive assessments the reason-relation reading plays a role. 
Accordingly, we will be interested in whether the same kind of dissociations 
predicted above with respect to the ABT sentences can be found for the cognitive 
evaluations of indicative conditionals. 
  
Reason Relations and Indicative Conditionals 
Throughout the last 10-15 years, a new paradigm has been introduced to the 
psychology of reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 2013) with researchers turning to 
probabilistic competence models of reasoning and drawing on Bayesian formal 
epistemology (Pfeifer & Douven, 2014). In the study of conditionals, this paradigm-
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shift is reflected in the widespread endorsement of “the Equation”, the Ramsey Test, 
and the de Finetti truth table (see Table 1 below).   
 
THE EQUATION: P(if φ, then ψ) = P(ψ | φ) (Bennett, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007).  
THE RAMSEY TEST: Instead of calculating conditional probabilities by means of the 
ratio P(φ and ψ)/ P(φ), the participants are conjectured to evaluate conditional 
probabilities on the basis of the Ramsey test. The Ramsey test is a mental 
algorithm that temporarily adds the antecedent to the participant’s stock of 
beliefs, makes changes to preserve consistency, and evaluates the consequent 
under its supposition (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Pfeifer, 
2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
As discussed by Elqayam and Over (2013), there are two direct sources of 
evidence supporting this approach to conditionals. First, it has long been known that 
the participants tend to judge the false antecedent cells of the truth table (⊥⊤, ⊥⊥) to 
be ‘irrelevant’ to the truth or falsity of the indicative conditional in the truth-table task 
(an effect known as “the defective truth table”). This defective truth table effect has 
been interpreted as direct evidence in favor of the de Finetti truth table (see Table 1), 
because it is hard to reconcile with accounts based on the material implication, which 
Table 1. Truth Tables of the Indicative Conditional  
Truth-Conditional Inferentialism 
 ⊤⊤ ⊤⊥ ⊥⊤ ⊥⊥ 
PO 
NE 
IR 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
Material Implication Account 
PO 
NE 
IR 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
De Finetti Table 
PO 
NE 
IR 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
⊥ 
void 
void 
void 
void 
void 
void 
Note. ‘⊤’ = true; ‘⊥’ = false; PO = positive relevance; NE 
= negative relevance; IR = irrelevance.  
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would require that the conditional is treated as true in the false antecedent cells (Over 
& Evans, 2003). Second, direct investigations of the probability of indicative 
conditionals have repeatedly supported the Equation. For example, P(ψ | φ) turns out 
to be a much better predictor of P(If φ, then ψ) than P(⌐φ ∨ ψ,), the probability under 
the material implication interpretation (Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & 
Sloman, 2007; Douven, 2015b, Chapters 3 and 4). 
Despite this empirical support for The Equation, recent results have shown, 
however, that the relationship between P(if φ, then ψ) and P(ψ | φ) is moderated by 
the relevance manipulation reviewed above. Employing the above-described stimulus 
material, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) showed that the marginal means of 
assessments of P(if φ, then ψ) were judged to be substantially lower in NE and IR than 
in PO and that the slopes of the regression lines employing P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of 
P(if φ, then ψ) were steeper in the PO condition. These results corroborate the idea 
that there is something defective about indicative conditionals that violate the default 
assumption of positive relevance. Thus whereas the sentence ‘If Scott turns on the 
warm water, then Scott will be warm soon’ (PO HH) has a high probability in the 
scenario above, sentences like ‘If Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as him, then 
Scott will turn on the warm water’ (IR HH) and ‘If Scott makes an effort to be tidy, then 
the bathroom will be dirtier than before he took his bath’ (NE HH) have a much lower 
probability than what would be expected based on P(ψ | φ) alone.  
In earlier empirical work (Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Over, 
Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, and Sloman, 2007; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014), 
the ∆p rule was investigated in relation to probability evaluations of conditionals, with 
little or no evidence for a relationship being found. But the crucial difference from 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al.’s (2016a) original study consists in that these other studies did 
not systematically vary ∆p to be negative, equal to zero and positive for realistic 
stimulus materials. In addition, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) did not assume that P(if 
φ, then ψ) would be directly predicted by either ∆p or P(ψ | ¬φ) as its proxy. Instead a 
heuristic for judging P(if φ, then ψ) based on a reason relation assessment was 
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formulated according to which the presence of negative relevance or irrelevance 
would make the participants apply a penalty to P(if φ, then ψ) based on the 
conditionals’ perceived defect in expressing a reason relation. 
In philosophy, it has long been argued that indicative conditionals without 
connection between the antecedent and the consequent (e.g. ‘If Copenhagen is in 
Denmark, then H. C. Anderson is dead’) are defective (Spohn, 2013; Olsen, 2014; 
Douven, 2015a; Krzyżanowska, 2015). This intuition has not, however, been integrated 
into contemporary treatments of conditionals in the psychology of reasoning based on 
either the classical treatment of conditionals as the material implication (‘⊃’), nor by 
probabilistic accounts based on the de Finetti truth table and the Ramsey test 
(Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a). 
As an alternative, Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven (2014) and 
Krzyżanowska (2015) argued that there should be an inferential relation (or reason 
relation) between the antecedent and the consequent as part of the truth conditions 
of indicative conditionals. In Krzyżanowska (2015, p. 62), the presence of either an 
indicative, abductive, or deductive inferential relation between the antecedent and 
the consequent is made part of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals. 
Moreover, they allow for auxiliary assumptions coming from the participants’ 
background knowledge to play a role in determining the inferential relation and add 
further qualifications that need not concern us here. Based on this line of reasoning, 
truth-conditional inferentialism predicts that the modal truth value assignments should 
follow the first rows in Table 1. 
One thing to note about the ‘True’ prediction for the ⊤⊥ cell is the following:33 
according to Krzyżanowska (2015: Chap.. 3), the inferential relation between φ and ψ 
admits exceptions (i.e. the ⊤⊥ cells) via inductive or abductive consequence relations. 
                                                             
33  Both Karolina Krzyżanowska and Igor Douven have confirmed that Table 1 is a 
reasonable explication of the definition cited above (personal communication, February, 
2016). However, Karolina Krzyżanowska did express some doubts about her earlier proposed 
definition and expressed concerns that it is less clear whether truth conditional inferentialism 
is really committed to predicting True for the ⊤⊥ cell in the positive relevance condition. 
 
98 
 
Inductive consequence relations would be instances of probability-raising based on 
purely frequentist information. Abductive consequence relations would be instances 
of probability raising based on explanatory considerations (e.g. causal structures and 
theoretical assumptions). Most likely, the stimulus material reviewed above and 
further specified in Table 2 below instantiates the abductive consequence relation. But 
crucially, it is not based on the deductive consequence relation, which does not admit 
of exceptions (i.e. the ⊤⊥ cells). 
As pointed out by Douven (2015a; 2015b), a main distinguishing feature of 
truth-conditional inferentialism is the rejection of the and-to-if inferences (i.e. 
inferring ‘if φ, then ψ’ from ‘φ and ψ’), which is valid under the other main semantics 
of conditionals. This inference is not supported by truth-conditional inferentialism, 
given φ is not a reason for ψ in the ⊤⊤ cell for the IR and NE condition.  
Note that whereas the Frege-Grice tradition is based on ignoring relevance 
differences between sentences in truth value evaluations, truth-conditional 
inferentialism stands out by making predictions that directly vary with the levels of the 
relevance factor. In contrast, both the material implication and the de Finetti truth 
tables follow the Frege-Grice tradition in assigning truth conditions to indicative 
conditionals that are invariant across the different levels of the relevance factor (see 
Table 1).  
For both the ABT sentences and indicative conditionals, the main focus of our 
experiments is to investigate whether evidence for the hypothesized dissociation can 
be found that the reason relation readings of these sentences affect the acceptability 
and probability evaluations of these sentences, but not their truth evaluations. In 
order to investigate these issues, Experiment 1 sets out to introduce the relevance 
manipulation into the truth-table task and Experiment 2 introduces the relevance 
manipulation into tasks that elicit the probability and acceptability judgments of our 
four target sentences. 
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Experiment 1 
As discussed above, it is part of the dissociation predicted by the Frege-Grice tradition 
that the truth table of the logical conjunction ‘∧’ fits the truth tables ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but 
ψ’, and ‘φ therefore ψ’, and that no effect of the relevance condition can be found for 
these three sentences (a hypothesis we denote as ‘H0_ABT’). Similarly, the material 
implication and de Finetti truth tables predict that no effect of the relevance condition 
should be found for ‘if φ, then ψ’ (a hypothesis we denote as ‘H0_IF’) and that the 
participants’ truth evaluations fit their respective truth tables (see Table 1). In 
contrast, truth-conditional inferentialism predicts that a relevance effect on the truth 
evaluations of ‘if φ, then ψ’ can be found, and that its respective truth table accurately 
describes participants’ modal responses. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted over the Internet to obtain a large and 
demographically diverse sample. A total of 752 people completed the experiment. The 
participants were sampled through Mechanical Turk from USA, UK, and Australia and 
were paid a small amount of money for their participation.  
The following exclusion criteria were used: 1) not having English as native 
language, 2) failing to answer two simple SAT comprehension questions correctly in a 
warm-up phase, 3) completing the task in less than 160 seconds or in more than 3600 
seconds, and 4) answering ‘not serious at all’ to the question of how serious the 
participant would take his or her participation at the beginning of the study. The final 
sample consisted of 557 participants. Mean age was 38 years, ranging from 18 to 75 
years; 36 % of the participants were male; 72 % indicated that the highest level of 
education that they had completed was an undergraduate degree or higher. The 
demographic measures of the participants differed only minimally before and after the 
exclusion.  
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Design 
The experiment involved a within-subject design. Specifically, there were three factors 
that were varied within participants: 1) sentence, with four levels: ‘…and…’, ‘…but…’, 
‘…therefore…’, ‘if…, then…’; 2) relevance, with three levels: PO, NE, and IR; and 3) 
priors, with four levels: HH, HL, LH, and LL (e.g. LH indicates that P(φ) = low and P(ψ) = 
high). The prior manipulation had the goal of ensuring that the participants’ truth 
evaluations were representative across different combinations of prior probabilities of 
the sentences in question.   
 
Materials 
The twelve within-participants conditions crossing the factors relevance and priors 
were randomly assigned to twelve different scenarios for each participant. Within 
each relevance level, each participant saw all four sentence levels randomly 
distributed across the priors manipulation. One participant might thus see the 
sentences ‘…and…’, ‘…but…’, ‘…therefore…’, ‘if…, then…’ in the PO level in the HH, LH, 
LL, HL prior levels, whereas the next would see them in a different permutation of the 
priors factor. 
With minor adjustments, the twelve scenarios used in this study were obtained 
from a large pre-study (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016b).34 From each of the twelve 
selected scenarios we were able to construe all twelve within-participant conditions. 
Consequently, mapping of the condition to each possible scenario was completely 
randomized for each participant anew.  
                                                             
34  The minor adjustments in question concern slight formulation changes to a few of the 
sentences and changing the temporal structure of all the sentences for the present 
experiment. Whereas the sentences in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b) had the temporal form 
of ‘if φ occurs, then ψ will occur’, their temporal form in the present study was ‘if φ is now 
happening, then ψ will occur’ (or: ‘φ is now happening and/but/therefore ψ will occur’). The 
latter temporal form was introduced in the present study to allow for the introduction of a 
reversal condition to test for violations of commutativity, which was later dropped prior to 
launching the experiment, however. 
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To  better illustrate these differences, Table 2 contains all of the experimental 
conditions for the ‘Scott scenario’ presented in the Introduction here illustrated using 
the connective ‘And’. 
 
Table 2. Stimulus Materials, Scott Scenario illustrated with And-Sentences  
                                    PO                                                           NE                                                      IR 
HH  Scott is now turning on the warm 
water AND he will be warm soon.  
Scott is now making an effort 
to be tidy AND the bathroom 
will be dirtier than before he 
took his bath.  
Scott’s friends are now also 
going home to take a bath 
AND Scott will turn on the 
warm water.  
HL  Scott is now making an effort to 
be tidy AND the bathroom will be 
just as clean as before he took his 
bath.  
Scott is now turning on the 
warm water AND he will soon 
start to freeze even more.  
Scott’s friends are now also 
going home to take a bath 
AND Scott will turn on the 
cold water.  
LH  Scott is now bathing in a hot 
spring AND he will be warm soon.  
Scott is now turning on the 
cold water AND he will be 
warm soon.  
Scott’s friends are now 
participating in the Winter 
Olympics AND Scott will turn 
on the hot water.  
LL  Scott is now turning on the cold 
water AND he will soon start to 
freeze even more.  
Scott is now bathing in a hot 
spring AND he will soon start 
to freeze even more.  
Scott’s friends are now 
participating in the Winter 
Olympics AND Scott will turn 
on the cold water.  
Note. PO = positive relevance; NE = negative relevance; IR = irrelevance.  
 
The complete list of stimulus materials, R-scripts, and raw data will be available 
on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/yder9/. 
 
Modified Truth Table Task 
For each of the twelve priors×relevance within-participants conditions stemming from 
our experimental design, the participants were presented with two pages. The first 
page featured a modified version of the truth-table task. In typical implementations of 
the truth-table task participants are asked to evaluate the truth value of a conditional 
statement on the basis of an outcome statement describing a cell in the truth table 
(TT, TF, FT, FF) with either binary or ternary response options (Schroyens, 2010; 
Nickerson, 2015, pp. 38). In our modified version, the participants were asked for each 
trial to evaluate the truth value of a randomly chosen sentence from our four target 
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sentences (‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, ‘φ therefore ψ’, ‘if φ, then ψ’) on the basis of two 
randomly chosen truth table cells.  
Since none of the truth tables reviewed in the introduction holds that speaker 
intentions and the Gricean maxims should play a role for the truth evaluation of the 
target sentences, we decided to test the participants’ truth evaluations under the 
relevance manipulation in a situation in which they would not have to worry about the 
speaker intentions behind uttering the strange IR items. To achieve this the 
participants were instructed that they should consider the target sentences as output 
produced by a computer program in the development phase in response to the 
scenario texts as input. A computer program in the development phase does not have 
any communicative intentions when producing odd sentences. Hence, calibrating its 
output based on truth values should increase a focus on truth evaluations of the 
sentences produced solely based on their content. The combination of naturalistic 
stimulus materials with our computer calibration task meant that the participants 
were encouraged to set aside concerns about speaker intentions behind the 
presented assertions and encouraged to use their background knowledge, underlying 
our manipulation of relevance, in evaluating their content. To illustrate, one 
participant might have seen the following scenario text: 
 
INPUT: Scott was just out playing with his friends in the snow. He has now gone inside 
but is still freezing and takes a bath. As both he and his clothes are very dirty, he is 
likely to make a mess in the process, which he knows his mother dislikes. 
 
with the following PO HH sentence presented as output produced by the computer: 
 
Computer output: Scott is now turning on the warm water BUT he will 
be warm soon. 
 
To help the participants organize the information, the output sentences were 
distinguished by a different font, as illustrated above. Following the output sentences, 
two randomly chosen truth-table cells were presented as continuations of the 
scenarios which occurred after the computer produced its output: 
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Continuation: Scott turned on the warm water. He did become warm. 
On the basis of this continuation, the computer output turned out to be:  
True                False                Neither true nor false                  
 
As shown below, the task of the participants was then to help us calibrate the output 
sentences of the computer by evaluating separately for each continuation, whether 
the output sentences were ‘True’ (⊤), ‘False’ (⊥), or ‘Neither true nor false’ (NN) given 
the continuations of the scenario. The exact wording of the instruction was as follows: 
 
On each of 13 pages, you will read, in order, a short text describing a scenario, a 
sentence, and two different continuations of the scenario. For each case, we ask you 
to imagine that a computer has been given the scenario text as input and that it 
produced the sentence as output. The computer is still in the development phase and 
we need you to help us calibrate its output sentences. For each of the two possible 
continuations of the scenario, your task is to evaluate whether the sentence produced 
by the computer turned out to be 'True', 'False', or 'Neither true nor false' by the way 
the scenario developed. 
 
Before continuing to our 12 experimental conditions, the participants first saw a 
practice trial, which was later discarded in our the analysis. 
On the second page, the participants were instructed to evaluate how 
confident they were in their responses on a scale from 0 % to 100 %. 
 
Procedures 
To reduce the dropout rate once the proper experiment started, participants first 
went through three pages that: 1) stated our academic affiliations, 2) asked for 
personalized information (that was not paired with the participants’ other responses, 
however), 3) posed two SAT comprehension questions in a warm-up phase, and 4) 
presented a seriousness check emphasizing the importance of careful responses for 
the scientific utility of the results (Reips, 2002). After a practice trial and a repetition of 
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the instructions, the experiment itself began with the presentation of the twelve 
within-participants conditions. Their order was randomized anew for each participant. 
 
Results 
The observed response frequencies were analyzed with multinomial processing tree 
models (MPT; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988), a well-known class of models that provides a 
convenient testbed for hypothesis concerning categorical data.  We will evaluate the 
MPT models’ absolute performance via the G² statistic (Read & Cressie, 1988) and 
their relative performance with the Fisher Information Approximation (FIA; Grünwald, 
2007). FIA is a model-selection statistic that penalizes models according to their 
functional flexibility and improves upon traditional statistics such as AIC and BIC. 
Further details on the models and the analyses are provided in the Appendix. But it is 
worth to highlight here that the models assumed that individual’s responses are 
stochastic in the sense that they can fail to reflect their true judgments with some 
probability. When specifying the different hypotheses, we relied on the most lenient 
stochastic specification, which only imposes the constraint that the preferred 
response option should be the modal response. For example, in the case of the ⊤⊤ 
cell, the stochastic implementation of the material implication account then predicts 
that 
P(⊤) ≥ P(⊥), P(NN) 
 
The reason behind the adoption of this specific stochastic specification is the 
diagnostic power associated to its failure, as any theory that fails to succeed under 
these minimal constraints should be seriously questioned. 
As can be seen from Figure 1 (right upper panel), aside from the ⊥⊥ cell, there 
does not appear to be much of a relevance effect for the truth evaluations of the 
indicative conditional. Indeed, for the true antecedent cells (⊤⊤, ⊤⊥), there appears to 
be an absolute majority for ⊤ and ⊥ respectively across the different relevance levels, 
which is shared by all of the ABT sentences (‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, ‘φ therefore ψ’). It is 
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only for the false antecedent cells (⊥⊤, ⊥⊥) that the indicative conditional seems to 
stand out from the ABT sentences. For the ABT sentences, there is an absolute 
majority of ⊥ responses for the false antecedent cases, whereas there is a mixed 
response for the indicative conditional with large differences across the relevance 
levels for the ⊥⊥ cell with the indicative conditional. 
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Figure 1. Truth evaluations across sentences, relevance 
condition, and truth-table cells. Participants could respond 
‘True’ (⊤), ‘False’ (⊥), or ‘Neither True nor False’ (NN). 
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The ABT Sentences 
We first tested whether response distributions differed across sentences and 
relevance levels. Our general approach for testing different hypothesis was the 
following: We fitted a set of constrained MPT models representing different 
hypotheses (e.g., response distributions do not differ across sentence levels), and 
compared their performance with an unconstrained model (Msaturated) that fits the data 
perfectly using one free parameter per degree of freedom provided by the data. An 
hypothesis (instantiated by a constrained model) is said to be rejected when it 
performs worse than the unconstrained model and/or any of the competing 
alternative hypotheses (even after taking differences in flexibility into account via FIA). 
For the ABT sentences, we considered four models: 1) Msaturated, which imposes 
no constraints whatsoever, 2) Msentence, which assumes that response probabilities are 
the same across sentences, but allows for differences across the different levels of the 
relevance factor, 3) Mrelevance, which assumes no differences across the relevance 
manipulation, but allows responses to differ across sentences, and 4) Mfull, which 
assumes no differences across both relevance and sentence levels. As shown in Table 
3, the preferred model for the ABT sentences in terms of FIA was clearly Msentence. Note 
that FIA differences larger than 3.40 already indicate a very strong preference for the 
winning model (see Kellen, Klauer, & Bröder, 2013). In absolute terms, all models were 
rejected under a significance level of α = .05. However, it should be noted that when 
large samples are used, any minor deviation from model predictions can lead to a 
statistically-significant misfit, and having a p-value of .02 for Msentence can be 
considered satisfactory. In fact, in structural-equation modelling, which faces a similar 
problem of large samples in the interpretation of χ2 tests, a ratio χ2/df between 0 and 
2 is considered to indicate a good fit (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 
2003), and here G2/df = 1.49. 
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ABT Sentences and Indicative Conditionals 
When comparing the ABT sentences with the indicative conditionals (‘If-Then’ 
sentences in Figure 1), we separated the true antecedent truth table cells from the 
false antecedent cells. In both cases, we considered three models: 1) Msaturated, 2) 
Msame, which assumes that responses to the ABT sentences are equal to the ones given 
to their indicative-conditional counterparts, and 3) Mdifferent, which assumes the same 
responses rates across the ABT sentences, but allows them to differ from the 
responses to the indicative conditionals. In the case of the true antecedent cells, Msame 
was the preferred model (see Table 4). In contrast, Mdifferent was preferred in the case 
of the false antecedent cells (see Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Model-Comparison Results: ABT 
Model G2 df p ∆FIA 
Msaturated 
Msentence 
Mrelevance 
Mfull 
0 
71.40 
237.51 
271.76 
0 
48 
48 
64 
1 
.02 
.00 
.00 
86.04 
0 
83.05 
50.84 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; G2 = goodness of fit; p 
= p-value;  ∆FIA = difference between the model’s FIA 
and the FIA from the best-performing model. 
Table 4. Model-Comparison Results: TT, TF, ABT + IF  
Model G2 df p ∆FIA 
Msaturated 
Msame 
Mdifferent 
0 
57.30 
31.84 
0 
36 
24 
1 
.01 
.13 
64.12 
0 
19.16 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; G2 = goodness of fit; p = 
p-value;  ∆FIA = difference between the model’s FIA 
and the FIA from the best-performing model. 
Table 5. Model-Comparison Results: FT, FF, ABT + IF  
Model G2 df p ∆FIA 
Msaturated 
Msame 
Mdifferent 
0 
243.73 
39.55 
0 
36 
24 
1 
.00 
.02 
40.98 
70.03 
0 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; G2 = goodness of fit; p 
= p-value;  ∆FIA = difference between the model’s FIA 
and the FIA from the best-performing model. 
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Indicative Conditionals and Truth Tables 
We now turn to an evaluation of the fit of truth tables in Table 1 for the indicative 
conditionals. As previously discussed, we will allow the models to predict that the 
expected responses constitute at least a relative majority (a very lenient requirement). 
The results reported in Table 6 show that none of the models was able to accurately 
characterize the individuals’ responses. Overall, the modal responses indicate a slight 
tendency to judge indicative conditionals as true whenever the antecedent and the 
consequent have the same truth status (in accordance with the truth table of the 
material bi-conditional, which is true in the ⊤⊤ and ⊥⊥ cells and false otherwise). This 
pattern is corroborated by the set of studies gathered by Schroyens (2010), which 
involved abstract stimulus materials with explicit negations and the option to respond 
that the truth table cell is ‘irrelevant’ for the truth value of the conditional (see Table 
7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Goodness-of-Fit Results  
Truth Conditional Inferentialism 
 ⊤⊤ ⊤⊥ ⊥⊤ ⊥⊥ 
PO 
NE 
IR 
0.00 
73.12 (⊤) 
107.41 (⊤) 
193.88 (⊥) 
0.00 
0.00 
171.94 (⊥)  
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Material Implication Account 
PO 
NE 
IR 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
171.94 (⊥) 
96.58 (⊥) 
147.56 (⊥) 
0.00 
12.64 (⊥) 
2.09 (⊥) 
De Finetti Table 
PO 
NE 
IR 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
43.44 (⊥) 
40.47 (⊥) 
28.31 (⊥) 
10.70 (⊤) 
30.92 (⊥) 
5.87 (⊥) 
Note. Values correspond to the G2 statistic. The symbols 
in parentheses (⊤, ⊥, N) indicate the observed modal 
response in case the model prediction failed. All values 
above 2.71 are rejected (p < .05) according to the most 
conservative χ�2 distribution (Self & Liang, 1987).   
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Confidence Ratings 
All the confidence ratings were in the interval [76%, 81%]. For the ‘Therefore’-
sentences, the participants were more confident in the PO (mean = 80.28, SD = 19.54) 
condition than in the NE (mean = 78.27, SD = 21.85), V = 60142, pH < .05, r = -.11,
35  
and IR (mean = 75.97, SD = 22.60) conditions, V = 66528, pH < .0001, r = -.21. But these 
were small effects and the participants continued to remain highly confident in the 
truth values they provided even when these conflicted with the reason-relation 
readings of the ‘Therefore’-sentences. For the ‘But’-sentences, the participants were 
no more confident in the NE (mean = 78.48, SD = 21.60) condition than they were in 
the PO (mean = 78.14, SD = 21.89) condition, V = 54333, pH = .53, r = -.027. For the 
indicative conditionals, the participants were more confident in the PO (mean = 78.74, 
SD = 20.65) condition than they were in the IR (mean = 76.01, SD = 22.53) condition, V 
= 61801, pH < .05, r = -.12, but no more confident in the PO condition than they were 
in the NE (mean = 76.42, SD = 21.90) condition, V = 63538, pH = .074, r = -.089. Again, 
these were small effects and the participants continued to remain highly confident in 
the truth values they provided even when these conflicted with the reason-relation 
readings of indicative conditionals. 
 
 
                                                              
35  We controlled for the family-wise error rate using the Bonferroni-Holm correction 
(indicated by the index "H"). 
Table 7. Data from Schroyens’ (2010) Meta-Analysis  
 ⊤⊤ ⊤⊥ ⊥⊤ ⊥⊥ 
⊤ 
⊥ 
Irrelevant 
100% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
0% 
5% 
77% 
18% 
64% 
0% 
36% 
Note. Values correspond to percentage of studies (out 
of a subset of 22 studies with abstract stimulus material 
and ‘irrelevant’ as third response option) in Schroyens’ 
(2010) meta-analysis in which a specific response was 
modal.   
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that there are significant effects of relevance on 
response probabilities in truth evaluations for each of the ABT sentences. But these 
effects are minor judging from Figure 1. It is possible that some of the small 
differences observed are due to some degree of heterogeneity at level of the 
individuals as well as at level of the stimulus material (e.g., Rouder et al., 2008). 
Moreover, the model comparison in Table 3 shows that the preferred model assumes 
no difference between these three sentence types, nor in terms of how they are 
affected by the relevance manipulation. Accordingly, the results do not support the 
idea that conventional implicatures (“therefore” conveying PO; “but” conveying NE) 
affect truth-table evaluations. Instead a common truth-table semantics of the ABT 
emerged in line with H0_ABT, as derived from the Frege-Grice tradition, and effects of 
relevance on their shared truth table were small. 
This finding was also supported by the high confidence ratings across 
conditions. Even in conditions were conflicts between truth evaluations based on the 
logical conjunction and the reason relation reading of the ABT sentences were 
induced, the participants indicated that they had a confidence of 76% or higher in 
their truth value judgments.  
In addition, the results indicate that none of the truth tables for indicative 
conditionals outlined in Table 1 are able to capture the patterns in the data for 
indicative conditionals, even when applying the most lenient test (i.e. that the 
deterministic truth tables only have to predict the relative, rather than absolute, 
majority responses). As shown in Table 6, the de Finetti table and the material 
implication account are much better suited to capture the modal responses in the true 
antecedent cases than truth-conditional inferentialism. 36  In comparison, truth-
                                                             
36  As noted in Footnote 33, Karolina Krzyżanowska has in discussion expressed doubts 
about whether the truth conditional inferentialism is really committed to predicting ‘True’ for 
the ⊤⊥ cell in the positive relevance condition—not least due to the context-sensitive 
interpretation of the indicative conditional voiced in Krzyżanowska et al. (2014). However, 
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conditional inferentialism does a much better job in the false antecedent cases, where 
the de Finetti table and the material implication account encountered difficulties. 
Indeed, although the defective truth table effect is often cited in the literature as 
strong evidence in favor of the de Finetti truth table (Over & Evans, 2003), neither the 
results reported in Table 6 with realistic stimulus material nor the results from the 22 
studies with abstract stimulus materials reported in Table 7 support the assumption 
that ‘Neither true nor false’ is the modal response in the false antecedent cases.   
Interestingly, Figure 1 does indicate the presence of a relevance effect on the 
truth evaluations of the indicative conditional in the ⊥⊥ cell, which is compatible with 
the truth table for truth-conditional inferentialism (see Table 1). 
However, the gross failure of the predictions in Table 1 to account for the data 
of Experiment 1 suggests the possibility of some kind of within-subject variation with 
respect to the truth tables the participants rely on. Indeed, it is possible that a mixture 
of truth tables (inter alia, the bi-conditional table and the de Finetti table) would have 
to be invoked to account for our results. However, the present data suggest that it 
would have to be a small proportion of the individuals that follow the de Finetti table. 
The proportion of ‘NN’ responses in the false-antecedent cells for ‘If Then’ sentences 
hardly exceeds 33%, suggesting that no more than a third of the individuals in these 
cells of the experimental design were able to respond in accordance with the de 
Finetti table. Moreover, such a mixture account is not able to account for the 
relevance effect found for the ⊥⊥ cell, captured by truth-conditional inferentialism. 
Follow-up studies better suited for testing individual variation that have the 
participants fill out all four truth table cells for each sentence (perhaps multiple times 
in order to estimate response-error probabilities) would be needed to investigate this 
possibility.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
even when taking this point into account, it is not clear to how the theory could be adjusted 
in order to successfully accommodate an absolute majority of ‘True’ responses in the ⊤⊤ cell 
for the NE and IR conditions.  
 
113 
 
Experiment 2 
Given that no difference was found among the ABT sentences in Experiment 1, we 
wanted to see in Experiment 2 whether a dissociation between these sentences 
occurs when they are evaluated in the context of a probability-judgment task and an 
acceptability-ranking task. According to the reason-relation reading, ‘φ but ψ’ 
expresses that φ lowers the probability of ψ (∆p < 0), and ‘φ therefore ψ’ expresses 
that φ raises the probability of ψ (∆p > 0). In contrast, ‘φ and ψ’ can suggest that φ 
raises the probability of ψ, but according to its reading as the logical conjunction ‘φ & 
ψ’, φ need not affect the probability of ψ at all.  
Hence, we expected that when presented with the ⊤⊤ cell, the acceptability 
ratings would accord with the following pattern, where ‘φ and ψ’ acts as a baseline:  
 
(NE)   φ but ψ ≻ φ and ψ ≻ φ therefore ψ   (b ≻ a ≻ t)  
(PO)   φ therefore ψ ≻ φ and ψ ≻ φ but ψ   (t ≻ a ≻ b) 
(IR)   φ and ψ / φ but ψ ≻ φ therefore ψ  (b/a ≻ t) 
 
Moreover, on the assumption that ‘φ but ψ’ expresses that φ is assumed to be a 
sufficient reason against ψ, and that ‘φ therefore ψ’ expresses that φ is assumed to be 
a sufficient reason for ψ, we would expect P(ψ | φ) = high/low to act as a moderator 
variable. That is to say, we expect the pattern b ≻ a ≻ t to be more frequent in NE 
when P(ψ | φ) = low compared to P(ψ | φ) = high, and t  ≻ a ≻ b to be more frequent 
in PO when P(ψ | φ) = high as compared to P(ψ | φ) = low. 
As a manipulation check, we tested whether the effect of the relevance 
manipulation on P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) from Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2016a) replicates despite the procedural change that our conditionals had the form of 
‘if φ is now happening, then ψ will occur’ as opposed to ‘if φ is occurs, then ψ will 
occur’ (see Footnote 34). In addition, we tested whether a similar moderation of P(φ & 
ψ) as a predictor of P(φ but ψ), P(φ and ψ), and P(φ therefore ψ) could be found for 
our ABT sentences with the expectation that the marginal means would be higher in 
the NE condition compared to the PO condition for P(φ but ψ) and that the marginal 
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means of P(φ therefore ψ) would be higher in the PO condition compared to the NE 
and IR conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
Like Experiment 1, the experiment was conducted over the Internet. A total of 805 
people completed the experiment. The participants were sampled through the 
Internet platform Mechanical Turk from USA, UK, and Australia and were paid a small 
amount of money for their participation.  The same exclusion criteria were applied as 
in Experiment 1. The final sample thus consisted of 593 participants. Mean age was 39 
years, ranging from 18 to 80 years; 32% of the participants were male; 73% indicated 
that the highest level of education that they had completed was an undergraduate 
degree or higher. The demographic measures of the participants differed only 
minimally before and after the exclusion. 
 
Design 
Experiment 2 had the same experimental design as Experiment 1 for the probability 
task. In contrast, the acceptability task only differed by presenting the participants 
with three levels of the sentence factor (‘…and…’, ‘…but…’, ‘…therefore…’).    
 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 unless otherwise stated. For each of 
the twelve priors×relevance within-participants conditions, the participants were 
presented with four pages. The first page featured only the scenario text, which 
participants read had been supplied as input to a computer program in the 
development phase (following the instructions from Experiment 1). The second page 
asked the participants both to evaluate the probability of the antecedent (e.g. ‘Scott is 
now turning on the warm water’) and of the consequent (e.g. ‘Scott will be warm 
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soon’) conditional on the antecedent on a slider with a scale from 0 to 100%. The 
instruction for evaluating the conditional probability was as follows: 
 
Suppose Scott is now turning on the warm water. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the following sentence is true on a scale 
from 0 to 100%: 
Scott will be warm soon. 
 
The third page asked the participants to evaluate the probability of a randomly chosen 
member of our four target sentences (‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, ‘φ therefore ψ’, ‘if φ, then 
ψ’). Continuing with our example of a PO HH condition from the Scott scenario, one 
participant might be asked to evaluate the probability of the ‘but’ sentence as follows: 
 
Could you please rate the probability that the following sentence is true on a scale from 
0 to 100 %: 
Scott is now turning on the warm water, BUT Scott will be warm soon. 
 
On page four the participants were presented with the acceptability task. Inspired by 
the task of evaluating the categorical acceptability of conditionals in Douven & 
Verbrugge (2012), we introduced the novel task of rank-ordering the acceptability of 
the ABT sentences given the ⊤⊤ cell with the computer program calibration 
instructions from Experiment 1. That is to say, the participants were presented with 
the scenario text, which they had been instructed to regard as input to the computer 
program. They were then presented with the ⊤⊤ cell as a continuation of the scenario, 
which took place after the computer program had produced its output sentences. The 
task was to evaluate which of the three ABT sentences was most acceptable in light of 
the continuation of the scenario. Continuing with the example from above: 
 
Continuation: Scott turned on the warm water. Scott did get warm.  
 
Please order the OUTPUT in terms of how acceptable they are in light of the 
continuations of the scenarios. Click on the most acceptable output for rank 1, the 
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second most acceptable for rank 2, and the third most acceptable for rank 3. Note that 
the responses can be deselected.  
 
Output: Scott is now turning on the warm water, BUT Scott will be 
warm soon. 
Output: Scott is now turning on the warm water AND Scott will be warm 
soon. 
Output: Scott is now turning on the warm water THEREFORE Scott will 
be warm soon. 
 
As in Experiment 1, the computer output sentences were distinguished by a different 
font to help the participants organize the information. Finally, the participants were 
asked to indicate whether they agree with the statement that at least one of the 
output sentences was acceptable given the continuation.   
The instructions presented after the practice trial followed Skovgaard-Olsen et 
al. (2016a) in giving the following explication of how ‘acceptable’ was meant to be 
understood: 
 
Please note that when we ask – here and throughout the study – how ‘acceptable’ a 
statement is, we are not interested in whether the statement is grammatically correct, 
unsurprising, or whether it would offend anybody. Rather we ask you to make a 
judgment about the adequacy of the information conveyed by the statement. More 
speciﬁcally, we ask you to judge whether the statement would be a reasonable thing to 
say in the context provided by the scenarios and their continuations.  
 
Results 
Acceptability 
We excluded rank orders for which participants found none of the output sentences to 
be categorically acceptable (24%).37 Table 8 reports the rank order of the sentences 
                                                             
37  Note that the ranking distributions did not differ qualitatively, when including rankings 
for which participants found none of the sentences to be acceptable. However, the increase 
of b ≻ a ≻ t in the NE condition when P(ψ | φ) < .50 was no longer significant (p = .06). 
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from the acceptability task. Overall, the results matched our predictions, with the rank 
order t ≻ a ≻ b occurring most often in PO, b ≻ a ≻ t in NE, and a ≻ b ≻ t in IR. 
Another prediction corroborated by the data was that in PO, t ≻ a ≻ b occurred less 
often when the participants judged P(ψ | φ) to be low. Indeed, the proportion of t ≻ a 
≻ b ranks was larger (66%) when P(ψ | φ) ≥ .50 than when P(ψ | φ) < .50 (53%), a 
difference that was found to be statistically significant (∆G2 = 25.51, p < .001, ∆FIA = 
10.29). Conversely, we predicted that in NE, b ≻ a ≻ t would occur more often when 
P(ψ | φ) was judged to be low rather than high, a difference that was also found in the 
data (74% versus 66%; ∆G² = 9.85, p = .001, ∆FIA = 2.44). 
 
The interactions between sentence levels and relevance levels in determining 
the preferred rank orders shown in bold in Table 8 are of such magnitude that a 
statistical analysis is superfluous; their prominence is too severe to leave any doubt.  
 
Probability Judgments 
According to Figure 2 (see panels in the second row from the top), the results from 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a) for P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) across 
relevance levels appear to be replicated. In comparison to Figure 1 in Skovgaard-Olsen 
et al. (2016a), the intercept is slightly larger and less points fall on the diagonal in the 
Table 8. Percentage of rank orders in the acceptability task    
 φ/ψ Priors  a ≻ b ≻ t a ≻ t ≻ b b ≻ a ≻ t t ≻ a ≻ b b ≻ t ≻ a t ≻ b ≻ a 
 
PO 
 
HH 
HL 
LH 
LL 
3% 
5% 
1% 
4% 
31% 
28% 
23% 
19% 
1% 
5% 
1% 
5% 
62% 
54% 
71% 
64% 
1% 
4% 
2% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
3% 
4% 
 
NE 
 
HH 
HL 
LH 
LL 
8% 
6% 
10% 
7% 
4% 
4% 
10% 
3% 
73% 
74% 
66% 
74% 
5% 
5% 
7% 
4% 
9% 
8% 
6% 
10% 
1% 
3% 
1% 
3% 
 
IR 
HH 
HL 
LH 
LL 
49% 
52% 
57% 
53% 
35% 
19% 
19% 
22% 
6% 
23% 
15% 
14% 
8% 
3% 
4% 
7% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
Note. φ = the antecedent (or first conjunct); ψ = the consequent (or second conjunct). The 
operator ≻ denotes “more acceptable than”. ‘a’ = ‘and’, ‘b’ = ‘but’, and ‘t’ = ‘therefore’. 
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present Figure 2. But the overall tendency is the same: There is a stronger relationship 
between P(ψ | φ) and P(if φ, then ψ) for the PO condition than for the IR condition in 
particular and the marginal mean (i.e. the overall level of the set of points on the y 
axis) of P(if φ, then ψ) is higher in the PO condition than in the NE and IR conditions 
across the scale of P(ψ | φ). For the IR and NE conditions there is a substantial portion 
of data points assigning probabilities almost equal to zero to ‘if φ, then ψ’ across 
variations in P(ψ | φ). This same tendency is visible in the probability evaluations in 
Figure 2 (top row) for ‘φ therefore ψ’ with P(φ & ψ) as a predictor; only this time the 
differences in intercept and marginal means between PO and the IR and NE conditions 
appear to be even more pronounced. In Figure 2 (third row from top), it moreover 
seems that P(φ & ψ) is a good predictor of P(φ and ψ) across relevance levels, with a 
higher intercept in the PO condition. Finally, P(φ & ψ) appears to best predict P(φ but 
ψ) for the NE condition. In contrast, in the PO condition there appears to be only a 
very weak relationship between P(φ & ψ) and P(φ but ψ). 
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        Figure 2. Probability evaluations of the sentence types across relevance levels 
 
Note. P(φ & ψ) is plotted as a predictor of P(φ therefore/and/but ψ) across 
relevance levels (rows 1, 3, and 4). P(ψ | φ) is plotted as a predictor of P(if φ, 
then ψ) across relevance levels (row 2). Raw data values (plotted with 80% 
transparency) and LMM linear effect of the predictors on P(φ therefore ψ) (row 
1), P(if φ, then ψ) (row 2), P(φ and ψ) (row 3), and P(φ but ψ) (row 4) across 
relevance manipulations (PO = left column, NE = center column, IR = right 
column). The confidence band show the 95% confidence region of the effect of 
the two independent variables, P(φ & ψ) and P(ψ | φ). 
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This pattern was confirmed in an LMM analysis (see Appendix for details). Main 
effects of P(ψ | φ) as predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ & ψ) as predictor of the ABT 
sentences were found, F(1, 18.4) = 1095.21, p < .0001. Also, a main effect of the 
relevance conditions was found, F(2, 12.3) = 99.24, p < .0001, as well as an interaction 
between the P(ψ | φ)/P(φ & ψ) predictors and the relevance conditions, F(2, 13) = 
10.20, p < .01. Main effects for the sentence type, and interactions between sentence 
type and the other predictors, were also found.  
 Follow-up analyses for P(ψ | φ) as a predictor of P(if φ, then ψ) showed that the 
slope found in the PO condition (b = 0.61, 95%-CI = [0.54, 0.69]), was significantly 
larger than the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.32, 95%-CI = [0.26, 0.39]), z = 5.99, pT < 
.001, but was not significantly larger than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.51, 95%-
CI = [0.43, 0.58]), z = 2.02, pT = .68. The subscript ‘T’ indicates p-value correction by the 
Tukey method for comparing a family of 12 estimates for all follow-up analyses. 
Follow-up analysis for P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ therefore ψ) showed that 
the slope in the PO condition (b = 0.43, 95%-CI = [0.36, 0.49]) was neither significantly 
larger than the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.35, 95%-CI = [0.27, 0.43]), z = 1.40, pT = 
.97, nor significantly smaller than the slope in the NE condition (b = 0.49, 95%-CI = 
[0.40, 0.58]), z = -1.11, pT = .99.  
Furthermore, follow-up analyses for P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ and ψ) 
showed that the slope in the PO condition (b = 0.56, 95%-CI = [0.49, 0.64]) was both 
significantly smaller than the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.79, 95%-CI = [0.71, 0.87]), 
z = -4.30, pT < .01, and significantly smaller than the slope in the NE condition (b = 
0.81, 95%-CI = [0.72, 0.90]), z = -4.15, pT < .01. 
Finally, a follow-up analysis for P(φ & ψ) as a predictor of P(φ but ψ) showed 
that the slope in the PO condition (b = 0.25, 95%-CI = [0.18, 0.32]) was both 
significantly smaller than the slope in the IR condition (b = 0.52, 95%-CI = [0.44, 0.59]), 
z = -5.07, pT < .0001, and significantly smaller than the slope in the NE condition (b = 
0.81, 95%-CI = [0.72, 0.91), z = -9.24, pT < .0001. 
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Differences in estimated marginal means for the four target sentences were 
tested for their statistical significance at the three scale points of the independent 
variables (P(ψ | φ) for P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ & ψ) for P(φ and/but/therefore ψ)) in 
Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Table 9 shows, the estimated marginal means of P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ 
therefore ψ) were consistently statistically higher in the PO condition than in the NE 
and IR condition across the probability scales of their respective independent 
variables. In contrast, the estimated marginal means of P(φ and ψ) was only 
significantly higher in the PO condition than in the NE and IR conditions at P(φ & ψ) = 
0% and P(φ & ψ) = 50%. And finally, the estimated marginal means of P(φ but ψ) was 
only significantly higher in the PO condition than in the NE condition at P(φ & ψ) = 0%. 
For P(φ & ψ) = 50% and P(φ & ψ) = 100%, the estimated marginal means of P(φ but ψ) 
were significantly higher in the NE condition than in the PO condition. 
 
Table 9. Differences in Estimated Marginal Means  
Sentence Relevance IV = 0% IV = 50% IV = 100% 
P(if φ, then ψ) 
 
 
P(φ therefore ψ)   
 
 
P(φ and ψ) 
PO 
NE 
IR 
PO 
NE 
IR 
PO 
NE 
32.6%        
4.0%    *** 
6.3%    *** 
53.6%   
6.8%    *** 
7.4%    *** 
42.9% 
12.6%  *** 
63.3% 
29.2%   *** 
22.4%   *** 
79.9% 
31.2%   *** 
24.9%   *** 
71.1% 
53.0%   *** 
93.9%   
54.4%   *** 
38.4%   *** 
96.1% 
55.6%   *** 
42.4%   *** 
99.3% 
93.5%    
 IR 21.3%  ***  60.8%   * 100% 
P(φ but ψ) PO 
NE 
IR 
33.2% 
20.6%  * 
21.4%  . 
45.8% 
61.2%   *** 
47.2% 
58.4% 
100%    *** 
73.0% 
Note. Differences for the  Estimated Marginal Means  for the four 
sentence levels were tested for their statistical significance across the 
following scale points of the independent variables (IV = P(ψ | φ) for P(if 
φ, then ψ) and IV = P(φ & ψ) for P(φ and/but/therefore ψ)): 0%, 50%, 
and 100%. The pairwise contrasts indicate whether the NE or IR 
conditions differed significantly from the PO condition using z-ratios and 
adjusted p-values through Tukey’s method for comparing a family of 36 
estimates. Signif. codes: ‘***’ .001, ‘**’ .01, ‘*’ .05, ‘.’ .1.    
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Discussion 
The results obtained in Experiment 2 show an unmistakable pattern. Participants rank 
ordered the acceptability of the ABT sentences given the continuation of the scenario 
in the ⊤⊤ cell. We predicted that ‘φ but ψ’ differs from the ‘φ and ψ’ baseline in being 
more preferable in NE, and that ‘φ therefore ψ’ differs from the ‘φ and ψ’ baseline in 
being more preferable in PO. The predicted rank orders clearly dominate the other 
possible rank orders in the data. Furthermore, P(ψ | φ) moderates the relationship 
between the rank order acceptabilities and the relevance levels in the manner one 
would expect, if ‘φ but ψ’ expresses that φ is a sufficient reason against ψ and ‘φ 
therefore ψ’ expresses that φ is a sufficient reason for ψ. 
This basic finding is corroborated by the results from the probability evaluation 
task outlined in Table 9. Consistent with the reading of ‘if φ, then ψ’ and ‘φ therefore 
ψ’ as indicating that φ is a reason for ψ, the estimated marginal means for P(if φ, then 
ψ) and P(φ therefore ψ) in the PO condition were invariantly higher than the 
estimated marginal means in the NE and IR conditions across the scale of their 
respective independent variables. Moreover, consistent with the reading of ‘φ but ψ’ 
as indicating that φ is a reason against ψ, the estimated marginal means for P(φ but ψ) 
was higher in the NE condition than in the PO condition at P(φ & ψ) = 50% and P(φ & 
ψ) = 100%.  
 
General Discussion 
Given the large sample sizes and high power for detecting even small differences, the 
finding from Experiment 1 that the (relative) response frequencies of the ABT 
sentences can be set equal across sentence levels, and that relevance does not 
interact with the sentence factor, is a strong and in fact surprising result. It suggests 
that the ABT sentences have exactly the same truth conditions. Taken together, 
Experiment 1 and 2 show a clear dissociation between evaluations of truth, 
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probability, and acceptability. Relevance interacts with sentence (and, but, therefore) 
in the rank-order acceptability task and the probability evaluation task as expected, 
but does not interact with sentence in the truth-evaluation task. In fact, truth 
evaluations of the ABT sentences could be set equal across sentences in that task with 
only minor losses in goodness of fit. The fact that Table 8 and 9 display such strong 
interaction effects, when the participants are asked to rank order the acceptability and 
provide probability evaluations, makes the absence of an interaction of relevance and 
sentence in the truth-table task even more surprising. It suggests that there is a deeply 
entrenched modularization and little cross-talk between the processes and/or 
representations tapped by the tasks in Experiments 1 and 2. These findings suggest 
that the Frege-Grice tradition was right in its assumption that the difference in reason-
relation readings of these sentences does not affect their truth evaluations.  
Instead, Grice (1989) conjectured that the differences of the ABT sentences 
would be part of their conventional implicatures. In fact, Experiment 2 found the 
signature effects of the reason-relation readings in the orderings of the ABT sentences 
according to acceptability, as also corroborated in the probability judgments. Finally, 
the fact that we were able to find strong effects of the relevance manipulation in the 
expected directions for the ABT sentences in Experiment 2 suggests that the absence 
of such a difference in Experiment 1 is not an artifact of the stimulus material (see 
Footnote 34) nor of the instructions of the computer-calibration task. 
Turning to indicative conditionals, the results from Experiment 1 on the truth 
evaluations of the indicative conditional present an explanatory challenge, as none of 
the investigated truth tables were able to account for the patterns found. We found 
that there is a marked relevance effect on the truth evaluations of the indicative 
conditional in the ⊥⊥ cell. This finding challenges the H0_IF assumption underlying the 
material implication account and the de Finetti truth table, which holds that truth 
evaluations of the indicative conditional are not affected by relevance manipulations. 
Moreover, it was shown that in spite of its recent popularity in psychology of 
reasoning (Baratgin, Politzer, and Over, 2013; Pfeifer, 2013; Elqayam and Over, 2013), 
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the de Finetti truth table lacks support for its distinguishing feature: The prediction of 
‘Neither true nor false’ evaluations in the false antecedent cases did neither find 
support in the results from Experiment 1 nor in the results of the 22 studies with 
abstract stimulus material from the Schroyens (2010) meta-analysis presented in Table 
7. In contrast, truth-conditional inferentialism correctly rejects H0_IF, but there is little 
support for its alternative predictions. In particular, truth-conditional inferentialism 
faced problems accounting for our results on the true antecedent cells, yet it was 
compatible with the relevance effect found in the ⊥⊥ cell. 
It is remarkable that none of the investigated theories was able to fit the data 
even under the most lenient stochastic interpretation of their deterministic truth 
tables, whereby they only had to be able to predict the relative-majority responses of 
the participants (see the Appendix for further discussion). A stricter interpretation 
would have imposed the requirement that the absolute majority responses were 
predicted by the theories, or by admitting relatively small “error” rates (e.g., 10%).  
As noted, it is possible that the pattern of truth evaluations of the indicative 
conditional found across relevance manipulations is best accounted for by a mixture of 
truth tables. It is up to future experiments more suitably designed to test for individual 
variation to explore this possibility. However, any account based on a mixture of truth 
tables is still constrained by the finding in Experiment 2 of a modest relevance effect 
on the truth evaluations of the indicative conditional.  
It should be noted, however, that a different perspective on our results is also 
possible. A non-truth functional conditional is a conditional whose truth value cannot 
be determined by the truth values of its parts. As Rescher (2007, p. 43) points out, for 
any non-truth functional conditional that is logically stronger than ‘⊃’, it holds that 
“we can say nothing about the truth status of p → q without a deeper look at the 
specifics of the matter”. It is therefore possible to interpret our results as indicating 
that indicative conditionals are non-truth functional with further parameters 
determining their truth values in the false antecedent cases. If the participants set 
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these parameters differently, then mixed results, like those found in Figure 1, may be 
the outcome.    
 
Potential Limitations 
When evaluating our results it is important to keep the following points in mind. First, 
when asking the participants to calibrate the output of a computer program, the aim 
was to create a situation in which the participants would not naturally begin 
interpreting communicative intentions behind producing assertions with components 
that are irrelevant for one another and reconstruct speaker meaning. It turns out that 
such an approach has a track-record in the literature. For instance, Schwarz, Strack, 
Hilton, and Naderer (1991) employ a conceptually similar manipulation to set aside 
Gricean conversational norms (for discussion see Lee, 2006). Moreover, Doran, Ward, 
Larson, McNabb, and Baker (2012) achieved a similar effect by asking the participants 
to provide truth value judgments based on adopting the perspective of someone who 
is only able to understand the literal content of what has been said. Finally, in Wright 
and Wells (1988) an attempt was undertaken to control for demand characteristics 
relating to the Gricean ideal of cooperative discourse in the attitude-attribution 
paradigm by instructing the participants that the set of questionnaire items they were 
presented with had been randomly selected from a larger pool. Due to this random 
assignment, the participants were instructed that they could encounter cases in which 
they had to make judgments on the basis of information that was either irrelevant or 
insufficient for the task at hand.   
In Doran et al. (2012) confidence ratings are moreover used as a measure of 
task complexity, because confidence ratings have been found to be inversely 
correlated with perceived task complexity. In the truth-table task in Experiment 1, all 
mean confidence ratings were in the interval [76%, 81%], which indicates that the 
participants were highly confident of judgments across all conditions. Indeed, the 
participants continued to remain highly confident of their responses even when 
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judging truth values based on logical connectives and reason relation constraints 
would have led to conflicting responses.  
For the rank-ordering of acceptability and probability evaluations in Experiment 
2 we retained the computer program instruction to discourage participants from 
looking for some hidden intention for why an irrelevance item had been asserted and 
to encourage a focus on rating the sentences for their acceptability and probability 
under different conditions. 
Note, finally, that the differences between the findings in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 cannot merely be attributed to the presence of a forced choice format 
or dependencies in the rank ordering task, since the probability evaluation task in 
Experiment 2 produced similar results without having a forced-choice format. 
Moreover, even if one restricts the attention to the most preferred sentence in each 
of the relevance conditions, because one is worried that the choices are not 
independent, a very clear pattern emerges: in the PO condition, the therefore-
sentences are by far the most acceptable sentences, in the NE condition, the but-
sentences are by far the most acceptable sentences, and in the IR condition the and-
sentences are by far the most acceptable sentences. This pattern is in agreement with 
the reason relation reading of these sentences and it is also one that is mirrored in the 
probability evaluations, on which our predictions were based.  
 
Conclusion 
In the Frege-Grice tradition of applying logic as a model of natural language 
connectives, it is assumed that the difference in reason-relation readings of the 
sentences ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, and ‘φ therefore ψ’ does not affect their truth 
conditions. Support for this assumption was found in Experiment 1. In contrast, 
Experiment 2 indicated a dissociation between the effects of relevance on ‘φ and ψ’, 
‘φ but ψ’, and ‘φ therefore ψ’ in truth evaluations and in evaluations of their 
acceptability and probabilities. For, when the participants are asked to rank order the 
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acceptability of ‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ but ψ’, and ‘φ therefore ψ’ on the basis of the ⊤⊤ cell, 
the different rank orders predicted by a reason-relation reading of each sentence are 
strongly preferred. Moreover, their probability evaluations accord with the reason-
relation reading. Turning to the indicative conditionals, a relevance effect on truth 
evaluations was found, and neither the truth tables supplied by material implication 
account, the popular de Finetti truth table, nor truth-conditional inferentialism were 
able to account for these results of Experiment 1, even under the most lenient 
stochastic interpretation of their predictions. Accordingly, the results for the truth 
evaluations of indicative conditionals across relevance levels from Experiment 1 
present an explanatory challenge for further theorizing and empirical work to solve.  
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Appendix: Statistical Analyses 
Experiment 1: MPT Analysis 
The observed response frequencies in Experiment 1 were analyzed with multinomial 
processing tree models (MPT; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988). The Models were fitted with 
R package MPTinR (Singmann & Kellen, 2013). The MPT framework is typically used to 
characterize the mixtures of processes and cognitive states that underlie individuals’ 
categorical responses (for reviews, see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 
2009). However, they can also be used to directly test hypotheses at the level of the 
observed response distributions through goodness of fit and model-selection statistics 
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(e.g., Birnbaum, 2013; Hilbig & Moshagen, 2014; Karabatsos, 2005; Klauer & Kellen, 
2011, 2015; Klauer, Singmann, & Kellen, 2015). We will evaluate the models’ absolute 
performance via the G² statistic (Read & Cressie, 1988) and their relative performance 
with the Fisher Information Approximation (FIA; Grünwald, 2007). Where traditional 
model-selection statistics such as Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (Burnham & 
Anderson, 2002) rely on the number of parameters as a proxy for model complexity, 
FIA penalizes models according to their functional flexibility. 
In the present study, the different theories establish distinct predictions for the 
truth evaluations. For example, according to the material-implication account, 
individuals should consider the ⊤⊤, ⊥⊤, and ⊥⊥ cells of the truth table as true (⊤), but 
deem the ⊤⊥ cell false (⊥). These predictions are deterministic in the sense that no 
other response is considered to be possible. The deterministic nature of axiomatic 
accounts represents a long-standing problem in psychology due to the need to recast 
these accounts in order to accommodate the stochastic nature of responses with 
respect to an experiment’s empirical sample space (e.g., Luce, 1995, 1997; 
Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2011). For example, the predictions of the 
material-implication account for the ⊤⊤ cell of the truth table would then be relaxed 
in order to allow false or NN responses with some probability. The exact manner of 
relaxation is not entirely clear though. For example, one could assume that individuals 
almost invariably respond true (e.g., 90% of the times), or alternatively that true 
responses constitute an absolute or a relative majority, among other possibilities. This 
issue has been thoroughly explored in studies focusing on whether preferences are 
transitive (when an individual prefers A to B, and B to C, then A is expected to be 
preferred to C), in which different stochastic implementations have been considered 
(e.g. weak, moderate, and strong stochastic transitivity, the triangle inequality; see 
Regenwetter et al., 2011). In the present case we adopted what we view as the most 
lenient stochastic implementation; to wit, that the predicted response should occur at 
last as often as each of the other responses (i.e., that it should enjoy at least a relative 
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majority). For example, in the case of the ⊤⊤ cell, the stochastic implementation of 
the material implication account then predicts that 
 
P(⊤) ≥ P(⊥), P(NN) 
 
The reason behind the adoption of this specific stochastic specification is the 
diagnostic power associated to its failure, as any theory that fails to succeed under 
these minimal constraints should be seriously questioned. Note that this stochastic 
specification is completely agnostic regarding the nature of the deviations from the 
predictions: Individuals might commit “errors” due to a misreading of the sentences, a 
failure in their evaluation, or a motor-response error, among other possibilities (see 
Birnbaum, 2013). 
 
Experiment 2: LMM Analysis 
For Experiment 2, a mixed linear model was fitted to the data with fully crossed fixed 
effects for the predictor (IV: P(ψ | φ) and P(φ & ψ)), relevance condition (PO, NE, and 
IR), and sentence type (P(if φ, then ψ) and P(φ and/but/therefore ψ)) and crossed 
random effects for participants and scenarios. In lme4 syntax (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2015), the LMM used took the following form:  
 
DV ~ IV * relevance * sentence_type  + (IV * relevance | participant)                                 
+ (IV * relevance | scenario)  
 
The R package afex (Singmann et al., 2016) was used to obtain the statistical 
significance of the fixed effects while controlling for variability due to participants and 
scenarios. Note that for the analysis, we controlled for the family-wise error rate of 
follow-up tests using the Tukey method for comparing a family of 12 estimates 
(indicated by the subscript ‘T’).  
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Relevance and Conditionals: A Synopsis 
Throughout the dissertation we have encountered two implementations of 
Inferentialism. On the one hand, the Default and Penalty Hypothesis as an alternative 
to the Equation, defended by the Suppositional Theory of conditionals. On the other, 
truth-conditional Inferentialism, which provided an alternative truth table to the de 
Finetti truth table, defended by the Suppositional Theory of conditionals. As we have 
seen, while the former received empirical support in Chapter 2, the latter was not 
supported by the results reported in Chapter 4. 
One methodological point of all the empirical studies in the dissertation is that if 
we are going to draw conclusions about equations and inequalities such as P(if A, then 
C) = P(C|A) and P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A, C) based on our experimental findings, then we 
should ensure that we have investigated all the permutations of high and low priors 
and probabilistic dependency and independency first. These equations and 
inequalities are not bounded in their domain to cases of probability raising, and hence 
the evidence we cite in support of them should not be thus bound either. Concrete 
examples of this methodological point are given in Chapters 2 and 3, where previous 
studies drawing negative conclusions about the role of relevance for P(if A, then C) are 
cited, and levels of probabilistic coherence in the PO condition is used as evidence for 
the Equation in the uncertain and-to-if inference task. 
To illustrate the impact of these results, consider the following statement from 
a recent, acclaimed introduction to research on conditionals in cognitive science 
(Nickerson, 2015:199):  
 
Treating conditionals as probabilistic statements is one of the defining features of 
what has come to be referred to as the new paradigm in cognitive psychology or 
the “new psychology of reasoning” (Chater & Oaksford 2009, Evans, 2012; 
Manktelow, 2012; Oaksford &Chater, 2013; Over, 2009; Pfeifer, 2013). Gilio and 
Over (2012) see the conditional-probability hypothesis as fundamental to the new 
paradigm and express it this way: “The conditional probability hypothesis is that 
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people will tend to judge the probability of the indicative conditional of natural 
language, P(If A then C), as the conditional probability of C given A, P(C|A)” (p. 
119). [Notation modified for uniformity] 
 
In Chapter 2 it was found that this conditional probability hypothesis—which is stated 
above to be fundamental to the new paradigm in psychology of reasoning—only holds 
under the condition of positive relevance (where P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) > 0). In the case of 
negative relevance (P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) < 0), or irrelevance (P(C|A) – P(C|¬A) = 0), the 
strong relationship between P(if A, then C) and P(C|A) is disrupted, because 
participants tend to view natural language indicative conditionals as defective under 
these conditions. 38  Moreover, it was shown that these results generalize to 
evaluations of acceptability, when the participants are specifically instructed to judge 
the adequacy of the information provided when considering the statement as a 
contribution to a conversation. In contrast, the Equation was found to fit the 
probability and acceptability evaluations of concessive conditionals (‘Even if A, then 
still C’) remarkably well across all relevance conditions. But the Equation was 
formulated as a thesis about indicative conditionals and not as a thesis concerning 
concessive conditionals, as noted in Chapter 2. 
 The empirical study in Chapter 3 shows that the results from Chapter 2 
generalize to the uncertain and-to-if inference and that empirical support could be 
found for the explications of reason relations and epistemic relevance in terms of ∆P 
used in these studies. Indeed, the absolute values of the participants’ conformity to 
P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A,C), which is normatively prescribed by the Suppositional Theory, 
showed a drop from 87% in the positive relevance condition to 54% in the irrelevance 
condition. And this was a drop that was not reflected in either the participants’ 
conformity to P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) or P(Even if A, then still C) ≥ P(A,C), which both stayed 
constant at around 78% across relevance conditions. As explained in Chapter 3, this 
finding presents supporters of the Suppositional Theory with a dilemma: either the                                                              
38  Subsequently, some of the findings have been replicated independently by Vidal and 
Baratgin (in review) using different methods. 
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participants are less probabilistically coherent than it appeared in Cruz et al. (2015) or 
a substantial part of them do not follow the Equation across relevance levels.39      
Finally, the findings from the empirical study in Chapter 4 strongly indicate that 
there is a dissociation between the influence of relevance on assessments of 
acceptability and probability compared to truth evaluations, when investigating ‘and’, 
‘but’, ‘therefore’, and ‘if then’ sentences. In Chapter 4 these results were interpreted 
as showing that there was a deeply entrenched modularization between the processes 
and/or representations tapped by the experimental tasks reported. 
Taken together with the acceptability evaluations from Chapter 2, the results in 
Chapter 4 indicate that indicative conditionals behave like ‘therefore’ sentences in 
their probability and acceptability evaluations, and opposite to ‘but’ sentences, with 
respect to the relevance manipulation. Yet in relation to the truth evaluations, ‘and’, 
‘therefore’, and ‘but’ sentences did not differ across relevance conditions, and no 
evidence for a relevance effect on the true antecedent cells of the truth table of the 
indicative conditional could be found. Moreover, the consistent high confidence 
ratings of the participants did not indicate that they were in a state of conflict when 
assigning truth values to sentences that conflicted with their reason relation 
evaluation. However, for the FF cell a moderate relevance effect was found on the 
truth evaluation of the indicative conditional. 
These results from Chapter 4 present a puzzle (in addition to the puzzle 
discussed in Chapter 4 that none of the dominant truth tables seemed to fit the truth 
evaluations of the indicative conditional at the group level). On the one hand, it is 
possible to interpret the dissociation found between truth evaluations and 
probability/-acceptability evaluations as indicating a dissociation between semantic 
and pragmatic processing of content—with relevance almost exclusively affecting the 
latter. However, on this interpretation it is still odd that strong probabilistic relevance 
effects could be found in Chapters 2-3 on experimental tasks, which have been used 
                                                             
39  In a subsequent study that is not part of this dissertation, individual variation in these 
results was investigated (Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Hahn, Klauer, ms). 
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by supporters of the Suppositional Theory to provide evidence in favor of a semantic 
theory. On the other hand, it is possible that some other explanation for the 
dissociation in Chapter 4 can be found. In particular, the following circumstance might 
be part of the explanation: the truth evaluation and the probability assignment tasks 
differed on whether the cognitive evaluation of the sentences were based on a 
particular truth table cell that was to be treated as certain. To be sure, a strong 
relevance effect was also found on the ‘and’, ‘but’, and ‘therefore’ sentences, when 
the participants were provided with the TT cell that they were supposed to treat as 
certain. But this acceptability task featured a comparative judgment of the 
acceptability of these three sentences in contrast to the truth and probability tasks, 
where the participants only had to focus on a particular sentence at a time in their 
evaluations. It is possible that these differences in the tasks may need to be taken into 
account in the final interpretation of our results. 
Since the boundary between semantics and pragmatics will feature centrally in 
the interpretation of Chapters 2-4, the next section outlines some of the open issues 
that these results raise. 
 
Semantic and Pragmatic Factors 
In deciding whether the dissociation found in Chapter 4 has implications for whether 
relevance is to be counted as a semantic or a pragmatic factor in the content of 
indicative conditionals, the following questions merit further investigation: 
 
(I) What interpretation of ‘truth’ do the participants have when they provide 
truth evaluations?  
 
The importance of (I) can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that the participants make 
truth value assignments based on an understanding of 'truth' as 'what can be proven 
in principle independent of whether it has actually been proven'. In that case, the 
truth table for negation would no longer be truth functional inasmuch as there would 
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be propositions for which both a proposition and its negation would be 'False'. 
Moreover, for this understanding of truth, '∨' and '⊃' would no longer be truth 
functional, since it can be shown that the truth functionality of '∨' and '⊃' depends on 
the truth functionality of negation (McCawley, 1993: 107ff).   
 Indeed, many other ways of interpreting truth exist. In the philosophical 
literature (Künne, 2005), realistic conceptions of truth (e.g. the correspondence theory 
of truth, “truth is what corresponds to the facts”) are contrasted with epistemic 
concepts of truth (e.g. the coherence theory “truth is what belongs to a maximally 
coherent set of beliefs” or “truth is what all investigators would agree on at the limit of 
an ideal inquiry”), pragmatic theories (“truth is what works”), and with deflationary 
theories (e.g. “the predicate ‘true’ is merely a convenient device for disquotating 
sentences, or a device for forming pro-sentences, which allows us to endorse 
assertions that we would not be able to endorse otherwise (e.g. “the next thing Pete 
says is true”, “Everything the Pope says is true”)).  
 At present it is unknown which understanding of the notion ‘truth’ the 
participants bring to bear on the truth table task. It is unknown whether the different 
truth tables elicited by the participants reflect different notions of truth or diverging 
interpretations of the conditional. And it is moreover unknown whether the 
participants understand the notion of truth in the same way as the semantic theory 
they are being tested according to. 
 Interestingly, Oberauer et al. (2007) found that the same group of participants 
that tend to conform to the de Finetti table in a ternary truth table task tended to 
conform to the material implication in a binary truth table task—although the two 
theories stand as diametrically opposite in the literature. It is thus possible that the 
participants interpret the truth values differently in the two experimental paradigms.  
 Indeed the truth table of the material implication sounds most plausible, if one 
interprets the truth value as indicating consistency. 40  Accordingly, the material 
implication treats the conditional as true in the false antecedent cells, beause the                                                              
40  I thank Christoph Klauer (p. c.) for this observation. 
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falsity of the antecedent is consistent with the truth of the conditional. This might 
account for the fact that the material implication is useful in mathematical and logical 
contexts, where the goal is to keep inconsistency at bay. In line with this idea of the 
material implication as especially suited for mathematics and deductive logic, Rescher 
(2007: 43) points out that what makes the material implication appropriate for these 
contexts is the following link between implications and deducabiltiy that it establishes 
for demonstratively true instances: p ⊢ q iff ⊢ p ⊃ q.41  
In contrast, the de Finetti truth table seems to be most plausible if ‘true’ is 
interpreted as ‘verification’ and ‘falsity’ is interpreted as ‘disconfirmation’. In this 
context, it is interesting to observe that in some experiments cited in favor of the de 
Finetti truth table (like Evans et al., 2007), the instructions explicitly ask for whether a 
truth table cell “conforms” to a conditional rule, “contradicts” it or “is irrelevant” to 
it”, rather than for the truth or falsity of the conditional simpliciter. 
 
(II) What is the relationship between (a) the semantic values invoked by a given 
semantic theory and (b) what the participants are evaluating in a given 
experimental paradigm?  
 
There is some precedence in the linguistic literature for not taking intuitive judgments 
of truth and falsity at face value. For example, von Fintel (2004) and Abrusán and 
Szendrői (2013) have argued that intuitive judgments on presupposition failures42 as 
true or false are influenced by pragmatic factors such as possibility of verification and 
need not represent the sentences’ actual semantic values. Instead, it is argued that it 
is more decisive whether the semantic values assigned would allow us to construct a 
systematic theory of the projection behavior of the linguistic expressions in question. 
Accordingly, in Winter (2016: 20) it is made an empirical adequacy condition of 
theories in formal semantics that they agree—not with the intuitive truth value                                                              
41  However, as Rescher (2007: 44) also points out, a demonstrated true material 
implication in mathematics and deductive logic is in fact a strict implication, ◻(p ⊃ q). 
42  E.g. ‘the Danish Pope is in his midsixties’ carries the false presupposition that there is a 
Danish Pope. 
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judgments—but with the intuitive entailment judgments. If so, then the strong 
tendency to focus on the truth table task in the psychology of reasoning as decisive 
evidence for or against semantic theories may turn out to be misguided.  
 Moreover, semantics for the indicative conditional and other connate epistemic 
expressions exist, which pose constraints on probability distributions as semantic 
values (e.g. Yalcin, 2012; Moss, 2015). Yet constraints on probability distributions do 
not themselves impose truth conditions that can be interpreted as representing ways 
that the world can be. 
 
(III) To avoid a free-license in invoking pragmatics as an explanation of 
divergences from the semantic theory (such as the divergences from the 
Suppositional Theory reported in Chapters 2-3), mechanisms that give rise 
to the pragmatic phenomena need to be posited, which give rise to 
predictions that can be tested independently.   
 
In commenting on the findings from Chapter 2, Over and Cruz (forthcoming) 
suggest that the effect might be pragmatic and not semantic, because there is some 
evidence that relevance also affects conjunctions and disjunctions. The implicit 
assumption is that if relevance is supposed to be part of the semantic content of 
indicative conditionals, then it should serve to distinguish the content of indicative 
conditionals from the semantic content of other connectives. 
 In Chapter 4, we did not investigate disjunctions. But the results on the 
probability assignments to conjunctions indicate that while the probability 
assignments are somewhat higher for the PO condition, there is no evidence for an 
analogous defect to the one reported in Chapter 2, which would make the participants 
assign low probabilities to ‘A & C’ in the IR and NE condition.  
 Moreover, based on Table 1 below, the conjecture could be made that 
disjunctions are most probable for negative relevance items. This is especially 
pronounced for the ‘either… or…’ formulation, which can be read as exclusive 
disjunction—but even for a reading of ‘… or …’ based on inclusive disjunctions, the NE 
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formulations that present the two disjuncts as alternatives seem to be more probable 
than the PO formulations. At any rate, disjunctions don’t seem to exhibit the NE/IR 
defect that was documented for indicative conditionals in Chapter 2. If so, then 
disjunctions have a distinct relevance profile from indicative conditionals, which is not 
captured when one talks indiscriminately about whether ‘disjunctions require a 
connection between the disjuncts’.43 
Table 1. Stimulus Materials, Mark Scenario illustrated with Disjunctions   
                               PO                                                                   NE                                                          IR 
 HH  (Either) Mark presses the on switch 
on his TV OR his TV will be turned 
on  
(Either) Mark lacks an 
appointment with the 
repairman OR his TV will work.  
(Either) Mark is wearing socks 
OR his TV will work.  
 HL  (Either) Mark looks for popcorn OR 
he will be having popcorn.  
(Either) Mark presses the on 
switch on his TV OR his TV will 
be turned off.  
(Either) Mark is wearing socks 
OR his TV will malfunction.  
 LH  (Either) the sales clerk in the local 
supermarket presses the on switch 
on Mark’s TV OR his TV will be 
turned on.  
(Either) Mark pulls the plug on 
his TV OR his TV will be turned 
on.  
(Either) Mark is wearing a dress 
OR his TV will work.  
 LL  (Either) Mark pulls the plug on his 
TV OR his TV will be turned off.  
(Either) Mark refuses to look 
for popcorn OR he will be 
having popcorn.  
(Either) Mark is wearing a dress 
OR his TV will malfunction.  
Note. PO = positive relevance; NE = negative relevance; IR = irrelevance.  
 
However, irrespectively of how this empirical issue is resolved, (III) still suggests 
that if the relevance effect on the probabilistic assessments of indicative conditionals 
is to be declared a pragmatic effect, we need to require that a suitable mechanism is 
specified which will lead to new predictions. 
                                                             
43  However, one source of opposition against the claim that disjunctions have a negative 
relevance profile might be that one takes their meaning to be characterized by the or-
introduction rule in natural deduction, which holds that a disjunction may be introduced in a 
proof whenever one of the disjuncts is true. But even granting this, it could still be argued 
that negative relevance is a conventional implicature of disjunctions which does not affect 
their truth conditional content (just as one way of interpreting the results from Chapter 4 is 
that the reason relation reading is a conventional implicature of indicative conditionals and 
‘therefore’ and ‘but’ sentences, which (almost) does not affect their truth conditional con-
tent). Finally, that there should be a relationship between negative relevance and disjunctions 
is suggested by the fact that there are acceptable instances of inferences from ‘A or C’ to ‘if 
non-A, then C’ (see Skovgaard-Olsen (2016) for a discussion under which conditions such 
inferences are acceptable on a reason relation reading of the conditional). 
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Since Grice (1989) has a maxim of relevance, which Grice never elucidated 
further than “Be relevant!”, it is tempting to invoke it to account for relevance effects 
on indicative conditionals. However, it should be noted that relevance can be assessed 
at different levels and that whereas Grice’s maxim concerns the contribution of 
complete speech acts to a conversational context, the epistemic notion of relevance 
used in Chapters 2-4 concerned the internal relationship between two components in 
a sentence. That these evaluations of relevance can come apart is nicely illustrated by 
the example ‘If it snows in July, the Government will fall’ introduced in Douven 
(2015a). The point is that although this conditional violates the expectation that the 
antecedent is positively relevant for the consequent, there may nevertheless be a 
rhetorical point in making this assertion, which makes the assertion relevant as a 
speech act in the conversation. More specifically, the speaker may be interpreted as 
making the rhetorical point that it is so obvious that the consequent will hold that the 
consequent will hold no matter what happens (and thus even under such absurd 
circumstances as it snowing in July). In Douven (2015b) an argument is moreover 
made that the other Gricean maxims of informative and non-misleading conversation 
do not put us in a better position to account for the influence of relevance on our 
assessments of indicative conditionals. 
Alternatively, other roles that have been assigned to pragmatics could be 
considered. As an example, Carston (2002: ch. 1) argues at some length that the 
semantic content of sentences in itself only suffices to provide a schema for a 
proposition and that processes of pragmatic interpretation apply even before a truth 
conditional content has been determined (by resolving reference assignments, 
ambiguities etc.). However, given that relevance was found only moderately to affect 
the truth evaluations of indicative conditionals in the FF cell in Chapter 4, it is unlikely 
that relevance assessments is a factor that enters directly into determining the 
propositional content of conditionals.  
At this stage, further experiments are needed to determine whether support can 
be found for other pragmatic accounts or whether relevance is part of the 
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probabilistic, semantic content of indicative conditionals. Some initial first steps are 
outlined below. 
 
Outlining Future Studies 
The purpose of this section is to outline some ideas for future studies that will help us 
make progress on the issue of whether to classify the relevance effect on condi-
tionals, reported in Chapter 2, as a pragmatic or semantic phenomenon.44 
One of the characteristics of conversational implicatures is that they can be 
cancelled without contradiction (e.g. the conversational implicature that the event 
described by the second conjunct followed the event described by the first conjunct 
temporally can be cancelled by saying ‘Peter and Ann got married and had a child, but 
not necessarily in that order’). Accordingly, if the relevance effect on conditionals is the 
result of a conversational implicature, it is expected that it should be cancellable 
without giving rise to a contradiction. Accordingly, assertions like ‘If A then C, but A 
does not have anything to do with C’ and ‘If A, then C, but A is not in any way 
connected to C’ should sound fine. 
Furthermore, it is well-known that presuppositions differ from entailments in 
their projection behavior under embeddings (Beaver and Geurts, 2014). In contrast to 
entailments, presuppositions tend to be preserved in embeddings under negation (e.g. 
both the sentence ‘the King of France is bald’ and ‘the King of France is not bald’ 
wrongly presuppose that there is a King of France). Accordingly, if the relevance effect 
on conditionals is a presupposition, then it should be preserved under negations of 
conditionals. In contrast, if a reason relation assessment is part of the semantic value 
of a conditional, then it is to be expected that it interacts with the negation operator 
such that the negation of a conditional is to be understood as denying that A is a 
reason for C (which is true, if, for instance, A is irrelevant for C).  
                                                             
44  In a subsequent study that is not part of this dissertation, experiments to implement 
some of these suggestions have been made (Skovgaard-Olsen, Collins, Krzyżanowska, Hahn, 
Klauer, ms). 
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In Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics for conditionals, the principle of 
Conditional Excluded Middle (⊨ (A → C) or (A → ¬C) is valid and so the following 
negation principle holds: ¬(A → C) ⊨ A → ¬C (Arlo-Costa, 2007). Moreover, the latter 
negation principle has also been invoked by proponents of the Suppositional Theory of 
conditionals to account for compound conditionals by providing paraphrases into 
sentences only containing basic conditionals (for discussion see Skovgaard-Olsen, 
2016). In contrast, on a reason relation reading, it should be possible to negate a 
missing link conditional (e.g. ‘It is not the case that if I will run out of milk tomorrow, 
then Merkel will give a speech about Syrian refugees’) without thereby being 
committed to a conditional that negates the consequent of a conditional (‘if I will run 
out of milk tomorrow, then Merkel will not give a speech about Syrian refugees’).  
Finally, it was suggested in (II) that the semantic value of a linguistic expression 
might depart from its evaluation by our intuitive truth value judgments, if assigning 
that semantic value to the expression allows us to build a compositional semantics 
that correctly accounts for its projection behavior. Accordingly, an avenue of further 
research would be into whether the internal relevance relations in sentences play a 
role in composing the semantic content of complex sentences in which they appear. In 
particular, the embedding behavior of conditionals under relevance conditionals could  
be investigated by examining principles such as the so-called Import-Export principle 
(A → (B → C) ↔ (A & B) → C). The Import-Export principle has been used by 
proponents of the Equation to account for right-nested conditionals (for discussion, 
see Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016) and it is also accepted as a valid argument schema by 
other conditional logics in the literature (see Arlo-Costa, 2007). However, on a reason 
relation reading of the conditional, counterexamples to the Import-Export principle 
can be found. 
For instance, in the Sophia scenario cited in Chapter 2, one of the positive 
relevance conditionals sounded as follows: ‘If Tim receives an orc costume, then he 
will be excited about his present’. But given that we have already accepted that 
conditional we might be inclined to accept the following slightly strange conditional as 
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well ‘If Tim receives an orc costume, and Sophia regularly wears shoes, then Tim will 
be excited about his present’. For in spite of the fact that that added italicized 
conjunct is irrelevant for the consequent, the first conjunct remains probability raising 
for the consequent, and thus the conjunction in the antecedent as a whole remains 
probability raising for the consequent. However, accepting the latter conditional 
would not incline us to accept the following conditional, which is entailed according to 
the Import-Export Principle:  ‘If Tim receives an orc costume, then Tim will be excited 
about his present, if Sophia regularly wears shoes’. The reason is, of course, that the 
added italicized sentence is not probability raising for the sentence stating that Tim 
will be excited about his present. Accordingly, the reason relation reading gives us a 
general recipe for generating counterexamples to the Import-Export Principle, which 
could be investigated empirically to shed light on the question of whether the internal 
relevance of the parts in a sentence enters as a factor in composing the content of 
complex sentences. 
 
Argument for Semantic Defect 
In Skovgaard-Olsen (2016) arguments were presented for counting relevance part of 
the semantic content of indicative conditionals. Here I would like to focus on a 
particular argument, which focuses on the cognitive utility of the linguistically encoded 
content of normal conditionals and points out that missing-link conditionals are 
semantically defective, because they have a literal content that prevents them from 
fulfilling this cognitive role. In stating the argument, it was pointed out that the defect 
of missing link conditionals could not be limited to violations of Gricean norms, 
because Gricean norms pertain to conversational contexts, and missing-link 
conditionals are prevented from fulfilling the cognitive role of normal conditionals 
even in individual reasoning. In particular, it was pointed out that the appeal to 
indicative conditionals as “inference tickets” that give the right to infer the consequent 
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from the antecedent is blocked for missing link conditionals both in conversational 
contexts and in individual reasoning.  
Here I would like to extend this argument by pointing to further aspects of the 
cognitive role of conditionals in individual reasoning which are blocked for missing link 
conditionals, because they require conditionals to express reason relations.  
As explained in Chapter 1, according to the Suppositional Theory of conditionals 
the word ‘if’ is to be understood through its role in hypothetical thought of initiating 
imagination and simulation of possibilities (Evans and Over, 2004; Evans, 2007). This 
type of mental simulation is thought to play a central role in entertaining hypotheses, 
forecasting future events, and supporting decision making by imagining the 
consequences of alternative courses of action (Evans, Handley, Neilens, and Over, 
2007). All of these mental processes are without doubt central to human thought and 
they have frequently been presented in the philosophical literature as relying on 
conditional reasoning. 
 A further central role of conditional reasoning is in argumentation, where 
inferential relations can be expressed by means of conditionals, which are often 
compared with ‘condensed arguments’ (Rescher, 2007; Krzyżanowska, 2015). 
 Now when Inferentialism puts the focus on conditionals’ role in expressing 
reason relations is it then committed to denying the central role of conditionals in 
hypothetical thought as emphasized by the Suppositional Theory? No, because 
missing-link conditionals are just as useless in explanatory reasoning, forecasting, and 
decision making as they are in argumentation. When considering alternative 
explanatory hypotheses, predicting the future, and computing consequences of 
alternative courses of action, the agent needs to make assessment of which 
propositions are probability raising or probability lowering for other propositions. 
Because hypothetical thought is unbounded in that it can transcend the here and now 
and consider even remote possibilities of which there are infinite alternatives, 
propositions that don’t make a probabilistic difference to the propositions of interest 
need to be set aside as irrelevant. It is a sign of rationality in hypothetical thought that 
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probabilistic dependencies are respected even if the basis of the reflection may depart 
from the actual course of events. 
 The point should be evident. But to illustrate, suppose the color of the socks 
of Stalin stood in the center of explanatory reasoning aimed at resolving why 
Operation Barbarossa turned out to be an utter failure, that the color of the socks of 
Angela Merkel was used to predict the outlines of the next European treaty, or that 
the premier minister of a European country used the color of the socks of other 
European leaders to calculate the consequences of alternative courses of actions 
guiding his/her decision making. The thought is so absurd that it is hard to take 
seriously.45 
 What this illustrates is that the mental processes of suppositional reasoning 
are only useful as long as only hypotheses that preserve probabilistic dependencies 
are considered. In the Default and Penalty Hypothesis the conditional probability is per 
default proccesed in the PO condition as a way of assessing the sufficiency of the 
reason relation. As long as only probability raising scenarios are considered, the 
Ramsey test is an effective mental algorithm for engaging in hypothetical thought. 
However, if there are no constraints on which hypotheses it is applied to, then it will 
not in itself help us explain past events, predict the future, or decide among 
alternative courses of action.  
 In Rescher’s (2007: 75) words: “conditionals effectively summarize the result 
of hypothetical inferences”. And in making hypothetical inferences we are, of course, 
constrained by probabilistic dependencies that govern all other types of thought. 
 However, even if such reflections suggest that irrelevance is a semantic defect 
of conditionals, the jury is still out on empirically determining its precise nature. In 
Skovgaard-Olsen (2016), it was tentatively suggested that epistemic relevance could 
                                                             
45  It is, of course, possible to restore sense in such examples by creating elaborate 
scenarios, where factors that initially appear irrelevant turn out surprisingly to be relevant 
after all. However, what this shows is not that probabilistic dependency plays no role for 
hypothetical thought but rather that it is so important for hypothetical thought that we invest 
substantial cognitive effort into restoring it. 
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be thought of as part of the sense-dimension of meaning characterizing its cognitive 
role.46  In Chapter 4, we have seen a stark dissociation between the effect of relevance 
on probability and truth evaluations of indicative conditionals. Since presuppositions 
and conventional implicatures are distinguished by whether there is a dependency on 
their failure on the truth conditions of the sentences in which they occur (Potts, 2015), 
the arrow presently points in the direction of conventional implicatures. This 
conjecture is also supported by the linguistic arguments in McCawley (1993: ch. 15).    
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